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Abstract 
 
What is effort and why do we value it? This thesis examines various ways in which 
effort has been used to answer questions of distributive justice. I begin with effort’s role as 
the unique legitimate basis for justifying differences in the deserts people receive. This role 
focuses on either the burdens associated with effort, so that it is only when we try hard 
and suffer disutility that we deserve anything; or else it is because our effort is the only 
part of our person for which we can be held responsible. I then discuss the legitimacy of 
the demand for specifically productive reciprocal effort in light of a society’s institutional 
structure meeting certain thresholds of justice. I find problems with all three of these 
approaches because they miss important ways in which we use and understand effort in 
the course of our lives. 
 I examine the uses to which we put effort, developing a more inductive approach 
which draws on a particular reading of the concept of burden developed in the first half of 
the thesis. What are the costs associated with trying hard to do something and why are 
they important to how our lives go? I then frame this by a particular account of a character 
I call the ‘craftsman’. This is someone who enjoys a particularly ‘costly’ way of living. The 
craftsman desires to achieve a depth in her life that is negatively affected by contemporary 
social and economic demands. Finally, I propose an unconditional basic income as a means 
to protect the craftsman and the agitator, an additional character identified in response to 
the discussion on reciprocity, who helps us collectively approach the thresholds identified 
in the third chapter. 
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Introduction: Why do we Care about Effort? 
The subject of this thesis is effort. In everyday life, our efforts are seen as something over 
which we have a significant amount of control. Whatever happens to us – short of crippling 
disease, catastrophic material deprivations and death – we can always try to make things 
better for ourselves. It is simultaneously the least that is asked of us and the most that can 
be expected. The intangibility and expansiveness of our propensities to expend effort, the 
fact that we can always try harder, is something that distinguishes it from our skills and 
talent. The talents we have, the families we are born into, the first language we speak and 
the colours of our skin are all accidents of birth and beyond the reach of our efforts to 
change. Effort then has a distinct status marking it from these other aspects of the person. 
Taking into account various important qualifications and caveats, effort has often been 
closely connected with individual responsibility. It is through our efforts and only our 
efforts that we can be said to deserve anything because it is only for this that we are 
responsible.  
There are two different ways in which this notion of desert can be cashed out. First, 
we can be said to deserve things on account of the costs and burdens we assume. The fact 
that a person performs a particularly difficult or loathsome task which produces some 
benefits for others means that that person is entitled to some form of compensation. 
Where no cost can be shown to have been borne then no desert can be said to be 
forthcoming. We are not responsible for our talents and passion which reduce the costs of 
effort. Neither are we responsible for our efforts all the way down: our ability to expend 
effort is also in part a result of genetic and social fortune. However, so this account has it, 
this effort-expending ability – unlike talent – admits of far less inequality across persons. It 
is once we remove talent and passion from our account that we arrive at the proper basis 
of desert, namely the costs created by effort. By compensating costs, individuals are 
restored to some kind of initial balance according to that for which they are responsible.   
The second approach designates effort as proximate to the person’s moral centre. 
Effort is that over which people exercise significant control and for which they are thus 
responsible. However, unlike the above account, this does not imply that only costs borne 
are to be rewarded. Instead, this approach tracks the division between the parts of people 
that are explained by their efforts – and thus qualify as choices – and the other parts which 
are more appropriately described as aspects of circumstance and do not admit of choice. 
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Inequalities between people can only be justified by reference to the efforts/choices a 
person makes because it is this and only this for which a person can be held accountable.     
An alternative way in which effort is important, one not revolving around questions 
of desert, is as a response to other people’s efforts. By sharing in the benefits of economic, 
social and political cooperation we are obligated to contribute to those schemes. Effort is 
that by which we claim entitlement to social goods. Working sufficiently hard we gain 
access to a portion of the goods produced by social cooperation. This productive effort is 
also a fulfilment of an expectation that we recognise and reciprocate the same efforts 
made by others. If we enjoy the benefits of cooperative endeavour we are obliged to 
contribute to that endeavour. To do otherwise in situations of sufficient fairness, so this 
position has it, is to be parasitic, to fail to fulfil one’s ethical duties and treat contributing 
others with insufficient respect. 
Broadly speaking, these strands can all be incorporated into the paradigm of 
distributive justice. The first and second use effort as an answer to the question of who 
gets what and why, whether it be because of the costs a person assumes or the isolation of 
some deserving – because controlled – part of the self. The third uses effort as an answer 
to the question of what we owe to one another as cooperating members of a society. As 
the policy proposal which concludes the thesis makes clear, I do not leave this paradigm 
and so neither do I entirely leave these questions behind.  
However, the current answers to those distributive questions are too limited in 
their understanding of the relation between effort and cost, responsibility, reciprocity and 
obligation. In the second part of the thesis I develop a different account of how we use 
effort and why it is important to us. I focus on the processes by which we use effort to 
develop the commitments, relationships and projects that matter to us. Contemporary 
studies of effort have paid insufficient attention to these processes. It is from this 
alternative focus that I develop my distributive proposal for an unconditional basic income.  
Who Gets what and Why? 
Effort has often been used to provide the answer to the question of who deserves what. 
There are two distinct strands to this treatment of effort. First, there is the idea that how 
hard one tries is synonymous with the extent of the costs one assumes and, this in turn, 
determines how much one is owed in terms of compensation. From this distributive 
perspective whatever else effort is and however much we might enjoy its expenditure we 
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must not factor such considerations into our designations of desert. Our passions and 
talents, from this perspective, are not our responsibility and so should not be allowed to 
influence deserts.   
At work in this account of effort is the vision of society as an arrangement of 
collective benefits and burdens: when a burden is felt by an individual so must a 
concomitant benefit be forthcoming to rectify that disutility.1 Effort only functions as a 
basis of desert when it expresses an actual burden.2 Absent this sense of burden or 
disutility, effort does not qualify as a relevant consideration when deciding on an answer to 
the question of who deserves what: to reward someone for something they already enjoy 
is to reward them again for something they have done nothing to deserve. 
Effort is thus almost entirely conflated with disutility. This perhaps rings true with 
how a great many individuals regard their work or the work of others. The intuition seems 
to be that the more loathsome a task, the more money should be forthcoming as a way of 
recognising those costs and that loathsomeness. Where talent and passion for a particular 
activity are present, the rewards are already at work and nothing need be done to correct 
the situation.  
There is a moral foundation underlying this general account of desert. The very 
skilled and talented amongst us can be enormously productive with little effort. However, 
such productivity lacks costs. Where a lesser mortal must struggle at the books for hours on 
end, this burden simply does not occur for others who simply breeze through homework 
and ace their exams. These ultra-talented, however, cannot appeal to the burdens or costs 
of their excellence precisely because it has come too easy: there is no desert claim that can 
be legitimately made and thus no reward that should be forthcoming. It is only where we 
face difficulties that desert becomes relevant. What is to count as a burden is of course an 
open question and likely to lead to some controversy. For example, the ‘burdens’ of 
responsibility and the risks of the marketplace are to some a boon, to others a nightmare. 
Similarly, the sociality of the workplace is oppression for some and a joy to others.3   
An alternative to this exclusive focus on ‘costs’ is to ground questions of desert in 
the notion of ‘choice’. This involves a more generous notion of moral responsibility for 
                                                          
1
 See Wojciech Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985). See also Alan Zaitchik, 
‘On Deserving to Deserve’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6:4 (1977) pp. 370-388. 
2
 Sadurski, Giving Desert its Due, p 116. 
3
 Sadurski includes effort, risk, responsibility inconvenience and sacrifice in his account. Ibid.  
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one’s activity: we are responsible for what we choose rather than what we suffer. Two 
prominent thinkers who have contributed to this stream of thought are Ronald Dworkin 
and G.A. Cohen.4 Both thinkers create a division within people between choices and 
circumstance: a choice is something for which a person can be held responsible whereas 
circumstances mitigate responsibility. Dworkin’s description of ambition is especially crucial 
to his account. He assigns ‘tastes and ambitions’ to the person whilst assigning ‘physical 
and mental powers’ to circumstance.5 Cohen’s division leaves even less to the choice side 
suggesting that some of our tastes should be designated as circumstantial.6 Both are 
agreed, however, that there is some part of a person’s activity that can properly be 
described as belonging to the person and it is only this which can justify inequalities. To 
allow inequality for any other reason is to illegitimately and arbitrarily reward those parts 
of a person over which no responsibility can be claimed.  
Effort is here employed as the device by which we can measure and compare that 
for which people are responsible. This need not imply that only efforts considered 
burdensome can be the basis of desert. This alternative approach stipulates only that we 
have to choose something – rather than suffer it – in order for it to be considered deserving. 
Where there is equal effort between people then they are said to be equally responsible 
and thus require equal reward. Of course, some of our efforts are down to our upbringing 
and are even genetically pre-determined. As a result, we lack effective control over these 
parts of our efforts.7 How is it possible, in that case, to glean from this mixture of 
contingent circumstance and real choice that part of effort which is somehow reflective of 
a responsible self? 
The most sophisticated and developed account of how this ‘gleaning’ might take 
place is provided by John Roemer’s account of equality of opportunity.8 As with other 
                                                          
4
 G.A. Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics, 99:4 (1989); Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign 
Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) esp. pp. 11-119 (the ‘What is Equality?’ essays) & pp. 
285-303 (‘Equality and Capability’).  See also Richard Arneson, ‘Equality and Equality Opportunity of 
Welfare’, Philosophical Studies, 56:1 (1989) pp. 77-93; Will Kymlicka, ‘Left Liberalism Revisited’ in 
Christine Sypnowich, Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G.A. Cohen (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006).  
5
 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p 81. Cohen takes a similar position in his critique of Rawls. See Cohen, 
‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, p 915. 
6
 These disagreements, in part, stem from a controversy regarding what ‘tastes’ or preferences for 
which a person can be held responsible. See for example Dworkin, ‘Equality & Capability’, pp. 291 – 
296 & G. A. Cohen, ‘Expensive Tastes Ride Again’, On The Currency of Egalitarian Justice and other 
essays in political philosophy (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011). pp. 81 – 115.      
7
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Belknap Press, 1999) p 89. 
8
 John Roemer, Equality of Opportunity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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thinkers who could broadly be labelled ‘luck egalitarians’, Roemer wishes to introduce 
responsibility into egalitarian discussions of justice: any inequalities that are allowed to 
occur between individuals have to be justified by reference to individual responsibility and 
deservingness as opposed to contingent and circumstantial advantages or disadvantages.  
However, where Cohen only recognises the difficulties of the morass surrounding the ‘free 
will’ problem and Dworkin attempts to deal with it through the abstract mechanism of the 
insurance market, Roemer takes the plunge and provides an actual real world policy to 
motivate and activate the cut between circumstance and choice. By adopting Roemer’s 
methodology it becomes possible, so he argues, to isolate effort from the warp and flux of 
circumstance. His approach provides access to the responsibility-making part of the person 
and thereby allows us to reward people according to their deserts. By navigating the 
‘morass’ of the free will problem in this way, effort functions as an answer to the question 
of ‘who gets what’.  
What do we owe to One Another? 
An alternative to the above concerns with costs and responsibility is the role effort 
performs responding to other people’s efforts. Effort becomes a sign of recognition that, 
given the benefits we accrue from other’s productive efforts, we are obliged to respond in 
like fashion. Where we are able, we too are obliged to work hard for the good of others.9 
On this account, the matter of determining for which parts of our activity we can be held 
responsible is no longer of primary significance. No longer is effort being used as that part 
of our person for which we can claim deserts. It is instead a manifestation of the regard and 
respect we owe our fellow-citizens.    
Importantly, this question of what we owe others must first be set against a 
sufficiently fair background, the conditions of which Stuart White describes as constituting 
a ‘civic minimum’.10 In the absence of this civic minimum the demand to reciprocate the 
efforts of others is either reduced or, in extreme cases, even eliminated.11 The civic 
minimum includes, amongst other things, a minimally secured standard of living, non-
discrimination and the possibility of one’s work being a site of meaningful activity. When 
these conditions are adequately furnished for people their ‘integrity interests’ are 
                                                          
9
 Although the level of appropriate, reciprocating effort is dependent on the capacities of the 
individual which will of course vary. See for example, Stuart White, ‘Should Talent be Taxed’ in 
Catriona McKinnon & Iain Hampsher-Monk, eds., The Demands of Citizenship (London: Continuum, 
2000) pp. 70-90. Stuart White, The Civic Minimum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p 79-85.  
10
 White, The Civic Minimum, p 90.  
11
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice p 302. 
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sufficiently protected and the means to live a full and dignified life are provided. By 
partaking in the collective, mutually-produced goods of their community, people are 
thereby obliged to respond with their own productive efforts. In other words, they are 
obliged to assume the responsibilities and burdens that are assumed by others.  
Questions of responsibility and the isolation of some controlled part of the self is 
not the concern here. The overriding concern is no longer with making sure that individuals 
are allotted their due according to effort expended. The intention is instead to make sure 
that obligations and entitlements are properly distributed and fulfilled by the concerted 
efforts of all those who enjoy the fruits of cooperation. Of course, one’s internal capacities 
are still a measure of what one owes since the stipulation is that one should expend 
according to one’s capacity to contribute.12 But this capacity is not used in such a way as to 
measure one’s deserts. Capacities are used to measure what one owes to those with whom 
are shared the productive burdens of political and economic community.  
In short, where from the perspective of desert effort is an almost exclusively 
internal phenomenon, descriptive of some part of the person’s moral constitution, here the 
concern is with the justness of relations between people. It focuses on the legitimacy of 
background conditions against which people relate to one another as fellow citizens and 
workers. Where these conditions do not conform to some specified minimum standard, the 
effort of workers and citizens cannot be legitimately demanded.  
What do we do with effort? 
However, each of the above approaches has significant shortfalls in their treatment of 
effort. To begin with, the notion of burden that collapses it into disutility does not take into 
account the true complexity of that concept. There is first the obvious difficulty in defining 
hardships in such a way that covers all possible understandings of an activity as toilsome. 
Given the subjective nature of disutility, what device can we use to measure people’s 
different experiences of burden so that they can be cashed out in desert claims? Moreover, 
if disutility was to be the main part of a life, this would not obviously issue in a call for 
desert or even compensation. Rather, it is a call for redress of a more substantive kind, 
reducing that hardship as opposed to dishing out money by way of an apology or 
expression of desert.        
                                                          
12
 Indeed, White alludes to the Marxist maxim of ‘from each according to his ability to each 
according to his need’ as a motivating impulse of his proposal. White, The Civic Minimum, pp. 50 – 
53. 
13 
 
However, there is a deeper and more interesting shortfall. Any account of burden 
which collapses it into being nothing more than a synonym for disutility fails to do justice to 
the value that often accompanies burden. In so ‘collapsing’, it abstracts from the complex 
ways in which our well-being and the commitments, projects and relationships we invest 
ourselves in and which are the source of that well-being, are in actual fact constituted by 
burdens. In deciding what to do with our time and energy, we are unavoidably making 
decisions as to the relationships, projects and commitments which are going to matter to 
us. It is through these decisions regarding what to do with our time and energy that we add 
weight to our lives and give them meaning. However, the flip-side to this weight is the cost 
it implies. 13 
  When effort is wrapped up in these projects it is, by its very nature, cost incurring 
because of what it forecloses for the individual. As George Sher puts it: ‘A fortiori, 
steadfastly pursuing an outcome requires foregoing many other activities that one would 
find pleasant or worthwhile’.14 But how are these ‘costs’ and burdens to be factored into a 
desert claim? It makes a mockery of the constitutive value of our commitments and 
relationships that they should be eligible for some kind of compensation. The vocabulary of 
desert/compensation is incapable of handling this aspect of our effort precisely because of 
the narrow way it treats burdens as synonymous with hardship or disutility.   
By focussing on effort as a proxy for that for which we are responsible and thus as 
the ground of our moral deserts, John Roemer’s methodology avoids this problem of 
defining and measuring costs. However, there remain a number of problems with his 
approach. First, Roemer’s notion of control is itself problematic. The overall account 
requires that we confine our understanding of responsibility to a particularly strong 
account of control: we are only responsible for that which we can control. How can we be 
sure that what we measure is the result of some autonomously taken effort as opposed to 
some good fortune that has befallen an individual? The mere possession of a library card, a 
neighbour who introduces us to a particular passion or the presence of a diligent 
grandparent can make all the difference to an individual’s fate. But sifting through this data, 
extracting from it a picture of some centre that is representative of the self is exceptionally 
difficult. How can we be sure that what we are measuring is really a person’s effort?  
                                                          
13
 George Sher, Desert (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987) pp. 53 – 68. 
14
 Ibid. p 60. 
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What is more, this pursuit of the part of a person which incurs responsibility 
abstracts from the effects environments can have on people. Roemer takes circumstances 
into consideration but only as that part of people’s activity which must be controlled for 
and then put aside. But the effects of circumstance, the ways in which they impact on 
individuals’ ability to take responsibility for their action, the ends they set for themselves 
and the ways in which they confront opportunities, are not things that can be easily 
accounted for. In other words, the subjective experience of effort is altogether missing from 
this account of responsibility. Effort is instead treated as something that can be read off 
from a person’s actions and choices in an objective way. It is then used to make 
comparisons between people who might be situated in possibly radically different ways. In 
attempting to find within the person some ‘sterile’ residual called effort it assumes a 
similarity that I argue might not be there.      
Understanding effort within the context of discussions on reciprocity is a way of 
moving beyond these attempts to find answers to the sticky question of where choice and 
responsibility begin and circumstance ends. What is more, this approach is better able to 
deal with the subjective experience of disutility. When certain minimums are met, such 
that work cannot be regarded as overly laborious, dull or dangerous, then a person’s 
attitude regarding the fulfilment of their productive contributions is essentially ignored.15 If 
someone simply does not enjoy work that has been made sufficiently appealing and 
continues to enjoy the benefits of cooperation, her complaints will neither excuse her 
idleness nor issue in legitimate claims for compensation.   
The thresholds specified by White’s ‘civic minimum’ act as a way of saying ‘If you 
enjoy the benefits provided by the work of others in your community then you are obliged, 
in a way commensurate with your ability, to contribute to production of those benefits for 
others’. This focus on obligation is therefore a more political treatment of effort. By this I 
mean that it is no longer with reference to philosophical questions of ultimate moral 
responsibility that effort is being used as an answer. Instead, effort is employed in a 
twofold fashion. First, it is something that can only be demanded of someone after certain 
basic conditions are fulfilled which, in being met, accord to the person the dignity that is 
her due. And second, that the establishment of these just minimums is not only a provision 
but also a demand. Individuals who benefit from social cooperation are obliged to make 
sufficient productive effort in order to sustain the justice of those background conditions.  
                                                          
15
 White, The Civic Minimum, p 90. 
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However, in a situation where these thresholds and minimums are a long way from 
being instituted, there is something problematic in treating productive contributions as the 
way in which people respond to the demands made on them as a result of enjoying 
benefits produced by other people’s efforts. Focusing exclusively on productive 
contributions fails to adequately capture the breadth and complexity of the demands of 
real social, economic and political life, i.e. demands not as they appear in the realm of ideal 
theory but in the actual world. What are not considered are other potential obligations that 
issue from the actual world, and the other metrics, aside from productivity, which can be 
used to measure the contributions individuals make. 
Indeed, there may be cause to baulk against the demand for productive 
contributions in cases of injustice and to fly in the face of demands to reciprocate like-for-
like. In certain situations, it may be necessary to resist the draw to contribute productively 
and use our efforts and energies to disrupt current practices that do operate (in some 
minimal sense) in terms of reciprocity. These are the efforts of what I call the agitator. 
Historically, the agitator is not immediately regarded as someone engaged in reciprocating 
efforts. And, indeed, given the disruptive nature of those efforts they are not even strictly 
reciprocal in their intentions. Their efforts are directed toward the reconstitution of 
relations of exchange and can thus conflict with the demands that reciprocal exchanges 
make of people. If we are to fully appreciate the historical contingency and processes of 
development typical of the social movements within which agitators play a crucial part 
articulating and bringing us closer to standards like White’s, we need to avoid the overly 
conservative concern with the sustaining dimension of productive contributions and 
reciprocity. 
As a result of this failure to capture the complexity of effort in its personal, political 
and social function, this account succumbs to a certain narrowness of treatment. Effort 
might no longer be reduced to being a proxy for costs suffered or desert-producing control. 
But a reductive tendency remains when effort is used as a proxy for productive or 
economic contributions. Rather than limit our understanding of effort to a relation of 
reciprocity that is almost exclusively cashed out in terms of productive contribution, I argue 
that we need to broaden our understanding of the uses of effort as they pertain to our 
relations with others.16 This includes incorporating a wider sense of the obligations we have 
                                                          
16
 White does expand the meaning of these obligations later on in his work to include the obligations 
and duties of citizens. See Stuart White, 'Markets, Time and Citizenship.’ Renewal, 12:3 (2004) pp. 
50-63 and Stuart White, ‘Property-Owning Democracy and Republican Citizenship’, in Martin O’Neill, 
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to one another and of the demands that are made of us as cooperating members of our 
communities. I couple this with a more expansive understanding of exactly what it is we do 
with our efforts, the lives which we build out of them and the value and meaning we are 
thereby able to enjoy through them. 
Value and the Craftsman    
My thesis is first a rejection of the desire to use effort as a means by which we solve 
decisions of just distribution, i.e. providing resources according to how much effort people 
make. Second, I wish to broaden the above account of the demands that issue from our 
obligations to others. As part of this strategy, I analyse the demands made of individuals in 
real, contemporary life as opposed to some ideal, normative variant of the form those 
demands should take in situations of sufficient justice. Specifically, I want to focus on the 
demandingness of value, the time and energies it (more often than not) takes to get 
particularly good at something and for that something to be deeply meaningful for a person. 
I couple this with a description of how changes in the way we work – a particularly 
prominent demand that is made of people – have impacted on our ability to live particular 
kinds of life.  
I therefore embrace a somewhat inductive approach. Rather than figure out what 
questions we want effort to answer and then try and grapple with how we bring those 
answers to fruition, I attend first to what effort actually does for us in the course of our 
lives. I therefore avoid the overly reductionist tendency to abstract effort into a proxy 
through which other things, desert or reciprocity, are able to make sense. By avoiding these 
tendencies, I gain a fuller picture of the uses and meanings that effort is able to have for 
the individuals doing the expending. By starting with what effort does for us we are better 
able to appreciate what effort is being prevented from doing for us. It is this line of 
reasoning which I then use to advocate for a particular distributive proposal, that of an 
unconditional basic income.   
I attend first to a refinement and expansion of the term ‘burden’ as developed 
above. Burden is used to describe the ways in which the decisions we make and the efforts 
we expend are also decisions about what, for want of time and resources, we do not do. In 
deciding to be a teacher, for example, there is a multiplicity of other things I cannot (and 
will not ever) do. We have only so much time to live and so much energy to expend and we 
                                                                                                                                                                    
& Thad Williamson, eds., Property Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2012) pp. 129-146. 
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therefore want our decisions to be the right ones. Roemer’s typology method is unable to 
include this qualitative dimension of effort. Since this methodology aims at an exclusively 
objective handling of effort it cannot compute people’s subjective understandings and uses 
of effort.17 What people think they are doing with their efforts, how they understand their 
decisions and actions, are aspects of effort that the methodology cannot handle. 
What we do when we expend effort in pursuit of things we have reason to value is 
a complex process. It involves using our effort to develop a particular relation with the 
practices we find in our surrounding contexts. Practices are any form of shared activity 
whose shape is defined by a certain pattern of dos and don’ts.18 Our involvement with 
these practices comes in two parts. First, we require a habituated involvement with the 
standards, those patterns of ‘dos and don’ts’, which determine what counts as good and 
bad instances of activity for that practice. It is alongside this habituation that people 
develop the expertise necessary to approximate those standards.19 Second, it also requires 
a degree of subjection to the authority of the practice, to the standards as they currently 
exist and to the practitioners who approximate and embody them. Both habituated 
involvement and subjection to authority are necessary for deep and long-term engagement 
with practices. But this depth is not an a priori possibility: we cannot deeply involve 
ourselves in practices simply because we are human beings or because our cultures are rich 
with an historical inventory of practices.20 The quality of this engagement can be degraded 
or even annihilated as a sociological possibility.   
Our involvement with valuable practices does not occur within a vacuum. Such 
practice-involvement must contend with the other demands characteristic of economic and 
social life. These demands, however, are not necessarily conducive to the demands of deep 
practice engagement. In responding to the demands of work, for example, we are not 
necessarily given the time and space to properly engage with some practice – either inside 
or outside of the workplace – that we find valuable. Increasingly flexible and insecure 
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labour markets are symptomatic of the quality of these demands: where a worker must 
constantly move between different kinds of job, perhaps moving house and postcode in the 
meantime, the whole foundation of a life is unsettled. As a consequence of that, depth is 
made a more and more remote possibility.  
I argue that contemporary economic demands reduce the possibility for the deeper 
kinds of engagement I describe through the character of the ‘craftsman’. This is a person 
who uses his or her effort to properly habituate to the demands of a valuable practice and 
subject themselves to the authority and expertise of other craftsmen (both dead and alive) 
who have informed the evolution and development of the rules and standards of a practice. 
Craftsmanship is predicated on a certain amount of stability and ‘ontological security’ in a 
person’s life.21 However, our current epoch makes more available and celebrates the 
character of the ‘dilettante’. This is someone who trades in the depth of the craftsman for a 
greater degree of breadth. Where secure careers and living conditions allowed for a degree 
of security and longevity in previous epochs, today these things are under increasing threat. 
Craftsmanship is turned into a riskier form of engagement by this threat, precisely 
because of the depth it implies: the deeper one goes into a practice, the more one commits 
to those processes described above and the more it comes to matter to a person (the more 
she identifies with the ‘craft’), the greater the loss that occurs when involvement with that 
practice is cut short. The craftsman is an example of a particularly vulnerable way of being 
and this is exaggerated by changes to the current economic system that promote the need 
and value of flexibility.   
Vulnerability, so Harry Frankfurt argues, is a necessary part of value.22 In order to 
live valuable lives the things we do must expose us to the possibility of profound loss. 
However, I argue that this is not strictly true. Vulnerability and value are actually quite 
distinct. We can live lives that we consider valuable without the frailty and risk implied by 
vulnerability. Someone who makes sure they cannot really be too deeply affected by the 
loss of any given project or relationship is not then utterly unable to live a life of meaning, 
purpose and value. Such a proposition smacks of an overly prescriptive perfectionism as to 
what is to count as valuable and meaningful, excluding a great deal of what some might 
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reasonably consider worthwhile. What is proscribed by overt vulnerability, however, is 
depth: vulnerability is therefore better described as the counterpart to depth and not value.  
So I do not suggest, as a certain kind of perfectionist might, that unless we are 
sufficiently deep our efforts lack value. Our efforts will still involve us in practices to some 
minimum degree, thereby allowing for valuable activity. But I do argue that depth, as a 
counterpart to vulnerability, is an important aspect of an overall plurality of value that 
should be preserved as a possibility for people. If the dilettante is the only mode of feasible 
engagement, something critical has been lost. By thus attending to the demands that are 
made of individuals’ efforts, in a sense that expands on White’s description of contributory 
obligations, we are able to appreciate the real impact of those demands on the possibilities 
and opportunities that confront people.  
In addition, by leaving behind the metaphysical questions of desert and the 
location of some responsibility-making part of the self, I attend instead to individuals’ 
actual uses and understandings of the effort they invest in their pursuit of meaningful ways 
to spend their time and expend their energies. This adds a more nuanced, subjective 
dimension to our appreciation of effort, allowing us to gain a sense of the actual challenges, 
tribulations and injustices that face people in the course of their lives.   
I argue one way of protecting this depth is through a policy of unconditional basic 
income (UBI). UBI is a stream of income provided equally to all qualifying members of a 
political community without regard for their employment status or the volume of their 
wealth. The income should be at least high enough to support a minimum standard of 
living.23 This proposed income would empower individuals to renegotiate and challenge 
contemporary economic and social demands from within a position of relative security, 
without fear of significant drops in their and their families’ standards of living. It is in this 
way a means to facilitate the deeper kinds of engagement characteristic of the craftsman 
and thereby preserve a plurality in possible forms of engagement. In addition, UBI can be 
used to fund and protect the agitators described in chapter 3. People who are in work they 
find degrading or exploitative can ensure a reasonable standard of living while they 
campaign for changes.  
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Outlines of Chapters 
In chapter 1 I provide a background of debates surrounding the status of effort. I begin the 
discussion of effort’s relation to responsibility and the ways in which it has often been used 
a proxy for our moral deserts. I pay particularly close critical attention to certain 
unsophisticated accounts of burden that fail to take into account the constitutive aspects of 
burden which cannot be collapsed into simple descriptions of disutility. In trying to link 
effort up to a compensatory paradigm that rewards people for the disutility they suffer, it 
does damage both to the notion of desert and, more importantly, to the ways in which we 
actually use and understand our efforts. We do not regard those constitutive burdens as 
worthy of reward or compensation in and of themselves. Rather, they are the very burdens 
out of which we hope to build meaningful lives. 
In chapter 2 I focus exclusively on the methodology and model developed by John 
Roemer. I first describe his methodology, which is both ambitious and complex, before 
moving onto a critique of its assumptions and the account of responsibility it relies on. First, 
I interrogate the comparisons that Roemer makes between individuals who face vastly 
different opportunities and life chances. I suggest that although the methodology purports 
to isolate something ‘autonomous’ from the individual (what he calls effort), in actual fact, 
these techniques miss important qualitative distinctions between the efforts of different 
situated person. Given these differences, the comparisons across ‘types’ are unable to 
properly account for the real meanings effort has for individuals who face either 
disadvantage or privilege in the course of their lives. Finally, I motivate a different account 
of responsibility that does not track so closely the metric of control which lies at the heart 
of Roemer’s method. This alternative view of responsibility draws instead on the evaluative 
capacities of individuals. This introduces a subjective element into discussions of 
responsibility and draws on people’s own understanding of the meanings that their effort 
has for them. It is this sense of the experience of what we are able to with effort, the 
challenges we face in confronting opportunities and choices, that thus becomes the basis of 
responsibility.      
In chapter 3 I focus on the ways in which we use effort to reciprocate the efforts 
and productive contributions of others. This chapter signals a move away from the issues of 
the self and toward an account of the relations between individuals in society. I first 
describe White’s account of the thresholds that need to be met before people can be 
demanded to contribute to production. I supplement this with White’s description as to 
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what is to count as reciprocal effort once those thresholds have been met. In light of the 
distance between actual political reality and an ideally theorised situation, a currently 
overlooked character, the ‘agitator’, becomes an important part of the political landscape. 
In non-ideal, political reality the sustained efforts of agitators are crucial for bringing us 
closer to White’s thresholds. These remain useful descriptions of what just background 
conditions should look like, but are incapable of motivating or directing the contestation 
and struggle needed to get us there. I argue that White’s account of what counts as 
contributory effort is thus too narrow and needs to be expanded to allow for the 
contributions of agitators.   
In chapter 4 I return to the concept of burden as developed in the first chapter as a 
way of fleshing out my inductive approach to effort. I describe the ways in which we 
involve ourselves in commitments, projects and relationships through our sustained efforts. 
The more of our time and energies we spend in specific practices, the deeper we go into 
them and the more vulnerable we become to the disruption or elimination of that 
engagement. I argue that vulnerability is not, as some have argued, an aspect of value per 
se.24 Rather, it is only an aspect of certain ways of living and of particularly deep forms of 
effort. This effort I describe as diligent-effort and it is this which is essential to the character 
of the craftsman.   
In Chapter 5 I describe craftsmen as exemplars of a particularly ‘burdensome’ form 
of effort. Within the contemporary political and economic landscape, it is this character, 
the values and styles of life which she represents, that is being made increasingly difficult 
to sustain. Drawing on various sociological thinkers and their arguments, I argue that the 
current ‘liquidity’ and insecurity of the modern world has brought with it a reduced 
possibility for the deeper forms of effort and burdens. I argue that ‘shallower’, less 
‘burdensome’ forms of life that are characteristic of the dilettante can survive these shifts. 
But the loss of the craftsman is still something that should worry us if we are at all 
concerned with the preservation of the dimension of plurality in our collective lives.  
In chapter 6, I discuss UBI. My advocacy for this policy comes with important 
qualifications pertaining to the different ways of justifying a basic income. I present UBI as 
a tool that can help to mitigate the vulnerability characteristic of craftsmanship and, in 
addition, assist agitation by securing people’s ability to tactically disengage from unjust 
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demands and the practices that sustain them. This disengagement is not an ‘exit’ though or 
a way of significantly expanding freedom away from these obligations if we lack sufficient 
preference for such activity. I argue that basic income should not be seen as the means to 
facilitate escape from our obligations to contribute – in some form – to the collective 
welfare of our fellow citizens. UBI is instead a means to allow reengagement, renegotiation 
and act as a political challenge to those unjust practices.  
My particular defence of basic income thus retains the power of obligation and 
necessity as motivating forces for people’s decisions regarding where to put their effort. I 
retain the idea that even though individuals are able – in light of unconditionality – to avoid 
having to make contributions to collective welfare, they should still experience the demand 
to contribute as a necessary and constant obligation. I end the thesis with a conclusion that 
highlights its various shortcomings and limitations while offering possibilities for future 
research. 
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Burdens and Desert 
“Hard work is a misleading term. Physical effort and long hours do not constitute 
hard work. Hard work is when someone pays you to do something you'd rather not be 
doing. Anytime you'd rather be doing something other than the thing you're doing, you're 
doing hard work.” 
        George Carlin25 
The aim of this chapter is to explicate and clarify the conceptual relationship between 
effort and desert. I focus on the ways in which the burdens and costs associated with an 
individual’s effort have been used to determine what he or she deserves. In other words, a 
person is said to deserve something depending on how hard they have tried to achieve 
something. A person may have achieved great things but unless we are able to point to the 
costs involved in that achievement there can be no talk of anything being deserved. Where 
achievement is costless then talk of desert, so this perspective has it, is inappropriate.  
The notion of costs and burdens is a complex matter. I argue that the hardship a 
person suffers in the pursuit of ends is too subjective a notion to ground any claim of 
desert. It is too difficult to systematically discount for the different ways in which people 
experience their efforts. Beyond certain obviously hideous occupations and activity, what 
for one person is a tedious and joyless task might be a great blessing for another. In the 
abstract, it might strike us as plausible that the joy of doing something should act as its own 
reward. It would therefore demand nothing additional by way of an expression of desert. 
But it is a step too far to then collapse all notions of desert into what is essentially another 
term for compensation.    
There are other burdens/costs to take into account when discussing effort. These 
are the costs that accompany our decisions about what to do with our lives. Such decisions 
mean we foreclose a whole host of other options. However, such costs are too deeply 
associated with the value in our lives to be treated as demanding reward or compensation. 
From this alternative perspective, every large decision we make in life produces costs. But 
to claim that these costs issue in a desert claim involves treating valuable parts of our life as 
something we suffer. It also ignores the demand of a performance that is appropriate to 
the reward in question: an agent’s effort is unable to guarantee a performance that is of a 
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quality sufficient enough to merit reward. I therefore conclude that the language of desert 
is incapable of making sense of this alternative understanding of costs.    
Matters of Pre-Institutional Desert 
It was John Rawls’ bold move in denying the role of desert within his conception of justice 
that set a still-standing paradigm for how effort continues to be perceived in contemporary 
political theory. 26  Rawls suggested that even our effort is down to genetic and 
environmental factors over which we have no control. As a result, our effort-making 
capacities are treated as effectively equivalent to our talents and proclivities.27 This raises 
questions about the self and what remains, if anything at all, once we strip away 
preferences, talents and even the ability to expend effort. Does effort (and the capacity to 
expend it) enjoy any special status that separates it from these other aspects of 
personhood, representing some important part of the individual for which we can hold 
them responsible? If effort is special in some way, what is it that constitutes that difference?     
The question of what we can be held responsible for is relevant to Rawls’ 
consideration (and rejection) of pre-institutional desert, i.e. perceptions of entitlement that 
are seen as separate and prior to the ‘legitimate expectations established by social 
institutions and community’.28 In summary his position is as follows; 
‘We do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments, any more 
than we deserve our initial starting place in society. That we deserve the superior 
character that enables us to make the effort to cultivate our abilities is also 
problematic; for such character depends in good part upon fortunate family and 
social circumstances in early life for which we can claim no credit.’29 
This is a picture of individuals stripped of any and all (pre-institutional) desert 
claims. The individual retains possession of these properties, protected as they are under a 
separate (and prior) principle of basic liberty which defends individual’s integrity against 
encroachment by others.30 But ultimately, without being able to ‘claim credit’ for the bases 
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of our constitutions – our abilities, preferences, characters, capacities to expend effort etc. 
– we are left without the use of either our actual achievements, or the efforts put forward 
in attempting to achieve, as legitimate bases of desert. Desert simply fails as one of the 
fundamental facts of our morality because what we are, at bottom, is anchored in events 
and causes beyond our control and consequently beyond even the possibility of desert-
claims. 
It is important to be clear on what Rawls is and is not saying. His view on effort 
does not exclude it from being a legitimate part of entitlement. As persons and groups take 
part in social, economic and political arrangements they acquire claims upon one another 
as defined by publicly recognizable rules. As a result of doing things encouraged by the 
institutions that form a part of such arrangements, individuals or groups develop 
entitlements to certain goods. A just distribution, in part, is precisely that distribution 
which honours these rights. 31  By conforming to the expectations defined by just 
institutional arrangements ‘those who are of the same level of talent and ability, and have 
the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of 
their initial place in the social system’.32 This ‘willingness to use’ our talent is another way 
of saying the ‘effort we expend’. 
This is the formal stipulation of fair equality of opportunity, the force of which 
implies that where endowment and motivation are equal, outcomes in the form of 
achievement should also be equal.33  Effort, though metaphysically shackled in the same 
way as ability, is still an important part of this equality since it forms a central axis upon 
which achievement is based and from which justified inequalities are allowed to emerge. 
Nevertheless, this is quite different to the pre-institutional desert that Rawls explicitly 
rejects. Effort is not freed from ability or other native endowments in this scenario because 
it is seen as being of much the same quality. There thus exists no attempt, within the 
Rawlsian account, to separate effort from those other attributes. 
The ramifications of this are imaginably extensive (both within Rawls’ own account 
and for political philosophy generally) and not without controversy. Rawls ties desert to a 
very thick notion of responsibility. In his view, for desert to be in anyway a legitimate 
concern, individuals must have had total control over not just the use but the invention of 
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their capacities. This is impossible. However, if we can avoid Rawls’ thick account of 
responsibility, effort might survive as a relevant basis for a desert claim. We must first ask 
whether effort should be treated as equivalent to talent and differences in social 
circumstance. If our ability to expend effort begins from an appropriately equal base, even 
if this base is beyond our choosing or invention, effort plausibly re-emerges as a way to 
justify deserts: we start off equally and the different decisions people make about what to 
do with their efforts are then classified as their responsibility and as justification for reward.   
Equality in ‘Effort-Making Capacity’  
This paradigm of non-responsibility for all our attributes may not then be as straight-
forward as it at first seems. The fact of non-responsibility for our attributes (including our 
effort-making capacity) can be conceded, whilst retaining the notion that effort is 
significantly different to talent. Effort, from this point of view, is important not because we 
are in control of its source and creation but because we possess it – as a potential – in more 
or less equal quantities. It is equality of – and not responsibility for – our effort-making 
capacity that can ground desert-claims.34  
By treating effort and talent as of ostensibly the same quality because we are 
responsible for neither of them is to overlook an important difference: namely, effort’s 
inherent fungibility. Whereas a specific talent can only be demonstrated by the 
performance of a particular activity or set of activities, effort can be demonstrated across 
any and every talent. The fact that I fail to put forward effort in performing A does not 
mean I do not – or am not able to – put forward effort in activities B through Z. This 
remains the case even where those activities are never performed because of an inability to 
access them (for instance, through lack of money – the other fungible). It might only be a 
matter of me finding my preferred activity. Once found, I am willing and able to expend an 
amount of effort equal to that which you put forth in performing your favoured A.  
So the observation that an individual is not putting forward effort in the performing 
of a particular activity does not necessarily mean that that person’s effort is necessarily 
more cramped or stifled across all activities. After recognising effort’s intrinsic fungibility 
across the performance of all activity the question that emerges is whether there really are 
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significant differences between people in their effort-making ability.35 The different effort 
levels that occur across persons might be a consequence of differences in the activities 
they have been able to find or access, rather than because of any innate idleness or the 
absence of some capacity related to effort.36 Though we might castigate someone for her 
laziness, what we in fact confront is her lack of contingent good fortune in finding a passion 
or pursuit into which she can throw her efforts. 
There is nothing to stop a person, at least theoretically, from continually exerting 
effort in the pursuit of some goal. This is both the beauty and tragedy of effort: a person 
doesn’t necessarily have to quit, even when perhaps she should.37 The exercise of effort is, 
unlike talent, something it is possible to will into existence despite the continued 
frustrations such exertion might bring. And yet, such willing always occurs from within a life, 
the material of which – our tastes, our early age development, our abilities – has not been 
willed. Effort thus manifests as a dynamic between, on the one hand, a potentially limitless 
phenomenon, and on the other, as something profoundly dependent on the world around 
it for support and cultivation.  
Instead of a concern with finding that for which people can be held responsible, 
this stipulation of equality in (undeserved) effort-making capacity generates an alternative 
concern with finding those additional abilities for which a person both cannot be held 
responsible and which are not possessed equally across persons. Individuals are not 
responsible for their effort-making capacity but because they are effectively equivalent 
across persons this non-responsibility is irrelevant. As far as effort goes, we are all working 
with the same tool. However, the additional abilities for which we are also not responsible 
can play no role in desert claims precisely because they are unequally distributed and 
belong to different people in different quantities. Effort as a tool remains the same but 
                                                          
35
 George Sher, ‘Effort, Ability and Personal Desert’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8 (1979) p 367. 
Rawls makes no specific defence of this claim regarding effort as a capacity that varies significantly 
across persons. Certainly for those who would have each and every one of us ‘on our bikes’ it is a 
defence that might be required. 
36
 This is complicated when ‘outliers’ are taken into account. Paul ErdÖs, the Hungarian 
mathematician, was famous for keeping at his maths for 19 hours a day (aided, it should be added, 
by copious amounts of Benzedrine). Paul Hoffman, The Man Who Only Loved Numbers (London: 
Fourth Estate, 1998). But even with this example, it just so happened that a man found an activity (it 
might well be numerous activities for other people) toward which he was able to expend copious 
amounts of effort. The capacity was arguably the same as other individuals; it was the application 
inspired by enthusiasm that distinguished him. That application is an option open to everyone 
whether or not it is all spent in the pursuit of some single task so long as the right activity is found 
and the means to engage with it are available. 
37
 I am thinking here of those images of tragic/comic/beautiful effort: Cervantes’ Don Quixote, 
Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea and Werner Herzog’s Fitzcarraldo (1982). 
28 
 
how we are able to use it varies widely across different people in light of potentially 
massive variations in our additional abilities.         
Skills and enthusiasm are important parts of these additional abilities. The actual 
expenditure of our efforts is dependent on both the skills we have and the finding of 
activities for which we have the requisite enthusiasm. Where skills and enthusiasm are 
lacking we can also expect a corresponding decline in the effort individuals make. Any 
effort that is expended is weighed down by a sense of the costs and burdens associated 
with performing an unpopular activity. Since both the skills we employ and the finding of 
desirable activities are affected by contingency characterised by inequality, these should 
not be taken into account when discussing a person’s deserts.   
Even though we have distinguished effort from talent the question remains as to 
how effort can now be motivated as a basis for desert. What are we rewarding when we 
reward the application of this equally-possessed ability? Talent and enthusiasm have to be 
discounted because they are not shared across persons in the same equitable fashion. In 
order to avoid including reference to either talent or enthusiasm, questions of desert can 
only be answered by reference to the burdensomeness of effort. When an individual tries 
hard from this equally-possessed common ability to expend effort, what we are in fact 
referring to are the costs of that effort. To assess anything else is to permit inappropriate – 
because unequal – attributes to affect our calculations.  
To flesh out this notion of burden, consider the following example: Steve is a very 
gifted footballer who spends every waking hour practising and playing football. He is 
disciplined, accepts the advice of coaches and works hard at all aspects of the game. Then 
there is Sarah, a gifted scientist. We can tell a similar story about her development and 
attitude. Both Steve and Sarah adore what they do and their talents and enthusiasm help 
them reduce the burdens of that effort.38 Despite the hours and energy plied into their 
respective activities, they do not experience such effort as disutility or cost because they 
love what they do – including what others might consider the more mundane aspects like 
cleaning football boots or microscopes – and are able to progress within their chosen 
practices to a high degree of excellence. Burdens might be experienced however, by people 
less talented than Sarah or Steve but who share the same passion. Such individuals will 
reach a certain level and then experience nothing but frustration as their talents allow 
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them to go no further. Similarly, individuals with more talent but less enthusiasm can feel 
frustrated in the pursuit of these activities. They find themselves doing something for 
which they have little passion. But talents and even enthusiasms are not down to the 
choices or decisions of the individual. They are soaked in the contingency of genetic and 
social circumstance.   
When talents combine with enthusiasm in this way, they do not seem to be 
accompanied by much, if any, disutility. To describe Steve and Sarah’s respective 
adorations and pursuits as costly or burdensome would strike us as peculiar.39 The less 
talented or enthusiastic do seem to suffer from frustrations and disutility whilst performing 
the same activities. They experience their efforts absent the boon of good fortune enjoyed 
by Steve and Sarah. However, where these less fortunate types try hard – and suffer by 
doing so – are we suggesting that they are somehow more deserving of reward? In other 
words, because their efforts make no reference to ‘arbitrary’ talents and enthusiasm we 
seem to be suggesting that what they do is closer to a ‘purer’ form of effort and thus a 
more appropriate basis of desert. Once something gets tiresome or difficult and we cannot 
meet those challenges with either our enthusiasm or talent, only then is effort really 
experienced and desert can kick in. 
There is a flip-side to the above story. If Steve had no access to football and Sarah 
no access to science yet they retained their respective enthusiasms and capacities, their 
previously abundant efforts would be stifled. What seemed like a bottomless supply of 
energy will have been stunted and all those talents locked up inside the person will now 
lack sufficient means for expression. In addition, where before they felt none of the 
disutility associated with spending significant amounts of time and energy doing what they 
loved, they now lack the activities and tasks that previously made sense of them. Whatever 
they end up doing is filled with the hardship and sense of burden that previously they felt 
not at all.  
There is a certain intuitive plausibility to this focus on burden. Where Steve and 
Sarah are rewarded for enthusiasm and talents as well as their efforts their rewards are 
being double counted in some sense. Nature has already rewarded them with these 
propensities and gifts. Why then should we come along and give them even more rewards? 
Surely meeting the challenges and complexities of the respective tasks of football and 
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science are their own reward. What entitles them to any more than that? Of course, this 
only explains why individuals do not deserve the utility and rewards they gain as a 
consequence of arbitrary things like talent and enthusiasm. It is necessary to make an 
additional case for the fact that the disutility and cost associated with this absence of talent 
and enthusiasm is a proper basis for desert. 
Effort-as-Burden 
In the examples of Steve and Sarah there is an important distinction at work within the 
concept of effort. They can hardly be said not to be trying. They still dedicate a great deal 
of time and energy to the things they love doing and are thus still making effort. Another 
notion of effort refers to the experience of the time and energy spent in doing those things. 
Where Steve and Sarah love what they are doing, and thus do not experience the spending 
of time and energy as in any way burdensome, there will be others who are absent talent 
and/or enthusiasm who will experience it in such terms. In other words, there are those 
who experience their time and energies expended in such tasks as frustrating, difficult 
and/or boring. Objectively, both spend time and energy doing something. Subjectively, 
they have different experiences of the time and energy necessary for that doing. It is the 
subjective experience of effort, stripped of undeserved and unequal additional abilities, 
which ground desert claims. 
In his justification of inequality, Rawls’ makes reference to the costs of effort. While 
talented individuals are not responsible for their ability to expend effort they still suffer 
from the costs and challenges of training. ‘The premiums earned by scarce natural talents… 
are to cover the costs of training and to encourage the efforts of learning’.40 These 
premiums direct the abilities of talented individuals to ‘where they are most needed from a 
social point of view’.41 Without such premiums, so the argument goes, the costs of training 
would prove too much for even talented individuals to handle. The enthusiasm and 
rewards associated with the exercise of talent do not put enough on the scales to justify 
the efforts involved in training and so additional incentives are required in the form of 
pecuniary remuneration.42   
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When this understanding of effort-as-burden is operationalized within accounts of 
desert – which of course Rawls does not attempt – it is with the underlying idea that desert 
is only of relevance when efforts expended are in pursuit of an end that ‘expresses an 
actual burden’.43 More specifically, when it ‘involves some inconvenience, sacrifice, work, 
risk (or) responsibility’.44A person can only be said to deserve something when there is 
evidence of these burdens or disutilities. This notion of desert rests on an image of justice 
as a hypothetical, initial situation of balance between the distribution of burdens and 
benefits throughout a society: where a cost is borne, a proportionate amount of benefit 
must be forthcoming in order to restore the balance.45 This is why we don’t feel playing 
games, for example, regardless of whatever effort expended, issues in a desert claim 
because there is no relevant burden being produced. Similarly, where work is itself treated 
as nothing but fun and games, like the joys experienced by Steve and Sarah, we have 
similar reason to challenge the idea that an appropriate burden is being borne. 
From this perspective, the distinction between a person’s possession of a specific 
ability and her use of such endowment is important.46 The initial ‘possession’ of ability lies 
beyond intentions and choices, and can constitute no part of any desert claim because such 
possession never in itself constitutes a burden.47 It is only the effortful use of abilities which 
can issue in burdens: where there is no application, there is no possibility for burden. 
Reluctant geniuses can have all their powers locked up inside them, but without even some 
minimum expenditure of effort, that is where they shall remain. Once they bring them out 
it becomes possible to incur costs and they can then make claims of desert.   
This again relies on a particular account of burden and draws on the above 
distinction between the types of cost we refer to when we talk about effort. Do we mean 
the mere cost of expending time and energy using some ability, irrespective of how we 
might feel about that use? This ambivalence regarding the subjective experience of effort 
produces that double counting effect for people like Steve and Sarah: we call effort a 
burden when it is not experienced in anything like that way. Suffering an ‘actual’ burden 
would seem rather to require cost in the sense of disutility. Otherwise it is not burdens, 
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sacrifices or responsibilities being compensated by benefits but benefits accruing more 
benefits. For the person who revels in the risks and responsibilities associated with her 
efforts, describing them as a burden is to misrepresent something that is experienced as 
constitutive of a great deal of enjoyment and meaning.  
Compensation is built directly into this account of desert. Wojciech Sadurski 
confesses as much when he asserts that desert, as far as justice is concerned, simply is 
compensation, a return to equilibrium in the distribution of burdens and benefits. 48 Desert 
claims refer back to an initial hypothetical situation of perfectly balanced benefits and 
burdens, where the disutility one experiences is matched by an appropriate sum of money 
or other form of redress. The very nature of burden that is being employed means that only 
claims expressing burdens experienced as hardship or toil will be deemed relevant to 
decisions regarding who deserves what. Mere time and energy spent doing something will 
not count, precisely because these things lack reference to the sense and experience of cost.  
When discussing what people deserve, Ronald Dworkin refers exclusively to 
sacrifices which our choices impose on others rather than the disutility or burdens 
experienced as a consequence of expending effort.49 As Dworkin puts it: a person might 
‘prefer working hard to anything else. But his preference cannot provide any argument … 
that he should gain any less in money or other goods by his work than if he hated every 
minute of it’. He believes instead that a just distribution of the benefits and burdens must; 
‘reflect the cost or benefit to others of the choices people make so that, for 
example, those who choose to invest rather than consume, or to consume less 
expensively rather than more, or to work in more rather than less profitable ways, 
must be permitted to retain the gains that flow from these decisions in an equal 
auction followed by free trade.’50 
From this perspective, cost refers to the prices people are willing to pay in order to 
purchase the goods produced by others’ efforts. It is necessary to discount for superior 
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talents enjoyed by others, but not for the enthusiasm or joy a person has in producing 
goods. When deciding on a person’s deserts, the subjective experience of one’s choices and 
productive efforts are irrelevant to the notion of cost. A person can still enjoy as well as 
deserve.51   
On Dworkin’s account, burdens are not measured according to how much a person 
suffers as a result of their efforts. They are measured instead according to the resources 
people are willing to give up in order to purchase the products that are the result of other 
people’s productive efforts. There is no mention of discounting for what a person might 
feel about the hard work, diligence or toil that goes into this productive labour. Dworkin 
cannot incorporate these into his account because these subjective experiences of our 
effort are things which belong to the person and for which we should be held responsible.52 
If we choose to expend our efforts in productive rather than unproductive ways then we 
should be rewarded according to this choice regardless of the enthusiasm – or lack thereof 
– that might accompany that decision. Individuals ‘must be permitted to retain the gains 
that flow from these decisions’ in so far as they are their decisions.53 This is not a matter of 
deciphering how heavy the burden of such decisions are to the person but rather of finding 
out how much is down to effort for which we can hold her responsible.  
On this account, taking responsibility for our experiences of effort is important 
because it is part of the wider responsibility we take for our beliefs, tastes, convictions, 
ambitions and judgements: we do not ordinarily regard these parts of ourselves as ‘lucky or 
unlucky accidents’ but as constitutive of our natures and of our selves.54 Rawls is certainly 
right that we lack control over ourselves ‘all the way down’ into the roots of our condition. 
But we nonetheless remain capable, so Dworkin would have it, of taking responsibility for 
who we are and what we do. Dworkin turns us away from questions of the costs to 
individuals in terms of hardship and toward the costs experienced by others as a result of 
the choices we make. 
The individual at the heart of Dworkin’s account is responsible in a way that the 
individual who is rewarded for the disutility she suffers is not. Holding talent and 
opportunity equal, Dworkin argues the subjective experiences of effort are the 
responsibility of individuals: if a person hates having to labour this is tough luck. 
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Preferences for labour cannot be placed on the scales when deciding what people deserve. 
However, assigning tastes to the person is not without controversy.55 Some of us are 
merely not as inclined to productive labours as others, lacking enthusiasm which others 
seem to possess as an instinct. For instance, in the west at least, in a family consisting of 
four children the first born typically works harder than the last.56 Social circumstances carry 
the day but the individual is still being rewarded, and it might be a double reward at that 
since she could already enjoy the work itself.     
One advantage of an approach that concentrates on experiences of disutility and 
treats burden as synonymous with hardship is that it avoids the double-counting of 
rewards. By discounting for both talent and enthusiasm, it retains Rawls’ treatment of 
talents and proclivities for effort as beyond our claims of responsibility, without thereby 
neglecting the distinctive fungibility of effort. If a person shows signs of suffering from their 
productive efforts we need not ask the supplementary question as to whether they are 
ultimately responsible for feeling that way. The disutility is sufficient because it signals the 
absence of unequal and undeserved additional abilities like talent and/or enthusiasm which 
could alleviate such costs. 
Despite this advantage, the approach fails to defend effort-as-burden as the pivot 
upon which desert must turn. As the argument proceeds no reason is given to believe that 
effort-as-burden (and burden of a particular kind at that) should be given pride of place in 
providing the foundation of our desert-claims. Why do trying hard and suffering costs mean 
we deserve anything? Why do we use the vocabulary of desert to respond to disutility 
rather than alter the situation in such a way as to reduce the disutility in the first place? 
This emphasis on compensation both fails to deliver the kinds of responses appropriate to 
disutility and distorts the meaning of desert.  
Where effort consists mainly of burden we should look less to the provision of 
monetary compensation to return us to some kind of imagined equilibrium and more to the 
reduction of effort thus consumed by burden so understood. 57  Recognising such 
burdensome effort should trigger an investigation into the sources of that disutility rather 
than cash payment and proclamations of deservingness. Our motivation in recognising such 
                                                          
55
 See for example ibid. pp. 291 – 296. G. A. Cohen, ‘Expensive Tastes Ride Again’.      
56
 Oliver James, They f*** you up: How to survive family life (London: Bloomsbury, 2006). 
57
 For a critique of the compensation paradigm see Wolff & De-Shalit, Disadvantage, pp. 21 – 35. On 
the idea that compensation cannot be a principle of desert see Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the 
Market, pp. 49-55. 
35 
 
effort-as-burden has little to do with desert claims or stipulations of reward: it is not that 
such suffering deserves reward but rather that people do not deserve to suffer in these 
ways. Our motivation is thus better characterised as sympathy for other’s plights, plights in 
which effort is doomed to only ever be perceived as something suffered, the infernal rock 
of Sisyphus.    
Furthermore, our relationship to even burdensome efforts can be complicated over 
time. Even though we might initially experience our efforts as heavy going and/or dull, they 
can develop into a source of fulfilment when applied to the cultivation and expression of 
particular abilities. There are of course the ‘typical situations’ Sadurski describes in filling 
out his account of burden which strike us as uniformly horrible and irredeemable. These 
are the occupations and pursuits within which effort seems utterly burdensome. But 
beyond the labour of miners in the developing world or the holders of so-called ‘McJobs’, 
we cannot hope to put together an overarching framework derived from the notion of 
effort-as-burden precisely because of the complex ways in which prima facie costs can 
ultimately produce benefits for the person. Moreover, the subjectivity of the notion of 
burden makes it practically very difficult to specify.  What to some might be hell on earth is 
to others the very stuff of the good life: just ask committed environmental activists about 
life as an investment banker and vice versa. Burden, when seen as hardship, is simply too 
subjective a phenomenon to do much work. 
We need not interpret burden or costs in such depressingly simplistic (or 
simplistically depressing) ways. There are other important ways in which effort involves 
costs beyond its merely back-breaking or spirit-ruining implications. Effort is that by which 
we appropriate or develop the projects, commitments and relationships that shape and 
give meaning to our life. It is through appropriation and development of such things that 
our lives gain direction, leading us to cumulative successes and/or failures. Indeed, it is 
precisely this part of effort that is alluded to in Dworkin’s account of the nexus of 
preferences we develop and discover, taking responsibility for the ends that emerge from 
the on-going, potentially difficult and effortful explication of our proclivities, talents and 
desires. By committing ourselves, by caring about these things, we create burdens and 
responsibilities for ourselves. But this sense of burden is marginalised when we frame 
burden exclusively in terms of hardship and disutility.  
There is an alternative, more nuanced account of burden in which effort – 
specifically sustained or diligent effort – necessarily incurs costs but not in the sense of 
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some brute hardship or disutility.58 By choosing what to do with the time and energy that 
fill-out our lives, we inevitably leave a lot of roads un-travelled. Time and energy are finite 
resources with which we can only do so much. This makes sense of the costs Steve and 
Sarah might be said to ‘suffer’. Though they love what they do there remain things they are 
unable to accomplish precisely as a consequence of that love and the effort it inspires. 
Moreover, because they love what they do, sudden withdrawals or disruptions to their 
engagement with preferred activities can prove particularly damaging to the meaning and 
purpose of their lives. Therefore, even though they may embrace their involvements in 
particularly intense ways, they are still vulnerable to disruption and the kinds of disutility 
this would bring about.   
George Sher argues that this notion of burden issues in its own set of desert claims. 
He distinguishes between the kinds of effort we experience as utter drudgery and that 
effort we direct toward certain ends we have reason to value. This second type of effort is 
burdensome, but rather than focusing on the hardships surrounding the expenditure of 
effort it focuses on the fact that every choice we make is also a choice to not do other 
things. The decision to do A is also a decision to not-do B, C… N.59 By investing our efforts in 
a particular pursuit we are constrained from investing that time and effort elsewhere. It is 
this sense of costs associated with ‘roads left untraveled’ that complicates what we mean 
by burden and what role burden can play in grounding desert claims.  
The idea that this forms a basis for desert is grounded in the common intuition that 
when people work sufficiently hard for the attainment of some goal, when they dedicate 
themselves to the accomplishment of some task, we believe it would be a good thing if 
they attained their desired end.60 We are loath to see people fail at tasks they care about 
because of things beyond their control: a lack of effort is one thing, the vagaries of 
circumstance another. What is more, the bigger the part a particular accomplished goal 
would play in a person’s welfare, the more painful the failures will be. It is this that gives 
sense to the idea that a person ought to achieve her goal. What is it that underlies this 
intuition? Why do we feel desert claims arise out of this kind of conscientious striving?61  
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Diligent-Effort and its bearing on burden 
Diligent-effort (as I shall, following Sher, continue to call it) is closely connected to desire: 
indeed, it could be argued that it is ‘logically impossible to desire something without being 
disposed to try to get it’.62  We need not assert anything so strenuous however to fulfil our 
purpose. We will do as well to suggest that diligent-effort (the conscientious striving 
toward a certain goal) is a reliable sign of desire: if we try and do something it is because 
we want it to happen. Furthermore, we need to be able to move from a belief that ‘M 
desires X’ to a claim that ‘M’s having X is valuable in itself’. In other words, we need to have 
grounds to believe that the very desiring of something confers value upon that thing, that 
the attainment of it would produce a better situation than would the lack of that 
attainment.63 But how do we make that inference, what is the connection between desire 
and value? 
In discussing diligent-effort and its relation to desert, Sher makes an appeal to the 
idea that individuals have, in and of themselves, absolute value. It is because of this 
conception of the individual that he is able to assert the following about them: ‘a portion of 
their (people’s) value devolves upon what they value, that some of the absolute value of 
persons is transferred to, or inherited by, the things they care about’. Put simply, if people 
themselves matter so do the things they care about.64 Effort, then, working as a function of 
desire, is a means of conferring value onto ends. We try hard to achieve things because we 
desire them, and in desiring we make them valuable.  
This is not meant to suggest that diligent-effort and desires are equivalents. What it 
does imply, however, is that differences between effort and desires are to be considered 
matters of degree: effort is what brings desires to fruition, an additional and necessary 
(though not sufficient) property that turns desire into reality. 65 The value of those desires 
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remains in the fact we, as holders of absolute value, want to see them fulfilled and it is 
effort that makes the realisation of that value possible. So although ‘the far greater value of 
the objects of diligent striving is somehow a function of the way diligent striving surpasses 
mere desire’, we must be clear on the manner in which effort performs this function and 
how it differs from desire via those degrees. 66 The key is on the diligent side of the hyphen. 
The reasons are two-fold.  
First, specifically sustained effort stems from deliberative and considered 
judgements as desires typically do not. Desires can be passing fancies, whims of the 
moment that simply spring up within the person, absent any effort at all. Second, and this 
is the crucial point, sustained effort by its very nature, forecloses other options as merely 
desiring does not. Wanting something is entirely compatible with wanting any number of 
incompatible things, whereas doing something is incompatible with doing any other thing 
(at least for a particular period of time). Taken further and applied to the narrative of a life 
we see the implications. Consider a student who pursues medicine for fifteen years: such a 
pursuit has necessarily foreclosed other options such as suddenly becoming an architect. 
This is not to say that changes cannot be achieved. But the fact she has spent so much time 
and effort pursuing another profession means such changes will incur potentially dramatic 
costs. Diligent-effort by its very nature is cost incurring in what it forecloses. As Sher puts it: 
‘A fortiori, steadfastly pursuing an outcome requires foregoing many other activities that 
one would find pleasant or worthwhile’.67 
As a consequence of the application of sustained effort and the foreclosing of 
options that follows, the agent has to make a series of important allocative decisions 
involving her ‘non-renewable resources’ of time and energy. These decisions take on an 
existential magnitude since it is via these decisions that we use the time and energy – the 
stuff of life as it were – and from which we fashion our lives: ‘any agent who devotes a 
major portion of his time and energy to achieving a goal is quite literally making that goal a 
part of themselves’. Such diligent-effort cannot but implicate the agent in ways that mere 
desires never can. Effort (in its sustained form) becomes a ‘mode of caring’, providing us 
with sustained and consistent direction, shaping a large part of our sub-goals, 
preoccupations and habits, across our ‘cognitive, conative and practical activities.’68  
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This view of effort does not require effort to be regarded as a proxy for a person’s 
deserts because of some alleged special metaphysical status it enjoys. Rather, diligent-
effort’s function as a desert base is grounded in the costs and burdens that are consequent 
to the allocative-decisions people make and which determine their sense of the success or 
failure of their lives. This approach avoids the problem of collapsing all effort into toil and 
hardship. Subjective experiences of disutility are no longer a primary concern and there is 
no need to determine what it is for an activity to be regarded as burdensome in the sense 
of toil. It also avoids the controversy surrounding what it is we can hold people responsible 
for: talented and untalented, enthused and unenthused alike will suffer from these kinds of 
costs. 
Cost, when understood as part of diligent-effort, refers to the tremendous 
importance some of our decisions have for us. Alongside the magnitude of the decisions we 
make about our life are other commitments, relationships and projects we, quite literally, 
have no time for. However, the connection Sher makes between this understanding of cost 
and desert is unconvincing. Sher believes that because of the existential weight that 
accompany diligent-effort and the choices it fills out there is a sense in which it is, ceteris 
paribas, a good thing that people who apply diligent-effort get what they desire.69 By this 
reckoning, if I have invested time and effort in the pursuit of some good and if that pursuit 
has taken on a significant enough role in my life then I can be said to deserve to succeed in 
my endeavours. 
There are a number of problems with Sher’s argument. First, there is the case of 
competitive goods. Where two or more ‘diligent’ individuals are applying for a particular 
job, for instance, cashing out this desert claim according to diligent-effort produces some 
peculiar results. Desert according to diligent-effort suggests that the most ‘diligent’ 
individual is the most worthy of reward. If so, we still need a sense of what this means in 
practical terms. The description of diligent-effort seems to suggest that the person who 
cares the most is entitled to the good, i.e. she who would suffer most if they were not to 
get the position. The person to whom it matters only a little must find something else 
about which they care more profoundly before they can be said to deserve it. But is this 
notion of cost really all we are to consider when deciding on what a person deserves?   
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Missing from Sher’s account is any consideration of the performances that we 
ordinarily regard as necessary when assessing people’s deserts or entitlements. We rarely 
look only to the efforts a person makes before we decide what to give them. This reference 
to performance is not just a description of the efforts which go into an attempt at 
performing some task or activity. Instead, performance refers to the actual attainment of 
some objective, which has effort as only a necessary and not a sufficient condition. 
Whatever we do, to whatever level of skill, our diligent-efforts are always expended with 
some objective in mind. These objectives take the form of certain standards we hope and 
strive to reach with our efforts.  
In archery for instance, it is not just the firing of arrows but hitting the target that 
counts and hitting the centre that counts most. As we progress, we introduce new 
difficulties into the activity such as the distance we stand from the target and the type of 
bow that is used. But the structure of success remains: we fire the arrow by drawing on 
some – perhaps a great deal of – effort but our success is not guaranteed by that effort 
alone. We can try and we can fail to meet the demands of these standards and in so doing, 
fail to deserve anything more than the sympathy of others who would have liked to see our 
efforts rewarded with success but who have also had their preferences disappointed.70  
Sher tries to account for this by speaking of ‘predictable failures’ and the ‘disvalue 
of unrealistic goods’. That is, when a person invests diligent effort in attempting to perform 
tasks which we can foreseeably predict will end in failure, irrespective of the time and 
energy she spends at it, desert claims are quashed. But this is insufficient to account for the 
meaning of failure vis-à-vis our efforts and intentions. If we have an interest in desert then 
decisions regarding who deserves what cannot be limited to measuring how hard an 
individual strives or how much it means to them only within situations where we expect 
them to succeed. Predictability is no guarantee that an individual will do what is expected 
of them, even if we can safely suggest that they could have or even can do it.   
Even in the case of unpredictable failure we are not left with adequate grounding 
for a desert claim. What we are really left with is a chance to express sympathy and 
commiserate with the ‘striver’ in her failure. We recognise, sadly, that she might have been 
better off doing something else with her time and energy. Or we might try and console her 
by pointing to the useful lessons learned through failure. We might also provide something 
by way of compensation as a means to express our sympathy and lessen the blow of failure. 
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But this compensation is by no means an expression of desert since the failure of 
performance has rendered that question essentially irrelevant. Ultimately, we cannot 
compensate the failed ‘striver’ with what she had wanted to achieve in the first place 
without rendering the whole act of striving meaningless.   
This all might sound harsh, cruel even. But the main thrust of my argument has 
thus far been to recognise that the sympathy generated by people’s sustained and diligent 
application, and the importance it has for the person expending that effort, cannot 
conclude in a desert claim. In comparison with those other accounts which isolate the 
disutility and hardship effort can cause, this more sophisticated account of burden suggests 
that burdens exist as a necessary part of effort qua effort. However, in both its more 
tangibly burdensome forms and in this more sophisticated rendering, effort remains an 
insufficient basis of desert – though it may elicit other responses on the basis of needs or 
rights such as the alleviation of the causes of disutility.   
The Importance of Performance 
Ultimately, if we want our distributive decisions to include references to desert – a matter 
on which I can remain agnostic – desert-claims cannot be collapsed into an account of 
effort conceived as burden. If we wish to use the language of desert, we have to be sure 
that what we are describing is something that approximates the structure and constraints 
of that concept. Desert is fundamentally concerned with the performance of activity. This 
inevitably takes us beyond a person’s intentions and effort. An exclusive focus on effort-as-
burden, however, is unable to account for other important aspects essential to the 
structure of desert. 
However lucky and arbitrary we consider the skills or genius which inform people’s 
accomplishments within their various fields of expertise, discussion of desert cannot simply 
strike out all reference to performance. Rawls avoids this by precisely refusing to talk about 
desert and limiting himself to discussions of entitlement. In this chapter, I have discussed 
an alternative approach to desert that does not rely on the thick vision of responsibility-for-
self which Rawls believes is necessary to motivate desert. This alternative posits effort-as-
burden as that which remains after all the things for which we are not responsible (talents 
and passions) are removed from our consideration. While we are not responsible for our 
effort making capacity it is also, importantly, a tool that exists much more equally across all 
persons. It is this equality that grounds possible desert claims. However, while it might 
42 
 
accurately capture differences between effort and talent, this approach’s failure to include 
reference to performances means it fails to capture the meaning of desert. 
There is a different approach to desert that locates the deserving part of the 
person within performance and outcome. In searching for the grounds of desert, this 
approach refuses to ignore those parts of the person which are ‘arbitrary from a moral 
point of view’. It accepts that performance and outcome will be affected by talent and thus 
by aspects of the person that are beyond their responsibility. But, so the argument goes, it 
is just these aspects that are crucial to any proper understanding of desert. If thinkers want 
to include desert in their discussions of distributive justice they are obligated to include 
reference to the ‘arbitrary’. 
 This move takes its cue from the profound contrast between, on the one hand, 
Rawls’ denial of desert’s relevance to discussions of political theory and, on the other, the 
mainstream, quotidian political discourse within which talk of desert still has a great deal of 
resonance.71 When we try and determine what it is a person deserves, our everyday 
understandings of desert are not confined to an account of the costs associated with 
activity. Nor are they confined to the suffering people endure because of a lack of 
enthusiasm for their performance.  From this perspective, the equality of people’s effort-
making capacity is insufficient for the purposes of grounding a claim to desert.  
The structure of desert involves the presence of three components; an agent (A), a 
performance (P) and a reward (R). It is implicit within ideas of desert that it is good for A to 
receive R as a result of P.72  There is a mystery in this relationship that confuses reward 
with what is better described as an incentive payment, i.e. models that conceive of reward 
as means of encouraging A to do P in the future. Alternatively, it is a confusion with issues 
associated with preference satisfaction, i.e. that the performance of P by A illustrates the 
strength of a person’s preferences and it is because of this strength that a reward thus 
becomes an appropriate response. This describes Sher’s account: people’s desire generates 
value which then, through the costs it creates, transforms into desert. 
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These other responses are appropriate for the objective ‘managing’ of action 
alluded to when we use the language of incentives and the like. It is to this ‘managing’ of 
action which Rawls refers in his discussions of payment for the costs of training. Rawls 
explicitly distinguishes such payment from any notion that they are rewards for a person’s 
virtue or desert.73 Furthermore, in our everyday appraisals of other people it is rarely the 
case that we consider their virtue or action by first referring to the voluntary acquisition of 
such virtue or to the means by which that action was able to take place. People ordinarily 
look no further than what is presently being manifest and admire it (or envy it) 
accordingly.74   
Take, for instance, the individual who was in the right place at the right time to 
save a child from drowning. We do not feel that another person’s confident assertion that 
he would have done the same makes him equally deserving of the parent’s gratitude.75 
Equally, consider the following extension of the drowning example: from a beach we see a 
man in peril out at sea. Two people go to his aid, one of whom realises he cannot make it 
and turns around three quarters of the way there. The other goes the whole distance and 
rescues the man. The rescued man can of course express gratitude to the person who 
turned back, but it will not be of the same nature as that expressed toward his rescuer. 
Intention and effort are important ‘but we are also interested in what people as a matter of 
fact bring about in the world’.76 And what people bring about in the world is inevitably 
going to be affected by the contingency that informs, motivates and conditions our actions. 
Performance, however affected by accidental ‘endowments’, is a crucial and a necessary 
part of the desert equation. If the agent fails to produce a performance worthy of reward 
then, although other things might be forthcoming, reward as an expression of desert will 
not. 
This is not to say that our current reactive attitudes to performances are always 
‘correct’ or ‘natural’. Certain performances within our culture are given rewards that far 
outweigh their actual desert. Such performances are rewarded in inappropriate ways while 
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others are not recognised with sufficient or appropriate admiration or prestige. Reactive 
attitudes are evolving phenomena which will always be present so long as there are 
performances to admire. We might hope that the performers of admired exploits will 
demonstrate modesty in light of the fact that a large part of their performances derive 
from a combination of good genetic and social fortune. But even absent modesty, the 
performance itself remains a source of our admiration.77 
Focusing on burden as the axis of desert involves treating the performance part of 
the above structure very differently. For performance to issue in a desert claim, it must be 
shown to be a burden to the agent. Our assessment is not of the performance itself but of 
how it affects the performing agent. In the above examples, the archer hitting the target or 
the swimmer rescuing the child cannot be said to deserve anything unless it can be shown 
that their actions issued in a burden. Performance qua performance is not the relevant 
consideration. The correct reference point is either the subjective experience of the effort 
involved in that performance, or else the costs that accompany the diligent-effort that 
produces the performance. 
The rewards in either case are also made with reference to burden. When the 
rescuer returns to the beach or the archer reflects on her rewards, what they can expect 
must again make sole reference to the burdens experienced in the action. To expressions 
of gratitude the rescuer must make it plain that she is a confident swimmer, enjoys it as a 
hobby in fact and it really was not the hassle the rescued might imagine. When receiving 
her prize, the archer must ignore the bull’s-eyes she has managed to score and refer 
exclusively to the costs and occasional boredom associated with training and the activities 
she has forgone by involving herself with archery and not something else.  
The peculiarity of this kind of talk makes clear how far removed we are from the 
concept and language of desert. Desert is a matter of responding to and taking from 
amongst our opportunities and ‘producing intentional performances of an appropriately 
valuable kind’. Given talent’s role in performance and performance’s role in desert, we 
seem unable to factor it out without destroying a large part of what those performances 
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mean. If we want to reintegrate desert into political theory we cannot dismiss performance 
qua performance as irrelevant, even if it is tainted by the arbitrary. 78 
Performance is never only talent. It is always accompanied by our ‘choices’ and 
‘efforts’ to at least some degree. The whiff of the arbitrary might exist in all three of these 
components but that does not render our reactive attitudes to performance wholly 
misplaced. We are, essentially, confronted with a choice. On the one hand we can do what 
Rawls suggests, abandon desert as a concept, and regard the reactive attitudes that 
accompany it as, so far as justice is concerned, inappropriate. Or, if we wish to retain the 
concept of desert, we can accept contingency as a necessary condition of life within which 
desert has to make sense.79  
From this second perspective, what we need, as Miller puts it, ‘is the idea of an 
agent and a performance, where the performance is intended and controlled by the agent, 
but makes use of characteristics and qualities that are integral to his or her natural tastes 
and abilities’.80  However, whatever approach we use, effort cannot perform the role of an 
exclusive basis for desert. In Rawls’ rejection of desert effort collapses into the free will 
problem and is dismissed as beyond even the possibility of responsibility and thus desert. 
On the other hand, we adopt this alternative version of desert and incorporate talent and 
passion into our assessment of performance. In these accounts, effort is either an 
inappropriate proxy for responsible action or else an insufficient part of performance. If we 
care about desert we cannot assess performance solely from the perspective of the costs 
performances produce, even if this move would effectively eliminate all non-responsible 
action from our considerations. To do so is in fact to avoid assessment of the performance 
altogether. 
Desert, from a perspective that allows concern with performance, is no longer 
dependent on total freedom from causation. Rather, it focuses on the ways in which 
individuals respond to their contingency. Genuine desert bases, if they can exist at all, must 
thus consist of a) choice and effort in turning natural talent into ability and b) the decision 
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to then deploy that talent in the production of a performance. Effort alone, as a reflection 
of disutility or the costs associated with important decisions, cannot be converted into a 
desert claim because such concerns lack reference to the ‘goodness’ or ‘excellence’ of a 
performance. Effort might still have a role to play in any and all possible desert claims but it 
is neither a sufficient nor even a greater part. 
Conclusion 
Like Rawls, I do not consider effort an appropriate basis for desert. Rawls’ argument rested 
on the assumption that since we cannot be responsible for our efforts nor can we be said 
to deserve any goods that are the result of effort. However, treating effort as effectively 
equivalent to talent also proves problematic. Although perhaps beyond our control, effort 
can be distinguished from our other capacities and endowments. Differences in effort do 
not admit of the same quality or magnitude as differences in those other categories. So 
despite the fact that our effort is beyond our responsibility, there is an equality between 
persons that renders this lack of responsibility less relevant.  
This re-establishes effort as a possible basis of desert. One way in which effort can 
function as a basis of desert is by reference to the costs associated with its expenditure. 
Where costs are incurred by individuals it is a sign that other abilities for which one cannot 
be held responsible – such as enthusiasm or talent – are not doing their part in alleviating 
one’s burdens. Such costs entitle individuals to compensation sufficient enough to cover 
them and return the situation to one of balance between benefits and burdens. Effort is 
thus treated according to its disutility and hardship and it is this which grounds desert. 
Another conception of burden considers the less tangible costs we experience in the course 
of using our ‘non-renewable resources’ of time and energy.  Neither of these accounts of 
burden issue in a convincing desert claim because of the overall lack of concern with the 
performative dimension which is necessary to the structure of desert. 
What emerges from this treatment of effort-as-burden are either the narrower and 
unworkable conceptions of toilsome effort – that emerge from Sadurski’s account for 
example – or the more sophisticated treatment of burden as represented by Sher’s account 
of diligent-effort. This second approach reveals interesting properties inherent to effort but 
misconstrues its real value by framing its analysis by discussions of desert. Diligent-effort is 
a useful way of expanding the notion of burden. But as a way of motivating effort as the 
correct basis of desert it is ultimately irrelevant. The problem is not only the practical one 
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of trying to define or isolate the burdensomeness of effort before measuring it and then 
according deserts. Without reference to some performance, even though that performance 
is a consequence of talent and luck as well as effort, the structure of desert is left 
incomplete. If we want to introduce considerations of desert into our design of distributive 
regimes, we cannot do so by referring exclusively to the effort people make. 
Burden remains an important concept. It is often conflated with hardship, as a cost 
that can only be described as disutility and which on occurring triggers ‘reward’. This is an 
inadequate because incomplete rendering of the functions that burden performs. Certainly, 
hardship exists and our efforts can produce considerable disutility. But treating effort solely 
in these terms overlooks the ways in which burdens – as the effort we dedicate to the 
pursuit of our ends – form the projects, commitments and overall ‘conceptions of the good’ 
that give meaning and purpose to our lives.  This more interesting and refined account of 
effort’s value has been glimpsed within Sher’s account of diligent-effort. In the second part 
of this thesis I will further elaborate and develop those glimpses into a coherent and 
systematic whole.  
However, my attempt at distilling effort out of this particular sphere of concern is 
not yet complete.  In the next chapter I consider John Roemer’s sophisticated explication of 
effort’s role in justifying inequalities between people. Roemer, along with Dworkin, 
believes there are parts of a person we cannot simply push back into determinism. 
Roemer’s model is thus another attempt at getting to a place of metaphysical significance 
within the person in order to confirm the possibility for moral responsibility and thus 
deserts.    
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Effort as the Responsibility  
In John Roemer’s innovative proposals regarding equality of opportunity (EOp) effort plays 
a central and decisive role. It is effort, and only effort, that can justify inequalities in the 
deserts to which different people lay claim. In no other account of distributive justice does 
effort play such a significant role and it is for this reason that a whole chapter has been 
dedicated to Roemer’s proposal.81 As in the previous chapter, effort is given a central role 
in determining who gets what. However, Roemer does not collapse the idea of effort into 
the burden or hardship of expending effort: experiences of effort as hardship are no longer 
given a central function in grounding desert claims. Instead, effort is understood as that for 
which we can be held responsible and it is in playing this role that issues of redistribution 
are resolved. The accounts of the previous chapter accommodated themselves to the 
Rawlsian paradigm. It was equality in effort-making capacities and not responsibility for 
them that grounded desert-claims. In contrast, Roemer’s proposal confronts and challenges 
the Rawlsian paradigm: Roemer’s policy is a means of finding that part of our activity and 
constitution that is truly ours. 
I begin with an extended explication of Roemer’s policy proposals. This explication 
is necessarily large in breadth and depth because of the intricacies of his methodology and 
the various employments of particular (technically construed) concepts on which the model 
ultimately relies. Roemer’s model is intended as a contribution to the so-called luck 
egalitarian debate. It seeks to define and justify the correct dividing line between choice 
and circumstance, between what a person can and cannot be held responsible for. It then 
operationalizes this division into different policy proposals that can be applicable to fields 
such as health-care and education.  
A crucial component in Roemer’s methodology is the type. A type describes a 
group of individuals whose backgrounds are stipulated as being fundamentally identical. 
Comparisons between and within types form the basis of Roemer’s distributive proposal. 
My criticisms of his methodology focus on the legitimacy of these comparisons. First, the 
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method is unable to adequately account for the effects of injustice on people’s experience 
of the world around them. It cannot capture how injustices affect individuals’ perceptions 
of the possibilities or opportunities that might be formally available to them. It fails to 
account for how a possible lack of confidence or security can affect the decisions people 
make regarding what to do with their time, effort and talent. The effects of injustice cannot 
be isolated in such a way so as to leave a remainder within the individual – in this case, her 
efforts – which we can describe as beyond those effects. This problematizes comparisons 
between the achievements of individuals who suffer from profound disadvantage and 
those who enjoy all the trappings of privilege and a cultural and familial climate of support. 
Second, there are problems affecting the possibility of comparisons within types. 
Given the myriad influences that shape our lives, very few of which can be totally reduced 
to actions taken by the agent, control seems too strong a notion to describe what we do 
and who we are. Increased effort, even from people who suffer from injustice, cannot 
necessarily be reduced to the ‘autonomous’ choices of individuals but might still be the 
consequence of happenstance and good fortune. In this vein, I also explore the conceptual 
difficulty of defining effort in contradistinction with circumstance. Effort is always a 
response to the way the world is. It is therefore affected by interaction with circumstance 
of some kind. There is no ‘blank’ space where an individual’s effort exists separate from 
this interaction.     
If we want to capture the profound impact (dis)advantage has on the efforts 
people make to achieve ends they care – or could care – about, then control as an exclusive 
metric of responsibility is inappropriate. Concentrating on an abstracted, technical version 
of effort (a ‘sterilised residual’ in Roemer’s terminology)82 understood to be in some way 
close to a person’s moral centre reduces the extent and intricacy of the interaction 
between people and their societies to a single quality. This simplification fails to do justice 
to the conceptual complexity of responsibility. To this end, I offer an additional, competing 
account of responsibility that does not tie so closely to Roemer’s particular understanding 
of control. This alternative account roots responsibility in people’s evaluative capacities. As 
a result, it is better able to accommodate concerns pertaining to the effects injustice has on 
our ability to take responsibility for our lives. 
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Roemer’s is a practical-technical guide to egalitarianism. As such his aims differ 
substantially from mine. This chapter does not seek to replace one piece of practical policy 
proposal with another. My intention is rather to interrogate Roemer’s use of the concept of 
effort and to challenge him for what I believe is a lack of qualitative understanding of the 
lived experiences of effort, how we tend to use and understand it from within our 
relationships, commitments and projects.   
Types and Effort 
Roemer’s methodology is best understood in the context of the wider substantive 
literature of which it forms a significant part. This literature falls under the heading ‘luck 
egalitarianism’, a moniker accorded to it by Elizabeth Anderson, one of its most fierce 
critics.83 Other important exponents of luck egalitarianism include Ronald Dworkin, Gerald 
Cohen and Richard Arneson.84 The founding belief of this version of egalitarianism is that 
individuals should not be held responsible for that which they cannot control but should be 
held responsible for that which lies within their power to do or not do.85 It therefore 
challenges Rawls’ account, considered in the last chapter: luck egalitarianism posits some 
part of the person which cannot be assigned to the vagaries of genetic or social fortune. 
There is a remainder which properly belongs to the person. 
This is importantly different from the critique developed in the last chapter. Where 
effort is conceived in terms of the burdens it creates it is not something over which we are 
designated some substantial control. It is rather the equality in the possession of the 
capacity to expend effort that exists across people. It is this which makes sense of effort as 
a ground for desert: we are not responsible for it all the way down but we are all equally 
non-responsible. The alternative offered by luck egalitarians like Roemer begins with the 
suggestions that there is a part of the person for which she is ultimately responsible. It is 
this responsibility for (some part of our) effort which justifies inequalities.86 
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In addition, there are interesting parallels with my discussion in the last chapter 
about the performance part of the structure of desert. In Roemer’s account, performance 
is not only understood in terms of the costs it produces for the individual. Of course, the 
focus is still different from David Miller’s account because Roemer retains the view that 
talent should be blocked out from our considerations of the performance. Nevertheless, 
performance qua performance (as opposed to qua ‘producer of disutility’) comes first. It is 
after the performance that decisions are made as to what part of it can be assigned to 
effort and what part, because rooted in circumstantial factors ‘performers’ are judged 
unable to control, should be ignored. It is control of the performance that is doing the work 
in justifying deserts, not the costs of that performance. 
Whatever people can be held responsible for, i.e. what is not the result of 
circumstance, can also justify interpersonal inequality. Conversely, where there is no 
responsibility, no inequality can be justified. On this view then, disabilities, howsoever they 
be construed and insofar as they are not the fault of the person, can never be used to 
justify inequality.87 The projects we attempt and the successes we accumulate have a 
portion that is down to what we do: there is some part of our activity that cannot be 
reduced to circumstance and can properly be called our own. There is another portion of 
our attainments/failures that belong to our circumstances. This portion can play no role in 
the justification of inequality.  It is this issue of distinguishing the ‘parts’ of life that 
individuals can/cannot control which is fundamental to Roemer’s approach.  
Roemer constructs a model that seeks properly (and definitively) to encapsulate 
that division between a person’s choices and their circumstances, between what is 
arbitrary and what is non-arbitrary from a moral point of view. Effort, it turns out, is the 
ultimate manifestation of the ‘choice’ side of that division, and comes to bear all the weight 
in the justification of inequalities.88 The efforts people make and their relation to the 
circumstances within which they are made is a complex matter: where does circumstance 
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end and effort/choice begin?89 The background conditions individuals confront are crucial 
in determining the choices they make and the efforts they expend. How can the seemingly 
infinite variety of circumstances and contingency that make up a person’s life be 
sufficiently manipulated and then eradicated (or at least significantly reduced) for the 
purposes of assigning responsibility? There needs to be a way to equalize or control for the 
differences in background so that what remains (by way of inequality) is down to individual 
efforts alone.   
Types are one of five key concepts in Roemer’s methodology. The others are 
circumstances, effort, objective and policy. Circumstances are those aspects of a situation 
beyond a person’s control and for which she should not therefore be made responsible – 
whether this be to her advantage or otherwise; effort is that ‘constellation of behaviours’90 
for which society does hold the individual responsible; the objective is that ‘opportunity 
equalisandum’, the thing we wish to equalize opportunities for, whether it be welfare, 
longevity of life or acquisition of wage-earning capacity; and finally, the policy is the social 
intervention by which opportunities are equalised ‘for acquisition of the objective’.91 
Policies of equality of opportunity derived from this methodology become a way of 
indemnifying individuals against malignant consequences that are due to circumstance, 
while denying indemnity against consequences that derive from real ‘autonomously chosen 
effort’.92 Conversely, it will deny individuals advantages accrued as the result of their 
circumstances while making sure rewards are forthcoming for those acts which can 
properly be described as their own.93 
Types are established via a process of collective deliberation in which citizens, 
drawing on relevant available empirical data, organise themselves into groups according to 
a list of circumstantial factors that mark out the background conditions against which they 
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and their fellow citizens make their choices.94 For example, in the case of proposals for 
education, relevant data might refer to parental education levels as one possible factor 
indicative of the environment within which children grow-up. Another could be parental 
income. Yet another could be IQ, used as an indicator of native intellectual potential. 
Moreover, depending on the context, different factors will have varying relevance. For 
example in Ireland, divisions according to detailed religious cleavages might be of particular 
salience where in other times and places they might be irrelevant. These societal decisions 
thus reflect people’s circumstances, i.e. those parts of the person for which she cannot be 
held responsible but which nonetheless structure both her opportunities and the resources 
with which she is to confront them. 
The formulating of types is based on three suppositions. First, that we know which 
circumstances jointly determine a person’s ability to process resources into a given kind of 
achievement. For example, we may know, based on existing evidence, that if a child’s 
parents achieved some tertiary level of education, they will have a greater chance of 
educational success compared to children whose parents did not graduate from high 
school. Secondly, that these circumstances can be broken down into a given number of 
components (I.Q., parental education levels, race, income etc.) which then take on a given 
vector. Finally, that it is possible for this vector to take on a number of values within the 
population, so that we can reorganise that population into a final set of types ‘where a type 
consists of all individuals whose value of this vector is the same’.95 In other words, 
members of the same type are said to experience the same set of circumstances. 
Depending on the policy, members of a type might all have parents who obtained the same 
level of education, be similar in terms of socio-economic background and they might also 
be of the same race and have the same IQ. Any differences that occur between individuals 
of the same type are thus not the result of circumstance. The type goes on to form the 
basis of resource distribution because within the type individuals have (nearly) identical 
ability to transform resources into achievement. Each individual within each type should 
receive the same bundle of resources, while less/more fortunate types should receive 
larger/smaller bundles.96  
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After each member of a type receives bundles identical to every other member of 
the same type, where they end up in the distribution of their type will be a result of the 
choices they make to expend effort. Roemer argues that variations of effort within the type 
will produce a normal distribution: on the x-axis is the effort (‘constellation of behaviours’) 
being measured and on the y-axis is the number of people performing at each level of 
effort. The majority of people will occupy the middle of the distribution with minorities of 
outliers at either end. The size of these minorities will vary depending on what is being 
equalised for. But whatever the objective, those minorities at the top-end of the 
distribution have expended a great deal of effort. The bottom-end minority has expended 
less effort than most in their type. Where a person appears within the distribution of their 
type is then compared with other members of other types. Where they appear in the same 
part (centile) of their respective distributions, they have tried equally hard.97   
The level playing-field required for an authentic policy of equality of opportunity is 
thus reached via a redistribution mechanism, providing appropriate resources according to 
the type’s circumstantial ability to convert them into goods. Money is thus doing the work 
in rebalancing resources onto a more equitable footing by restoring more equal conversion 
ability across types. More advantaged individuals are endowed with greater conversion 
ability whether that advantage is genetic or more strictly environmental. Providing equal 
resources will fail to correct for ‘conversion-inequality’ since outcomes will continue to 
reflect abilities that are beyond the control of the individual. More financial resources are 
provided to individuals with less advantage in order to compensate for a certain measure 
of (unchosen) inefficiency in their conversion abilities. This parallels Amartya Sen’s 
capability approach by recognising the part disadvantage plays – in both social and genetic 
terms – in affecting the conversion of ‘money into good living’.98   
Differences between types are the result of differing circumstance whereas 
variations occurring within the type do so as the result of individuals’ different 
expenditures of effort: the former are equalised, the latter preserved. 99 Take education for 
instance. If the median effort level of type A is ‘2’ and the median effort level for type B is 
‘5’ (where this could be measuring years in post-16 education for example) then individuals 
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within each type, operating at that median level, deserve equal reward (measured as wage 
after graduation for instance). This equality of reward is because they have tried equally 
hard. An individual of type A who expends effort level ‘5’ (perhaps attending and 
graduating from university) deserves more than an individual from type B who expends ‘5’ 
because reaching that level within type A is a more demanding achievement, i.e. type A has 
tried harder. 
Anticipating an example I deal with in more depth below, a child who grows up in a 
household of smokers will be making more of an effort not to smoke than a child whose 
parents were non-smokers even if the two smoke the same quantity of daily cigarettes as 
adults. The former has shown a greater degree of self-control and had to try harder given 
the environmental pressures that surround(ed) her. Similarly, if I am one of only a handful 
in my type to get an A in an exam then I am trying harder than another recipient who is in a 
type where high grades are ten a penny: that is, are more easily available. (Again, Roemer’s 
model demonstrates an advantage over the approaches considered in the previous chapter 
because performance is here treated as a performance and not merely as something 
through which costs are assumed. Effort – freed from talent – is the part of the 
performance being measured but it is not the subjective experience of disutility or hardship 
that is doing the work.)   
The capacity to exercise effort remains dependent on the individual’s 
circumstances. Such pressures are always going to exist to some extent: we cannot escape 
circumstance tout court and be left with nothing but our efforts. But within the range 
provided by the constraints and strictures of the type, individuals can choose at what 
centile range they operate and it is for this we hold them responsible. A citizen’s place 
within her type is chosen because this is determined by factors outside of the type, by the 
‘autonomous effort’ one is free to expend or not expend. If one belongs to a type where 
the number of cigarettes smoked lies between 2 and 5 a day, then the real choice a person 
in that type makes is between 2 and 5 cigarettes. We hold her equally responsible for the 
choice of 2 or the choice of 5 but cannot legitimately hold her to account for the fact she 
smokes, since zero cigarettes is not within the range of choices supplied by her type.  
Perhaps the most interesting application of this theory is a policy designed to bring 
about equality of opportunity in the acquisition of wage-earning capacity.100 The aim of the 
policy is to ‘use educational finance to equalize opportunities for wage-earning capacities 
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among young men in the United States’.101 The population is divided into four types 
according to the level of education enjoyed by the individual’s most educated parent.102 
This is defined by ‘years of education’ amounting to less than 8 years for the most 
disadvantaged type and, for the most advantaged type, includes some experience of 
tertiary education (12 years and up). The outcome in this instance is taken to be the 
individual’s wage at age 30.   
Roemer advocates a distributional difference between types such that those 
disadvantaged by the circumstances of their upbringing, i.e. whose parents did not receive 
as much education as others, benefit from additional funding from their state’s educational 
finances. Consequently, those whose most educated parent has less than eight years’ 
education would receive about five times as much funding as those whose most educated 
parent experienced some tertiary level education (in 1989 dollars, $5,360 compared to 
$1,110).103 In this example, money corrects for differences in conversion ability that are the 
result of circumstances. This equalises the ability of the least advantaged to compete with 
the most advantaged in the job market, thereby levelling the playing field. Of course, the 
individuals in the data-set will not benefit since the disadvantages they faced have already 
taken their toll. Nonetheless, their experiences can be used for future redistributive 
measures that use the same criteria to organise a population into types and redistribute 
accordingly.   
What is particularly interesting about this account is the fact that it moves beyond 
a strictly compensatory paradigm. It still utilises money’s inherent fungibility but more as a 
restructuring device than as a compensatory mechanism: this is not a policy that suggests 
redistribution is a form of reparation or apology for injustice.104 Roemer’s proposal, at least 
in this case, is better characterised as a preventative measure. His model uses money 
alongside information pertaining to the effects of disadvantage to restructure and equalise 
opportunities. Money is not a means to reconcile individuals to their lack of opportunity. In 
employing models like this, Roemer is able to escape those critics of luck-egalitarianism 
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who claim that it focuses only on after the fact inequalities, thereby failing to appreciate 
the structuring role of inequality.105  
For instance, Roemer’s model can respond to Samuel Scheffler’s point that 
‘equality, as it is more commonly understood, is not, in the first instance, a distributive 
ideal, and its aim is not to compensate for misfortune. It is, instead, a moral ideal governing 
the relations in which people stand to one another’.106 The education proposal gives form 
to and quantifies these relations, enabling assessment of the effects that differences in 
people’s circumstances have on their lives. Roemer’s model also takes the further step of 
enabling us to make these relations more just by introducing radical differences in the 
resources allocated to differently advantaged sections of society. This could still be framed 
in terms of compensation: the types are organised according to ability to convert resources 
and money is supplied to make up for disparity in this ability. But it is not compensation as 
motivated by a sense of pity or commiseration, or the recognition of a failing on the part of 
the individual.107 The different amounts of resources provided to differently advantaged 
individuals are a means of equalising starting points so that differences in conversion ability 
do not prevent individuals from realising their ambitions and projects.  
The typology method issues in recommendations that are both radical in 
consequence and consistent with views on responsibility ranging all along the political 
spectrum. Roemer is able to argue for radical policy recommendations within the confines 
of a particularly ‘conservative’ (that is, extensive) vision of responsibility.108  Indeed, 
Roemer’s proposal can be seen as rendering an ingenious response to advocates of 
especially individualistic models of responsibility. This is especially true with regards to the 
way such advocates use the notion of ‘conceivability’.  
One such thinker, Lawrence Mead, referred to conceivability when he considered 
(and criticised) the ‘sociological’ approach to poverty and inequality developed in the 1970s: 
‘the poor and disadvantaged were understood to be so conditioned by their environment 
that to expect better functioning of them, such as work, became almost inconceivable. The 
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responsibility for their difficulties, even behavioural ones, was transferred to government 
or society’.109 The powerful insight in Roemer’s use of statistical data is precisely with 
respect to the conceptualisation of conceivability. 
While Mead may be right that individuals can dig themselves out of dire straits 
through sheer will and determination, it is equally obvious that success is more conceivable 
for some than for others. That which contributes to such conceivability is precisely what is 
being captured by Roemer’s use of the type. Where, for instance, no single student from a 
particular background (in Roemer’s terms, within a specific type) manages to go to 
university, this reflects a lack of real opportunity and can be ascribed to the conditions 
facing members of that type. We cannot then try to blame the traits or characteristics of a 
single individual for something that is ubiquitous across all people similarly situated. Types 
purport to establish the parameters of conceivability, that within which responsibility can 
be defined. In so doing they also bring to light the various ‘shackles’ people face – without 
necessarily precisely defining the causes that produce them – shackles some erroneously 
believe fell off as soon as direct racial discrimination was made illegal.110 Roemer’s 
methodology conceptualises the ways in which background structures and individual 
choices interact with one another to shape and constrain the opportunities and possibilities 
a person confronts.111 He manages to retain the insights of the lambasted sociological 
approach and combine it with both a radical vision of individual responsibility and equally 
radical distributive agenda.  
Problems with Methodology 
Roemer’s model makes two comparisons using effort. The first comparison is between 
members of the same type: circumstances having been controlled, individuals are 
compared according to the effort they have expended. A person’s ability to convert 
resources into achievement is deemed equal within types. One’s position within the type’s 
distribution of achievements is therefore determined by one’s effort and choices alone. 
Moreover, it is not just one’s position that is decided by effort but also the differences in 
effort and achievement between members of the same type. Compared to members of 
other types, a person’s trying hard might not look that impressive: it might appear that she 
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is actually not trying hard at all. For example, casual smokers might not look like they are 
trying hard when amongst non-smokers. But within the type, if you are trying hard, you are 
necessarily trying harder than others in the type.  
The second comparison is between types. Where one appears in one’s own type 
can be compared to where other individuals appear in their type because this is the 
measure of the residual (choice) and not of circumstances. Two individuals appearing in the 
same percentile of their type’s respective distributions are deemed effective equivalents: 
they have expended the same degree of effort despite what might have seemed to be the 
case absent the comparisons enabled by the typology methodology. By making the first 
comparison amongst peers where conversion ability is the same the second comparison, it 
is supposed, also accurately captures effort alone.  
Both these comparisons are problematic. Given that conversion ability is different 
across types, it is not obvious that effort can be regarded as equivalent without taking 
proper account of the potentially wide-ranging effects the type has on determining that 
ability. People in very different types facing very different possibilities might be doing very 
different things when they either try hard or fail to. Can we assume that equally gifted 
children who drop out of a chronically under-funded school fail in the same way that 
privately educated high-school drop-outs fail? Isn’t there something different going on 
behind their respective failures that can explain differences in the (lack of) efforts they 
made? There is something troubling about judging and comparing people across type when 
the ‘available behaviours’ and opportunities they face within their type can vary so widely.  
Comparisons across Types 
But do such differences actually make any difference to the practicable workings of 
Roemer’s model? Indeed, it might even be considered a virtue of the model that it is able 
to evade these tricky subjective issues regarding the precise nature of what people are up 
to and why. From the perspective of positive policy proposals, focusing explicitly on the 
more objective and quantitative dimensions of effort is far more useful than entanglement 
with the subjective experiences and understandings of effort.112 What individuals do when 
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they convert resources into achievement becomes a question we can avoid having to 
answer, precisely because of the tools Roemer supplies and the radically egalitarian policies 
they justify. The meaning of effort for the person who is expending it is simply too complex, 
too personal a concept to do much work in an account of distributive justice. Furthermore, 
the additional resources that are supplied to those with less ‘conversion ability’ seem an 
intuitively plausible way of instituting more equality. 
However, the effects of injustice can alter our perception of that for which we hold 
people responsible. Consider the following example. We compare two children, one who 
attends an under-resourced inner city school (type A) and another who attends one of the 
country’s top private schools (type B). Both children operate at the same low percentile 
within their respective types. Children in type A live in socio-economically deprived areas 
where opportunities both for future employment and personal development are few and 
far between. Children of Type B on the other hand come from wealth, privilege and a 
cultural climate of support and encouragement where lots of opportunities are available 
for all kinds of valuable activity. 
Can membership of equivalent centiles capture the effects such differences in 
circumstance have on the efforts made both by these children and the adults they will 
become? It would be hard to argue that their low positions within their respective types 
are reflective of the same kinds of choices, the same reflective deliberations and attendant 
behaviours. Rather, we might plausibly argue that where the latter could be accused of a 
variety of idleness for which we are not so willing (without good reason) to deny 
responsibility, something else is going on in the case of that other child, something which 
requires an entirely different response. The effects of injustice interfere with the 
equivalence necessary to motivate the comparisons that are crucial to Roemer’s 
methodology.  
We can of course say that both these individuals are lazy and that the problem is 
just that lazy people in type B will achieve a great deal more in life, including a larger wage-
earning capacity. But the different reasons for – and possible justifications of – their 
idleness are relevant material for assessing the absence of efforts and the making of poor 
choices. Individuals who suffer significant disadvantage can suffer from a sense of 
hopelessness that is not suffered by advantaged others. By considering the concrete ways 
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in which opportunities are structured and experienced, we are able to better understand 
the reasons people act the way they do and what they as individuals understand 
themselves to be doing when they either succeed or fail to try hard. People operating at 
the same centiles within different types are qualitatively not doing the same thing 
whatever the methodology of the ‘type’ might have us believe.  
To take the flip-side of the example, imagine two individuals performing at the 90th 
percentile within each of their types. In type B, we again have an individual blessed with 
stellar educational opportunities, a supportive background at both home and school, and a 
wide variety of role-models and exemplars of success in her peer group. In the 
disadvantaged type, by contrast, we have an individual who struggles on without support, 
opportunities or role-models. Whereas the privileged individual in B can be seen as in some 
ways expressing the ‘mode of her type’, i.e. performing in ways esteemed and respected by 
its other members, the same cannot necessarily be said of the person in type A. Indeed, she 
might have to fight against certain built-in expectations that are in part constitutive of her 
type, that act as ubiquitous cultural norms she must resist and break down in order to be 
successful. Furthermore, the primary motivation in the struggle to achieve academic 
excellence might be to escape the confines of her upbringing, to leave behind her formative 
environments and the background against which she has come to maturity. 113 The difficulty 
of this process for the disadvantaged child is inadequately captured when too much 
equivalence is assumed between her efforts and those expended by the child of privilege.  
Roemer overlooks something similar when he discusses an ‘equal-opportunity-for-
health ethic’ – specifically, people’s entitlement to treatment for diseases related to 
smoking.114 He derives two types from the factors that influence a person’s propensity to 
smoke (race, gender, occupation). The first type is a black, male, steelworker and the 
second a white, female, college professor. A decision to smoke will be in part influenced by 
these circumstances. However, within these types the number of cigarettes smoked (the 
‘achievement’ on the type’s x-axis by which effort is measured) will be a consequence of 
the choices individuals make. The environmental pressures supply a certain range of 
‘cigarettes-smoked’ within which it is reasonable to hold members of a type responsible. To 
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put this in extreme terms, in a type where not one member smoked, a single puff on a 
single cigarette would be an act of gross ‘irresponsibility’.115  
However, what the black steelworker is doing when he smokes and what the 
college professor is doing when she smokes are not necessarily the same even though they 
might smoke equivalent numbers of cigarettes, i.e. appear in the same centile. Before 
comparing them directly it is necessary to look at the cultural contexts within which they 
smoke their respective cigarettes. Imagine two steelworkers who occupy the same type: 
one enjoys socialising while the other is a bit of a loner going his own way home after work. 
The person who likes to socialise is surrounded by smokers and, exercising restraint, only 
smokes a couple a night where others, again in the same type, go through a pack each. The 
steelworker lacking the preference for socialising has no need to exercise restraint. His 
preference has saved him from the pressure and thus from the need to try hard to avoid 
smoking.  
For the white, female, college professor we can imagine a reverse of this situation. 
The college professor who likes to socialise does so in a way that avoids any communal 
pressure to smoke. Her co-socialisers do not smoke, either. In this case her preference for 
company saves her from the cigarette. On the other hand, there is another professor who, 
like the second steelworker, prefers not to socialise. Her method of relieving stress is to 
have a couple of cigarettes. The other professor who avoids smoking is not trying harder to 
do so. If she abandoned her preference for socialising, she too might enjoy a cigarette. It is 
thus her preference – although this time for socialising – that saves her from the need to 
try hard.  
As a result, it is not just effort that is being measured when we count the cigarettes 
a person smokes. Effort might still be part of it to some extent but not as a phenomenon 
isolated from people’s preferences. Our efforts make sense from within the preferences we 
have. We then pursue these preferences in a world that is to a large extent beyond our 
choosing: people do not invent the communal habits of their type. Where the non-smoking 
loner steelworker/socialising college professor are commended for being particularly 
restrained in their behaviour, all that can really be said is that a preference, combined with 
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how that preference manifests itself within a given cultural context, helps them avoid the 
need to restrain themselves or ‘try hard’ not to smoke.116  
Recognition of the significant role preferences have in our actions provides an 
important counter to the suggestion of equivalence which underlies the validity of 
Roemer’s comparisons. The smokers are supposed to be trying equally hard not to smoke. 
But they are trying to do different things and smoking cigarettes is incidental to those 
purposes. Cigarettes are the same means by which different ends are realised. The means 
only make sense given the presence of certain preferences that in turn are played out 
within environments over which the individual has no control.  Returning to the education 
example: differences between people who in trying hard at school can express the mode of 
their type are not trying to do the same thing as others who use educational opportunities 
to escape from their type. To treat these as equivalent is to miss the respective meanings 
that trying hard has for the two students and thus the extent to which it classifies as trying 
hard at all.  
Effort is not some uniform substance we use in uniform ways. It is influenced by 
our understandings of what we are doing and why we do it. We expend effort with certain 
goals in mind, reasons as to why we do what we do. The origins of our preferences are hard 
to pin down. Roemer’s model is an attempt to isolate just that preference to try hard, 
unsullied by circumstance. However, given that our efforts are always influenced by how 
preferences take form in the unchosen social contexts in which we move, it seems there is 
always something outside of effort doing work in determining how hard we try.  
By abstracting from the ways in which individuals understand their own effort, we 
lose a great deal of the detail which explains and makes sense of a person’s behaviour. This 
much is recognised by Iris Marion Young when she criticises Roemer for a theory of social 
relations which is implicitly ‘individualistic and expresses the philosophy of the ownership 
society’. 117 She makes the point that the playboy who squanders an inheritance racing 
fancy cars is held equally responsible (within his type) to the ‘lower-income working man 
who charges a fancy suit even though he knows he has maxed out his credit cards’.118 One 
has a lavish lifestyle that he manages to fritter away through careless choices; the other 
occupies a situation stymied by financial pressures where a mistake is made and prudence 
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perhaps only momentarily forgotten. Different things are going on in the examples, against 
different backgrounds which render the acts of purchase and the purchasers qualitatively 
different. While both make choices and might even be responsible for the disadvantages 
that are the result of those choices, they should not be regarded as equivalents (even 
though they might both be rightfully subject to our and their dependents’ frustration and 
disdain).  
Circumstances cannot be regarded merely as the counterpart to choice, something 
to be flushed out of our considerations before we can properly answer the question as to 
what people deserve. Circumstances are the background against which people choose the 
projects, relationships and commitments that will matter to them and give their lives 
meaning. The design and pursuit of these things are only ever partially connected with ‘a 
choice’. We choose from within sets of constraints and opportunities over which we have 
very little control. Indeed, most of the time our choices are better described as dependent 
on prior assent to the way the world is: we develop our talents, follow our inclinations and 
pursue specific opportunities depending on how we perceive the world around us. 119 The 
socialising, steelworker smoker could not invent the ways in which sociality was expressed 
in his environment any more than could the socialising female professor non-smoker invent 
hers. The ways of sociality are, to some extent at least, accepted as given after which 
choices are made accordingly.  
Comparisons within Types 
The last section considered the ways in which people from different types do different 
things with their efforts depending on the circumstances being confronted. This 
complicates the comparisons Roemer’s model makes between types: what is it we are 
actually comparing if the performances under consideration are potentially very different? 
There is no necessary equivalence between what people aim at with their efforts across 
different types. In addition, the absence of effort can be explained in very different ways 
depending on the opportunities one faces. Roemer’s methodology forces us into assuming 
this equivalence and in so doing mischaracterises the depth of effect wrought by 
circumstance. Where one appears in the centiles of one’s type is incapable of capturing this.  
For comparisons made within types the notion of control carries a great deal of the 
burden of justification. Control is understood in distinction from luck: what we cannot 
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control is the result of ‘luck’. This collapses a great deal of different kinds of circumstance 
into the same category. People’s nationalities, the colour of their skin, whether or not they 
live in an area with a good state school are all treated as part of the general ‘jumble of 
lotteries that constitutes human life as we know it’.120 A person’s effort is measured by 
removing all the effects of luck so that what remains is that which the individual controls.   
However, collecting all forms of luck together should not blind us to the variations 
in that concept. I do not want to criticise Roemer’s position because it collapses social and 
institutional injustices into the same category as ‘injustices of nature’.121 Instead, I focus on 
other contingencies that although affected by social injustices are not reducible to them. 
These are the kinds of flukes and circumstances that have the potential to massively 
influence what a person is able to achieve, but over which that person has very little 
control.  
From this understanding of luck, the child who stumbles across an author who 
inspires them toward their own literary aspirations, or who is motivated into learning about 
the cosmos after catching Carl Sagan on TV, or who in being the focus of a particular 
relative’s attentions is encouraged to escape the confines that define their type, might all 
be deemed ‘lucky’. They have an additional resource that can instigate possibly remarkable 
achievement. But how do we factor this luck into (or out of) Roemer’s account? Even when 
the decisions concerning what are to count as circumstances are made by society (or a 
philosopher committee)122 there is simply ‘too much going on’ beyond the question of 
one’s own ‘hook’ for the concept of autonomously-chosen effort to hold much weight.123 
Luck (in its more cosmic forms) plays too large a role in shaping and determining our life. 
The bedrock of the person that Roemer hopes to have reached seems more than a little 
chimerical.124  
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Interestingly, the resources this kind of luck provides, i.e. the having of enthusiasm-
inspiring activities or people, are conducive to the additional abilities considered in the 
previous chapter. We are not responsible for either our talents or the further ability to be 
enthusiastic about the things we do. In the previous chapter these were removed and we 
were left with disutility as a measure of effort since this was all that we could be said to 
have as our own. Roemer does not take this position and is therefore saved from my 
previous criticisms. However, the point remains that this enthusiasm and all that inspires it 
are beyond the control of the individual. 
Roemer’s methodology seems to rely on an intuitively plausible assumption which 
could discount these kinds of luck: individuals with similar backgrounds (as defined by the 
type) will face similar situations of luck as well. The accidental boons enjoyed by some and 
the chance misfortunes suffered by others within one type will be of a similar, though 
never identical, quality. The effects of the additional resources that are the consequence of 
this variety of luck will thus cancel one another out in the long run. Everybody within the 
same type will get a more or less equal allotment of good and bad luck. Yet this only seems 
plausible if we abstract from the nature and depth of luck’s unintended occurrences. Luck 
does not manifest itself in merely singular incidences that are contained and finite, enjoyed 
today by one member of Type-A and tomorrow by another member. They can often be 
deeply constitutive of a person’s identity, informing not just one particular moment but the 
narrative course of an entire life. This kind of luck is not something that occurs equally 
across all different members of all different types. 125 
 The examples of Sagan, inspirational neighbours and the diligence of relatives 
cannot be factored into Roemer’s model without rendering each type n=1. There is no such 
thing within us which we can refer to as our own ‘hook’. All such hooks are forged both 
within the foundry of the individual and the blaze of her surrounding environments – along 
with the depth of contingency that entails.126 This doesn’t necessarily return us to the 
Rawlsian paradigm where the regression requirement destroys all desert claims or all 
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possibility of responsibility. Rather, it once again puts us outside the chimera of control as 
the axis around which the concept of responsibility or desert must rotate. However, as we 
saw at the end of the last chapter, this would entail letting talent and circumstances affect 
the rewards which we give to valuable performances.  
But is it not enough that the theory can approach the idea of control? Am I not 
asking too much of any theory if I attach these kinds of demands to the concept of control? 
What Roemer’s type tries to capture are the conversion abilities of individuals similarly 
situated. Circumstances are held constant across its members and are then used to 
measure the effort people (really) make.  Admittedly, this is made more complicated by the 
presence of those ‘incidentals’ that are constitutive of persons. But perhaps proximity to 
this measure is the best we can hope for: the model goes as far as possible in determining 
where control begins and ends and therefore gets us as close as we can hope to the ideal of 
distributive justice.  It is essentially as free as we can get effort to be, as free as ‘morally 
relevant choice’ can possibly be realised.  
However, even admitting that this level of control is all that we can hope for, there 
remains a rift between our ordinary experience and understanding of responsibility and the 
model of responsibility developed by Roemer.  In contrast to Roemer, we do not ordinarily 
give control as central a role in our understandings of efforts. Indeed, as Hurley notes, in 
our quotidian use of the terms, effort and responsibility do not matchup: ‘To give people 
what they deserve because they make more effort is not to give them what they are 
responsible for.’127 What people end up bringing about is not the result of effort alone: it is 
always mixed up with the circumstantial aspects both of our selves and our situations.128 
Roemer does not explicitly ask us to change this habit: his is an approach that uses 
statistical methods to glean the information he needs from actions already performed and 
so it need have no impact at the level of everyday practice.  
But something disturbing happens to our view of individuals when responsibility is 
derived from the methodology of the type. Since the distribution of effort is a characteristic 
of the type it thus stands beyond the control of the individual. Individuals should not 
therefore be held responsible for that distribution but only for their place along that 
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distribution. However, Mathias Risse makes a fascinating technical point that seems to 
challenge even this degree of control. Since the individual is not responsible for the 
behaviours of those within their own type, they should not then be held responsible for 
that behaviour. However, ranking them comparatively with the behaviour of one’s fellow 
type-members is precisely holding them responsible for choices beyond their control.129 By 
focusing on control, the individual becomes abstracted from everything which lies beyond 
it – including the behaviour of one’s peers – to such an extent that responsibility seems to 
reduce to a vanishing point.  
Roemer has responded to this argument by conceding that the effort of others 
within the type is out of one’s control. However, one’s rank within the range provided by 
the type remains a subject of control because what the type organises is precisely the 
range of actions that are reasonably available to its members: ‘My circumstances, the 
circumstances of others, the distribution of efforts of other types, and, if my type is large, 
the distribution of effort of my type, are all morally arbitrary for me, while my own effort 
level is not morally arbitrary for me’.130 By dint of my effort I can appear anywhere I like 
within my type. This is what it means for effort to be under my control and this is why I can 
be held responsible for it.  
Our efforts are always responses to the form luck takes in terms of what our 
natural abilities, interests and social circumstances happen to be. For some, that luck 
means they grow up in countries with generous welfare states. For others, it is luck that 
that they grow up in a state without such provision. Either way, our effort is a reaction to 
the luck of these draws. Susan Hurley makes the following point:  ‘if most of a person’s 
basic life circumstances, or some very influential aspect of them, are a matter of luck, what 
particular choices would he have made in the absence of luck?’ Or, put differently, ‘what 
choices would someone make if his life had been a very different life.’131 We cannot tell 
what people would do were they to face entirely different circumstances. We cannot 
escape the fact that what we measure is not just effort but is effort as a reaction to – and 
thus parasitic on – circumstance. Effort and control, as Roemer understands them, are 
always circumscribed by the range of behaviours our types presents to us. There is nothing 
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other than this reaction to circumstances people actually do face which can act as a 
measure of a person’s deserts.  
Roemer’s emphasis on control as something opposed to circumstance affects our 
normative understanding of the person. As Anne Phillips has suggested, we are left to 
wonder what ‘is left of the individual when we separate her out from all the circumstances 
that have formed her’. 132 What we are left with is supposed to be the aspects of the 
person that we can hold her morally responsible for, that comes close to some moral 
centre. Again, as Phillips puts it, ‘only these last are ‘really’ ours’. Anything that is a ‘more 
common practice within one social group than another has to be treated as a characteristic 
of the type and therefore not a characteristic of the individual’.133 Human control, and by 
extension responsibility, becomes nothing more than the leftovers from circumstances. Can 
we really reduce all responsibility to an account of agents’ reactions when they are 
confronted with an available range of behaviours? 
This vision of the self produces a peculiar relation between people and their 
circumstances. Our circumstances become characterised as in some way interfering with 
our true, deeper content. Bernard Williams’ comments on moral luck seem particularly apt: 
‘Justice requires not merely that something I am should be beyond luck, but that what I 
most fundamentally am should be so, and, in the light of that, admiration or liking or even 
enjoyment of the happy manifestations of luck can seem to be treachery to moral 
worth’.134 In Roemer’s attempt to render control the axis around which responsibility turns, 
individuals understand large parts of who they are as in some measure irrelevant, as not 
touching that which they most fundamentally are. Inspiring authors, populist scientists and 
watchful relatives, despite the extent to which they shape the efforts we make and the 
things we care about, are all irrelevant from this moral point of view. What we really do 
and who we really are is the effort gleaned from Roemer’s methodology.   
Hurley signals something equally strange with the idea of ‘morally arbitrary 
welfare’.135 That which the individual is not responsible for, regardless of its role in the 
production of her welfare and the meaning it has for her life, is morally arbitrary from this 
view of the agent: her worth is centred on her ability to control alone. Following this line of 
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thought to its logical conclusion, the differing abilities between individuals to generate 
welfare – right down to the biological propensity to produce endorphins – can be 
considered a resource and therefore a possible reason for distribution or a potentially 
relevant consideration when dividing a population into types.  
Our most natural of moral assessments and our most immediate intuitions do not 
marry with the idea that responsibility has to be so closely aligned with the presence of 
control. 136 Samuel Scheffler expresses this sentiment when he writes ‘we are neither so 
systematically alienated from the unchosen aspects of our own identities nor so uniformly 
confident of and identified with our role as choosers as to regard the presence or absence 
of choice as having this kind of make-or-break significance’.137 There is luck (and therefore 
lack of control) in defining the person we are, in the problems and situations we face in life, 
in how we are determined by antecedent circumstances and contingency. And, finally, 
there is a large dose of luck in the ways one’s actions and projects turn out.138  
Is there another way to approach responsibility that avoids this neutered 
normative image of the person? Are there other concerns that can complement the focus 
on control whilst not necessarily altogether replacing it? It might be the case that other 
intuitions we have pertaining to responsibility are simply misplaced, at least as far as 
distributive concerns go, and that the account provided by Roemer explicates the correct 
view of responsibility thus conceived. It might be that other accounts of responsibility have 
other purposes but are inappropriate in this particular sphere. It is to another model and 
these questions that I now turn. 
Another Model of Responsibility  
There is an unspoken assumption underlying Roemer’s model regarding the justice of the 
background structures behind the types. This is the assumption that although different 
individuals face very different circumstances, the effects can be captured in a purely 
quantitative way.139 For Roemer’s model, the circumstances we confront and by which we 
are shaped do not alter the fact that our efforts are all aimed at producing outcomes that 
are effectively equivalent. This assumes that the efforts themselves can be handled as 
equivalents. Wealthy individuals who have enjoyed privilege and support their whole lives 
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and others who have lacked all that are still judged and compared according to expenditure 
of some uniform substance called effort.  
Conversion ability – turning resources into welfare – is possessed in different 
quantities depending on the type. By controlling for the effects of type on the possession of 
conversion ability we thereby develop a process for comparing between people who are 
said to be doing the same thing. There remains a stipulation of equivalence at this level 
since privileged and unprivileged alike are alleged to be doing the same thing only with 
different amounts of resources. This focus on the possession of a uniform capacity to 
expend effort obfuscates important differences in how individuals facing different 
opportunities understand their own efforts and intentions.  
Precisely what this conversion ability amounts to is left unexplored. What are 
individuals doing when they turn their effort into projects and plans – the basis of any more 
general welfare? By drawing on another idea of responsibility, one not ordinarily used for 
purely distributive matters, we gain some insight into what might be missed when 
conversion ability is treated as constant and uniform across types. This alternative account 
of responsibility provides a better sense of the pernicious effects of injustice that are 
ignored when equivalence is assumed between the efforts of people facing vastly different 
circumstances.  
This is not to suggest that the alternative I outline is up to the task of replacing 
Roemer’s methodology as a guide to practical policy. It is rather to suggest a competing and 
additional sense of responsibility which Roemer’s model is incapable of adequately 
capturing and which undermines its attempt to ground responsibility in effort alone. It 
better accommodates the concerns raised in this chapter regarding the false equivalences 
informing the inter-type comparisons and the policies they justify. It also offers a normative 
vision of the self that does not produce the peculiar consequences described above.   
This alternative vision anchors responsibility in our capacity for evaluation.140 The 
image of the individual as an evaluator is a complex one. It takes into consideration the 
relation between a person and her desires: we do not simply desire things but also have a 
sense of the desirability of those desires. That is, we have various orders in our desires: 
there is a step beyond our actual preferences where we evaluate them, where we are able 
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to ask ‘Do I really want to be what I now am?’141 The stands we take on our preferences 
and our evaluations of the desirability of our desires are, from this perspective, our 
responsibility.142 This is not confined to the preferences themselves but also refers to the 
actions we take as a consequence of those preferences. So, the glutton who steps back 
from his preferences and decides to rein in his appetite is taking a stand on those 
preferences whilst also hoping to escape from the kinds of activities with which those 
preferences currently involve him.143           
This level of the self is missing from Roemer’s model. The differences between, for 
example, what the smoker-types (white female professor and the black male steelworker) 
are doing cannot be properly captured. The typology method sees them both smoking 
cigarettes and the investigation of what this activity amounts to ends there. There are no 
resources in this model that can be used to ask how smoking might interact with either of 
these people’s other preferences, their sense of who they are or what they are doing when 
they smoke.  If they are both smoking so many cigarettes as to put them in the lower 
centiles then there is an absence of effort – as Roemer construes it – and they have ‘failed’ 
to the same degree.  The same applies for the example of inactive students at the prep 
school and the inner city school. The evaluations that motivate their respective inactivity 
and the deeper reasons behind such failure are not properly taken into account.    
The effort that goes into evaluation provides a different way of understanding the 
choices we make and the things we do. This effort is different from effort measured 
according to the number of hours spent at the school desk, the library or the factory. But 
our evaluations are not effortless: they are on-going and require focus, discipline and an 
understanding of the available options and the methods and costs associated with pursuit 
of an option. The time and effort involved in evaluation has immense importance for the 
relationships, projects and courses of action that they illuminate and which organise 
possible future actions and behaviours.    
We hold individuals responsible for their evaluations and the actions that emanate 
from them: if someone claims to care about courage and then acts in a cowardly way we 
evaluate them at both levels. However, despite this assignation of responsibility, the things 
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we care about are not necessarily matters of choice. As Charles Taylor argues ‘Our 
evaluations are not chosen. On the contrary they are articulations of our sense of what is 
worthy, or higher, or more integrated, or more fulfilling’.144 When we evaluate we are 
involved in a reflective process about who we are and what we do. We are always, 
according to Taylor, already within a given set of evaluations, an already present sense of 
what matters to us, of some mode of life we consider higher than other available 
possibilities.145 The sense of who we are and what we do draws from an already established 
set of dispositions and character. In Roemerian terms, the backgrounds that the typology 
method attempts to control will be the provider and source of this material. However, this 
alternative view of responsibility does not abstract from this material as a means of 
accessing an individual’s sterilised efforts. Rather, agents’ efforts are regarded as being 
directed toward this material to transform it into a site of responsible action.  
The matter of control is still alluded to in Taylor’s account but not in the same way 
as Roemer employs it. In holding individuals responsible for their evaluations we are 
stipulating that they have a certain control over their sense of the importance of things, of 
the sense in which things matter to them. These evaluations are not impositions from some 
external source. They are the consequence of a person’s on-going effort and activity to 
make sense of what they are doing. It is the presence of the agent in these evaluations, the 
deliberations and decisions she makes regarding her actions, dispositions and preferences 
which lead to judgements of responsibility. For Roemer’s model this presence is neither 
here nor there. Indeed, there is a certain irony in Roemer’s model in that, although he 
claims to use effort as a means of tracking the control an agent exercises, this control does 
not have to be acknowledged by the agents themselves. It is the mechanics of the type that 
measure the control being exercised.     
However, although control remains a part of this alternative vision of responsibility, 
the capacity of evaluation on which it relies is still complicated by the lack of control at the 
level of background circumstances. These backgrounds are very rarely things that can be 
controlled: we are always dealing with givens in making our evaluations. Indeed, the use of 
the type recognises precisely this. But the givens that some people have to face seem more 
conducive to the development of skills necessary for effective evaluations. The terms of 
this fairness are necessarily complex and difficult to elucidate. But individuals from radically 
different backgrounds facing radically different prospects will be presented with very 
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different material from which evaluations – and the understandings of the activities that 
issue from them – are to be fashioned.  
This turn toward the capacity for evaluation might seem a long way from the 
smoking and education examples. I have turned the argument towards more complex 
matters of the self, so the responsibility here in question might seem to have very little to 
do with either the distributive questions motivating Roemer’s methodology or the policies 
he proposes as answers to them. In order to make this alternative vision of responsibility 
relevant I therefore need to motivate this shift toward the language of evaluation.   
Effects of Disadvantage on Evaluative Competence  
If effort is the proposed moral centre of the person it makes sense to ask what it is the 
centre of, i.e. what is the concept of the person that acts as the complement to this idea of 
effort? Roemer’s methodology, as I argue above, relies on an unappealing normative view 
of the person. In developing this different evaluative dimension the moral status effort 
enjoys is complemented by an additional account of the capacities that constitute the 
person. As Taylor again puts it: ‘A person is a being who has a sense of self, has a notion of 
the future and the past, can hold values, make choices… at least, a person must be the kind 
of being who is in principle capable of all this, however damaged these capacities may be in 
practice’.146 In abstracting away from those capacities (and their damages) and attempting 
to deal with effort alone we lose a sense of their practical development and relevance, of 
the degrees that they can admit and of the ways in which they can be either stunted or 
nourished by one’s environment.  
Inequalities in the opportunities people face throughout their lives can be 
understood, in part, by reference to inequalities in people’s evaluative capacities. 
Advantaged types enjoy environments more conducive to the development of these 
capacities than disadvantaged. Inequalities in evaluative capacities are therefore a useful 
way of characterising the influence of injustice on people’s sense of what they are doing 
and their intentions in doing it. In so doing it complicates the assumed equivalences that 
underlie Roemer’s intertype comparisons: our ability to make sense of the opportunities 
we confront is not just a matter of our facing different sets of options with different 
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quantities of resources. There is also the need to account for the self-understandings, 
sense of security or its lack and the relations we have with other people which ultimately 
make those opportunities intelligible for us. It is because of the evaluations we form that 
we are able to employ our efforts, talents and desires in the pursuit of ends we have 
reason to value. Abstracting effort from our use of these capacities neglects a great deal of 
the work that they do (or are unable to do) for us. 
This evaluative competence can be broken down into different aspects. The effects 
of disadvantage can then be discerned as they impact at these different levels. First is that 
initial articulation of how things matter to a person. This is not tied in any conceptually 
necessary way to the having of a range of alternatives. Things can matter to people without 
them having access to a plethora of different options. Think of the Amish way of life or 
other isolated communities who lack ready alternatives but who remain capable of 
articulating what they care about. More generally though, our articulations of what matters 
to us are formed out of backgrounds we have very little to do with creating, even though 
we are able to consider, possibly, a great many alternatives. Devout religious observers as 
well as the ‘tamed housewife’ are both capable of articulating their sense of the good 
without a variety of choices against which to do so.147 However, the presence and real 
availability of alternatives commonly provide a means of understanding our choices and 
the articulations we end up with. Housewives and religious observers – even those who do 
not find their convictions particularly hard to bear – can be understood as lacking a sense 
of – and access to – alternative ways of understanding their lives and other possible 
interpretations of what could constitute their good. Disadvantage can, in part, describe the 
lack of a ‘favourable environment’ within which these articulations are first formulated as 
well as revisions that later get made to them.148     
The example of the ‘lazy’ inner-city student can also be described as lacking this 
sense of alternatives. Without confidence in their abilities, appropriate role models or the 
encouragement of either peers or adults, such students have a stifled vision of the 
alternatives that are perhaps formally available to them. What they come to care about is 
formed against a background where alternatives are insufficiently illuminated. If these 
‘missing’ parts of the background had been made available, a whole other person with a 
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different articulation of what mattered to him could have emerged. The processes and 
challenges of this articulation are missing if we dismiss this person as not only lazy, but as 
‘equally’ lazy as students who possessed all the requisite background conditions, resources 
and opportunities and yet failed to try hard at school.   
Secondly, by giving a sense of how things matter to a person this initial articulation 
is then used as a guide for action. For instance, a person who identifies with the cause of 
socialism will involve herself in various courses of action to put that identification into 
effect; joining a union, attending local talks, demonstrations and meetings and/or reading 
relevant economic and political theory. It will not do for a person to espouse an account of 
the good which then affects nothing in her behaviour. However, this follow-through on 
one’s articulation is not a consequence of sheer will alone. It is, like the initial articulation, 
also affected by the support one experiences from one’s parents, peers or other possible 
figures of authority, the time one has available for particular activities and the security and 
confidence people have in their abilities to pursue them. The presence or absence of just 
one of these can make enormous differences.  
So people gain a sense of what matters to them and then would like to act 
according to that articulation. But in situations characterised by disadvantage where 
perhaps other more urgent ends need attending to, these preferences for action may have 
to take a backseat. There may be women who believe deeply in the virtues associated with 
private entrepreneurship but who are prevented from pursuing this because they are 
confined to the household by the expectations of their husbands, extended families and 
peers. Others who experience less pressure, who are bold enough to resist those 
expectations or whose more basic needs are met, will have more freedom to pursue their 
sense of the good and do not have to worry about these issues. They are free to be guided 
by those higher aspirations and that loftier sense of what matters to them.  Without an 
appreciation of the evaluative spaces within which decisions are made we have no sense of 
what it is possible for the individual to include and what she is forced to exclude in the way 
of possibly valuable courses of action.149 Moreover, we also lack a sense of the meaning of 
effort that is not forthcoming or the effort that is forthcoming but goes into other activities 
that are not so deeply cared about.  
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Disadvantage does not just impact on people’s ability to meet their basic needs. It 
resonates out into the rest of a person’s life. This is similar to Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-
Shalit’s work on the impact disadvantage has on a person’s ‘sustained functionings’. 150 
Sustained functionings are those parts of our life that are most basic to our welfare and 
which we need to secure against overt risk. This category is by no means fixed but would 
usually entail access to food, shelter and some minimum standard of healthcare and 
education. When these are inadequately secured the rest of a person’s welfare is put at risk. 
In addition, the absence of ‘sustained functionings’ brings with it a lack of adequate space 
within which people can develop a sense of their preferences, desires and possible 
conceptions of the good, because they are too involved with attempts to secure the more 
basic groundings of their existence.  
Finally, there is the openness to re-evaluation of how things matter to us and our 
ability to put these reassessments into effect. The kind of openness and competence 
necessary for this negotiation – the awareness of options, the ability to choose reasonably 
amongst them and then to see them through to completion151 – are not free from socio-
economic influence. People who are more secure – in both the financial and emotional 
senses of that term – may be more willing to experiment with this kind of openness, to 
throw themselves open to radical reformulations and re-evaluations. People who lack this 
security might be more reticent in attempting such reformulations, worried about what it 
might mean for their current projects and the resources that might be put in serious 
jeopardy by too radical a change.  
In these moments of re-evaluation one runs the risk of recognising mistakes in 
one’s past choices. The relatively advantaged might see such revelation as beneficial, 
exposing flaws in their past conceptions and allowing rectification. This rectification is going 
to have practical consequences on the way a life is being led. For instance, a desire to 
change occupation will require re-skilling, the sacrifice of a certain status in a particular 
profession as well as the resources that accompanied that status. Those with the support 
to see through these changes have benefits unavailable to those who are less fortunate. 
The less fortunate will only expose themselves to the revelation without the means 
necessary to see those re-evaluations take effect in reality.     
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When we reflect on the behaviours and attitudes of those less fortunate than 
ourselves we should, as Tim Scanlon suggests, ‘recognise that what separates us from such 
people is not just, as we would like to think, that we behave better and choose more wisely, 
but also our luck in being the kind of people who respond in these ways’ we see as valuable 
and worthwhile.152 This ‘luck’ is in part constituted by the opportunities and choices we 
have faced, and the shape these have given to our evaluations and the projects, ends and 
possibilities that have been opened up for us. This cannot be controlled for and merely 
whisked away by algorithms and statistical imagination but is rather a fundamental part of 
the injustices that structure relations between the advantaged and disadvantaged.  
This evaluative competence is missing from Roemer’s use of the concept of 
conversion ability. Without giving proper attention to the differences in opportunities to 
develop this evaluative competence, Roemer ends up stipulating compatibility between 
centiles and making overly simplistic comparisons across types. In not being able to capture 
the complexity of these issues something is missed with regards to how individuals actually 
confront the world around them depending on the advantage they enjoy or disadvantage 
they suffer. People denied the opportunity to develop the different aspects that make up 
evaluative competence cannot be accused of failing to try hard, even controlling for the 
effects of the type. Holding individuals equally responsible – even in the technically 
ingenious way in which this is cashed out by Roemer – when they face vastly different 
possibilities produces an image of effort that is incapable of capturing the invidious effects 
of injustice and disadvantage.  
Roemer’s model ‘inappropriately reifies’ the social processes that structure these 
possibilities because at no point is responsibility seen as being a competence that is in 
important ways denied to certain people. We are all equally responsible for where we end 
up within the type and so the effects of injustice on that competence are hidden from 
sight.153 What Roemer attempts to do is wrestle with the problem of establishing a 
comparable basis of responsibility. It is this which motivates the move to inter-type 
comparisons. However, while the move is intuitively persuasive, on reflection it fails to 
convince that equality has been reached in any substantive sense. It fails because 
advantage and disadvantage are framed at one remove from the ways in which effort and 
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control are actually experienced, and how people are shaped by the environments within 
which they live their lives. 
 
Conclusion 
What emerges from this extended engagement with Roemer is essentially an addendum to 
the work done in the previous chapter. Roemer’s account is undoubtedly ambitious and 
performs the impressive feat of combining a notion of responsibility that is both extensive 
and broadly endorsed across all parts of the political spectrum, with aggressively egalitarian 
proposals. In particular, the way it can justify different levels of spending on policies like 
education before the competition in the marketplace gets going, means it is able to escape 
the compensatory paradigm and use redistributive measures to generate far more 
transformative legislation.  
However, it relies on a pair of comparisons between and within types that fail to 
capture the complexities in the ways we use effort. The comparison between types relies 
on the assumption that people at opposite ends of the spectrum of advantage can be 
described as doing effectively equivalent things, ‘trying (or failing to try) hard’ in the same 
way but with different resources. Differences in initial resources justify different levels of 
distributional rewards. However, though different levels of distribution might be welcome 
they are grounded in a false equivalence. Lazy individuals who enjoy all the trappings of 
privilege and support should not be deemed equivalent to ‘lazy’ individuals who lack all 
those things. 
The second comparison within types relies on an account of responsibility which is 
tied closely to issues of control. Where we line up within our type is said to be down to 
something called ‘autonomously chosen effort’. However, even where the type is supposed 
to account for and eliminate the effects of background conditions, control is simply too 
strong a term to describe a great deal of what we bring about in the world and how we do 
it. Too much of who we are as people are the result of things over which we have no 
control and which we are also unable to systematically account for without stretching the 
type almost indefinitely.  
At the end of this chapter I have tried to offer an alternative vision of responsibility 
that both takes seriously the effects of injustice and incorporates criticisms surrounding 
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Roemer’s collapsing of responsibility into questions of control. Our sense of what matters 
to us informs the plans and commitments we make and the lives we end up leading. This 
process of discovering what it is we care about is deeply dependent on the circumstances 
within which we live and mature. The experience of serious injustice will affect the 
development of competencies necessary to this process. For example, injustice affects the 
ability of individuals to properly assess and pursue their sense of what matters to them 
because of a possibly restricted sense of their options or lack of support in their pursuit. 
Responsibility is not determined by what we can isolate from this process. Judgements of 
responsibility must take account of the effects of injustice on the ability of people to take 
effective control over what matters to them and what gives their lives meaning and 
purpose. Roemer’s model is incapable of performing this function.  
In line with the conclusion of the last chapter, I suggest we avoid the idea of effort 
as representing some residual category for which we can be held responsible. It should not 
be employed as a means of justifying inequality in however elaborate a form. Effort is 
inappropriately employed when it is given this function, focussing too much attention on 
sticky problems of ‘free will’ and the foundations of ‘real responsibility’. In so doing, it 
directs attention away from the practical, lived experiences of which effort is such an 
important and irreplaceable part. The next chapter considers one of the ways in which the 
‘lived experience’ of effort has been tackled in current literature: that is, the effort 
expended in maintaining relations of reciprocity between members of political and 
economic communities.   
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Effort as Reciprocity 
In the first chapter I examined the relation between effort and burden. I considered 
approaches which argue that deserts are related to the costs a person suffers in the 
performance of certain activities. The approach I considered in the second chapter regards 
effort as that which it is within our power to control and for which we are therefore 
responsible. Decisions regarding the extent of people’s responsibility issue in further 
decisions of a redistributive nature: deserts are to be determined solely by people’s efforts. 
Both effort-as-burden and effort-as-responsibility focus on gaining access to the interior of 
the self: one posits the experience of hardship and disutility as the crux of effort’s meaning, 
the other argues that responsibility and effort are synonyms for one another.      
The present chapter exits the interior of the person and instead investigates the 
spaces between people. I consider the ways in which the efforts of individuals are needed 
to maintain relations of reciprocity within an on-going political and economic community. 
In particular I focus on Stuart White and his work on what he calls the ‘civic minimum’. The 
civic minimum is essentially a description of a set of conditions that need to be fulfilled to a 
sufficient degree before demands of reciprocal effort can be considered legitimate. Where 
this sufficiency is not met such demands cannot be fully justified.     
The aims of this chapter can be summed up as follows. First, I briefly explore the 
debates within which White’s approach offers a significant contribution. I then provide an 
explication of the key concepts and ambitions of his project. Where conditions of a just 
background are sufficiently met, effort is synonymous with the productive contributions we 
owe to others with whom we share the burdens of cooperation. Where this effort is not 
forthcoming injustice is being perpetrated.  
However, I argue that the demandingness of different tasks in ‘non-ideal’ and 
‘actual’ circumstances cannot be derived from considerations of ideal theory. Too exclusive 
a focus on ideal theory obstructs our view of other possible contributions that cannot be 
described as productive. In current political reality we require a different kind of individual 
able to contribute in ways that are neither substantially reciprocal nor productive. 
Moreover, the types of individuals needed and generated by the demands of non-ideal 
environments – agitators and political activists – are essential in defining the content of 
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‘productive contributions’.154 Productivity is itself a contentious and historically changing 
term. It is not a fixed concept about which we have, at this juncture, achieved something of 
a permanent understanding: what we mean by contribution evolves and expands, often 
out of the heat of fierce, sometimes violent, debate and contestation. 
The activities of agitators are not likely to be embraced or saluted by all members 
of a community and can sometimes be met with possibly severe resistance. They might be 
dismissed by productive others precisely because they regard them as non-contributory 
and as disruptive of productive contributions currently being made. By ignoring the 
necessity of this kind of activity and focusing on narrowly productive contributions, the 
expansive, transformative but nonetheless potentially parasitic – and certainly non-
productive – efforts of agitators and other politically relevant actors are inadvertently 
marginalised.  
Stake-holding 
Concern with this substantive background is something I argued was missing from the 
previous chapter. In Roemer’s model individuals can be compared across types even 
though what individuals experience within those different types might be qualitatively very 
different. By focusing on the quality of the backgrounds against which opportunities are 
faced and choices made, disparities in the experiences of advantaged and disadvantaged 
can be more directly confronted. It is by paying attention at this level that we avoid 
drawing false equivalences between individuals whose life chances are utterly different. 
We thereby sensitize our understanding of inequality to the more complex effects of 
injustice. Although White does not employ effort in so central a position as Roemer, his 
account nevertheless achieves significant insights by taking a step back from the actual 
expenditure of effort and exploring the quality of the environment within which that 
expenditure takes place.  
White’s view of effort, more often than not phrased as ‘productive contribution’, is 
framed by an overarching concern with establishing the correct terms of economic 
citizenship. He describes the fundamental rights and obligations that should inform and 
structure the ways in which we live our lives; both as individuals with our own projects and 
commitments to attend to and as interacting and interdependent members of a political 
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and economic community. Defining the terms of economic citizenship should thus be 
understood as part of the background against which justice is to be initiated: we work out 
the correct terms of cooperation (what we owe to others) and entitlement (what we are 
owed) and from this gain an idea of what institutions and policies are necessary to establish 
a just society.155 In its ideal form this amounts to a particular conception of justice (justice 
as fair-dues reciprocity) which is satisfied ‘when the demands of reciprocity are made in the 
context of policies and institutions that, among other things, prevent or fully correct for 
unequal access to the means of production and unequal marketable talents’.156  
White’s specific project contributes to a wider literature on the so-called 
‘stakeholder society’.157 The emphasis of this literature is on the emancipatory potential of 
providing individuals with ‘assets’ – stakes – within the economic system.158 These assets 
can come in the form of basic capital grants, a universal basic income to be paid in 
increments, or a fund intended for a given set of activities such as (re)training or 
education.159 This reflects moves made by the left more generally toward ‘supply side’ 
egalitarianism, i.e. providing people with goods necessary both for meeting their 
fundamental needs and for effective competition with one another in the marketplace. The 
efficiency of the market is therefore sustained whilst also supplemented by greater 
protection for people in the event of serious market fallouts.  
In addition, stake-holding has the potential to enable individuals and groups to 
explore new possibilities in economic and political governance.160  This emphasis on 
enhancing individuals’ market capacities and using the institutions of private property and 
the market replaces (or complements) more traditional left-wing strategies which argue for 
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the socialised means of production and control over the division of labour. 161  The market 
as an institution is thus taken as both a necessary and effective institution so long as 
adequate attention is paid to its functioning and to appropriately skilling all people for 
participation in the marketplace.162  
Assets provide people with more equitable starting points so that on entering the 
marketplace they compete with one another on a more level playing field. This is similar to 
Roemer’s intent in employing the type methodology. The important difference is that 
White is not instituting this playing field in order to reward people’s moral centre with its 
just deserts. Rather, his model distributes assets as a way to alleviate market vulnerability, 
improve workers’ bargaining positions vis-à-vis employers and reduce the pressure of 
responding to market demands by providing all with a decent, stable material minimum.163 
In addition, assets endow people with the ability to develop themselves and their 
capacities and pursue ends they have reason to value. Moreover, much like the evaluative 
space considered at the end of the last chapter, resources are important in providing the 
space necessary for people to reflect on the direction their lives currently take and, if need 
be, change that course.164 However, resources require an environment conducive to this 
kind of use. Where Roemer fails to adequately account for such structural concerns, they 
appear front and centre in White’s description of the civic minimum.    
This provides a brief picture of the kind of arguments in which White’s work on 
effort/contribution has participated. The overriding tenets of his project are the creation of 
favourable background conditions from within which individuals are 1) able to fairly and 
effectively contribute to the communities to which they belong and 2) have the resources 
and endowments necessary to live fulfilling lives. We can summarise these different 
ambitions as, respectively, the ‘contributory aspect’ and the ‘capacity aspect’. The first is 
concerned with the effort individuals ply into their (sufficiently just) communities in order 
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to ground their entitlement to the fruit of that collective productivity. The second is 
concerned with the capacities and opportunities that are made available to individuals who 
have at their command significant quantities of resources and enjoy institutional structures 
that facilitate the use of these resources in pursuit of various worthwhile ends.  
The Civic Minimum 
What then are the specific tenets of White’s scheme of economic citizenship? There are a 
number of concepts White uses that need fleshing out and connecting in order to 
illuminate an account that is both complex and radical in its implications. A useful starting 
point is White’s idea of the civic minimum. The civic minimum establishes the basic 
conditions against which all economic activity has to take place if the demand to participate 
in such activity is to be regarded as just. If these background conditions do not satisfy a 
minimum threshold of fairness, then the cooperation that emerges fails to qualify as fully 
fair.165 A lack of justice at the background level reduces the legitimacy of the demands that 
our community can make of us vis-à-vis our reciprocating, productive efforts. This 
minimum threshold is animated by reference to the proletarian condition, the second term 
that needs explication.  
The proletarian condition is employed by White as a term that broadly 
encompasses the ‘bads’ of life under capitalism. All such bads need alleviation to at least 
some degree in order to establish a background that is just enough to render demands of 
contribution minimally legitimate.166 This is to be considered a matter of degree so that 
reduced contributions can be demanded against backgrounds of diminished economic and 
institutional fairness. This is crucial to the critique I provide below.  
Alleviation of the different parts of the proletarian condition runs as follows: non-
immiseration (the elimination of ‘brute luck poverty in income or, more generally, in (a 
person’s) capability for core well-being and/or ethical agency’); market security (‘each 
citizen should enjoy adequate protection against market vulnerability and the exploitation 
and abuse to which it can lead’); work as challenge (the opportunity to have work become 
a ‘site of intrinsically valuable challenge’ – also framed as opportunity for ‘self-realisation in 
work’)167; minimized class division (reduction of inequalities in educational opportunities 
and initial access to wealth to a ‘reasonable minimum’); and non-discrimination (protection 
                                                          
165
 White, The Civic Minimum, p 19. 
166
 Ibid. p 87-91. 
167
 I discuss this particular aspect of the proletarian condition in the final chapter. 
86 
 
against discrimination in areas such as education and employment on the basis of morally 
arbitrary characteristics).168  It is only against a background of economic institutions that 
are able to satisfy these conditions that a contributory obligation can be imposed on 
citizens and relations of genuine reciprocity – as opposed to asymmetry and exploitation – 
can be established.169 
The alleviation of this proletarian condition is justified by reference to what White 
terms the ethical-integrity interests of individuals. For a person to adequately develop a 
view of the good life their ethical integrity must be protected. This holds across all 
legitimate conceptions of the good: where ethical integrity is lacking the ends and 
preferences that people develop do so in unjust situations.170 To live within the constraints 
of the proletarian condition is therefore to have one’s ability to live a meaningful life 
sharply impinged upon precisely because such interests are always either undermined or at 
significant risk of being so.  
These ethical-integrity interests can be broken down into three parts: the first is an 
interest in physical integrity, the ability to draw boundaries between one’s own person and 
others and to regulate the movement of others across those boundaries. To lack fulfilment 
of this condition is to lack a fundamental physical and psychological condition of ethical 
agency. The second aspect is expressive-integrity. This is a ‘matter of being able to live in 
authentic accordance with one’s view of how life is best lived’.171 This integrity is violated 
when one is pressured into conforming to other ways of life, professing commitment to a 
set of beliefs one does not genuinely endorse. The result involves a dichotomy within the 
individual between how she appears to others and who she feels herself to be or who she 
would like to become. The final integrity interest is deliberative-integrity: each individual 
has a right to enjoy adequate opportunities to deliberate and reflect on what she regards 
as the good life (including the ability to evaluate and consider other views that pertain to 
possible good lives) and the ways in which she is able to pursue it.172  Alleviation of the 
proletarian condition is necessary for the protection and realisation of these integrity 
interests.  
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The content of these integrity interests lead us to another of White’s terms: 
democratic mutual regard. The commonly-shared institutions that govern the lives of a 
community of citizens must respect their integrity interests and work to prevent their 
violation. In accordance with this principle each citizen must consider the effect that 
different institutional arrangements have both on her own and on other’s integrity 
interests. These considerations issue in the following maxim: ‘each must respect the basic 
interests of all’.173  
What this amounts to is a community-wide internalisation of a certain viewpoint 
with respect to these interests, i.e. that citizens should never permit their violation nor play 
a role in reproducing the background conditions that make such violations more likely. This 
internalisation has consequences for other members of the community: if I believe 
protection of these integrity interests are appropriate for me as ‘a self-respecting citizen’ 
then they are perforce appropriate for each and every other member of my community. 
They thereby set a limit to which all institutional and policy matters must pay sufficient 
heed. As a result, ‘a democratic social order is one in which individuals can mutually affirm 
the social arrangements in which they live as respecting their standing as free and equal 
citizens’.174 
Democratic mutual regard is also the ethos that underlines what in White’s account 
is perhaps the most important idea for the concerns of this thesis: the idea of fair-dues 
reciprocity. The idea can be summed up with the following: where the institutions 
governing economic life are otherwise sufficiently just, i.e. alleviate the proletarian 
condition and protect citizens’ integrity interests to a significant degree, and by virtue of 
this provide citizens with both adequate opportunity for productive participation and a 
sufficiently generous share of the social product, people have an obligation to make a 
‘decent productive contribution’ to the community.175 Reciprocity is thus a ‘primary virtue 
of shared productive endeavour in its own right’, irreducible to any other egalitarian 
concern.176  
By alleviating the proletarian condition and thereby protecting people’s integrity 
interests, the institutional background against which individuals are expected to expend 
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their effort is legitimised. In establishing a just institutional order it is fair and right to 
expect capable people to contribute to the productive efforts of their community as a way 
of sustaining the justice of that order and sharing in the burdens which its on-going stability 
and efficacy demand. Conversely, to do otherwise in such a situation is unacceptable: 
reciprocating effort becomes a legitimate and inescapable demand in the light of the goods 
that others produce for our use. 
Effort within this context is thus seen in terms of the contribution one makes to the 
overall production of one’s community. It is a duty, in the light of the attitude underlining 
democratic mutual regard, that each one of a community’s members makes a ‘reasonable 
effort’ to ensure that others in that community are not burdened by their membership. The 
notion of reasonable effort is elastic, depending on the individual’s capacity to contribute: 
reduce that capacity to zero, in the case of children, the severely disabled and the very 
elderly, and their respective obligations will be reduced accordingly.177 But if one is able to 
contribute and does not make the effort to do so, this violates the principle of democratic 
mutual regard and the attitude of fair-dues reciprocity that is emblematic of a healthy, 
cooperative society in which those who enjoy the products of (a sufficiently just) 
collaboration should also contribute to their production.178  
To sum up what I take to be White’s position in drawing all these strands together: 
against a background of a sufficiently just economic order which protects the integrity 
interests of each member of a community, all such beneficiaries are obliged to contribute 
to the productive work of that society to the best of their ability. Members of a community 
who fail to contribute in such a situation gain illegitimate access to the goods their 
community creates. To neglect to contribute is to exploit one’s fellow citizens and live in a 
parasitic relation to them, failing to treat them with appropriate democratic mutual regard. 
Responding to demands to make productive contributions is also a rejection of this 
parasitic relation and an embrace of the demands of fair-dues reciprocity: one is not a 
burden to one’s community without whom they would be better off, but an active 
participant in the group’s continuing shared labour.  
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What is particularly commendable about White’s account is the way in which he 
moves between contemporary intuitions and images regarding ‘people pulling their weight’ 
and a recognition that there needs to be a sufficient background without which such 
demands cannot be legitimately made. These contemporary intuitions, adopted from a 
different political slant and dominated by a particular agenda, are often unremittingly 
scathing of a so-called underclass and undeserving poor. They are described as feckless 
drains on the resources of society who must be corralled into work against their will if 
necessary.179 Such views pay little or no regard to the background against which these 
sizeable (40 hour a week) demands can legitimately be made. Instead, they posit the 
demands for productive contribution as prior to other concerns, including those of 
individual’s integrity interests. There exists no appeal to the injustice of the background 
conditions that can excuse non-contribution. At work in these intuitions and their agendas 
is the idea that individuals possess the skills, capacities, and dispositions necessary for 
effective contribution irrespective of the on-going unfavourable societal processes and 
practices that surround them.180 
 In challenging these dispositions and attitudes, White accomplishes a similar task 
to Roemer: marrying strenuous claims of responsibility with recognition of the disparities in 
advantage which inevitably complicate those claims. White, like Roemer, does admirably in 
defeating these unfair assumptions and rescuing the value of reciprocity from the 
prerogatives of particularly conservative perspectives and political programmes. Moreover, 
White avoids the pitfalls of Roemer’s account by taking into account the practical effects of 
injustice on the possibility for responsible action when crucial integrity interests are 
violated. White effectively demonstrates how empty much of the contemporary discourse 
of parasitism is in current political reality and provides effective tools to expose the 
viciousness of its intentions.181  
Contribution  
In a situation where the integrity interests are protected and the thresholds of the civic 
minimum have been met, the contribution to reciprocate the efforts of others is fairly 
straight-forward: if I have contributed a certain amount of effort from which you benefit 
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and which you recognise as beneficial then I am entitled to having the same conditions 
satisfied by you. To refuse to reciprocate in such a situation is to fail to satisfy the 
democratic mutual regard owed to contributing others and thus to behave as a parasite. 
What is the content of a productive contribution then? For labour to count as 
contributory in the relevant sense it must be what White terms ‘civic labour’. This is labour 
that provides a significant service to or on behalf of the wider community.182 This requires 
that contributions are not only regarded as valuable by the provider but are also 
recognised as such by the recipients of our reciprocating efforts as well. This is because 
recipients have themselves participated in the production of goods enjoyed by those now 
obliged to return the favour. Lawrence Becker has framed this point as follows: ‘The good 
returned will have to be good for the recipient, and eventually perceived by the recipient 
both as a good and as a return.’183 I call this condition – that the people receiving others’ 
reciprocal effort must recognise it as such – the subjective dimension of reciprocity. 
The first form of civic labour is contributions made in the marketplace. By joining a 
company or starting up their own, people are making efforts to provide a service that 
answers to a human want or need. The second type of civic labour is the contributions 
made in the public sector, which can be further divided between the provision of ‘merit’ 
goods (public provision motivated by concerns of distributive justice) and ‘public’ goods 
(characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry such as the defence of a country or the 
supplying of a lighthouse).184 The third type is care work contributions. Care work describes 
the efforts made by capable others to satisfy the needs of individuals who cannot meet 
those needs themselves. This includes the work of looking after children and the infirm.185 
In all these forms of labour the subjective dimension is at work. First, the market 
has an important role in organising individuals’ preferences. Others then provide a service 
which satisfies those preferences: if people are willing to part with money to receive the 
goods and services provided then we can judge the effort that went into the production of 
those goods or services to be an effective contribution. It follows that the more people are 
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willing to pay for the effort manifest in those goods and services, the larger is the 
contribution that is being made.186  
White accepts that the presence of a market demand per se does not automatically 
render productive contributions which attempt to satisfy that demand. For example, 
prostitution, firearms and heroin have both excited considerable market demand but can 
be deemed illegitimate on grounds of, in the first case, violations of integrity interests, in 
the second and third, paternalism. These issues are controversial, and White admits that 
where such controversy exists there is likely to be disagreement as to what labour can 
count as civic.187 There are additional limits to market contributions: where public provision 
is inadequate it could signal excessive production in the private sector and a need to adjust 
productive priorities. In which case, certain of the market-oriented productive efforts 
would fail to count as civic labour until appropriate adjustments have been made. 
Public sector goods are not validated in the same way as market-generated 
employment, i.e. through consumer preference and purchase. However, the subjective 
dimension remains an important measure of the contributive status of public sector 
provision.188 In determining whether or not this kind of labour is productive we need to 
look at whether what it provides is meeting the general interest of the population or if, on 
the contrary, it is the interest of the sector itself that is acting as the spur to production 
rather than any underlying genuine need.189 This becomes harder to assess in the absence 
of the consumer preferences that are available to measure the contributions made in the 
marketplace.  
Yet there remain possible standards to which we refer our reciprocal contributive 
efforts in the public sector. These efforts are directed toward and checked by the relatively 
fixed and determinate integrity interests described above.190 Integrity interests do not 
admit of the same flexibility and expansiveness as market preferences and the efforts that 
go into providing them lack ready-made institutional forms, like the market, to facilitate 
their measurement. However, assuming we can devise means that measure what must be 
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practically done to respond to citizens’ integrity interests, the provision of such goods is still 
checked by reference to the subjective dimension. Public good provision must be 
recognised as a good and as a return by those who pay for it and receive it. The same 
applies to care work: when effort expended in care is not recognised as contributive, by the 
application of some appropriate standard, then it fails to register as answering the 
reciprocal obligation to contribute.191 
 How much we are expected to contribute depends on our own productive abilities 
and the type of needs to which we are responding. In ideal circumstances (or sufficiently 
just non-ideal circumstances as described by the civic minimum) benefits that are accrued 
generate a reciprocal obligation to contribute. It is only the different ways that contribution 
might be made which present us with problems, the technical details and measurements of 
that effort. Whether it is through the market, provision of public goods or care work, some 
productive effort must be made to meet one’s obligations.  
Individuals are asked to share the benefits and burdens of production. These 
different accounts of contribution effectively capture our general intuitions regarding what 
we owe to one another in light of the fulfilment of minimum standards of justice. However, 
once we step away from ideal circumstances new problems emerge. The only 
considerations at the ideal level are how much to contribute (depending on my capacity to 
do so) and the means by which to do it (paid employment in either the market or public 
sector or care-work). But what do we owe others when these standards are not met? 
Benefits can still be accrued in non-ideal situations: injustice does not have to completely 
eliminate all benefits to count as injustice. Are these to be benefits enjoyed without any 
need for the return of effort of some kind? Must such efforts conform to the same 
productive demands, if only in some more limited way?  
Ideal, Non-Ideal & the Actual  
Productive contributions, which seem thoroughly appropriate in situations of substantive 
justice, do not necessarily merit the same valuations in situations that are not just. 
Moreover, the subjective dimension which acts as a measure of those contributions, most 
explicitly in the case of the market, is unable to track other efforts we have reason to value 
but which might prove antagonistic toward citizen’s productive contributions. These are 
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the efforts of political agitators and campaigners which aim at the disruption of productive 
contributions. Unfortunately they are insufficiently motivated by White because his 
account uses the ideal as a framing device for other relevant levels of political theorising.    
There are three levels at work within White’s account. First, there is the ideal 
standard of justice as fair-dues reciprocity. In ideal societies the proletarian condition has 
been fully removed. The obligation to contribute one’s efforts to the tasks of productive 
cooperation through either the market or public service exists at full force: there would be 
no mitigating circumstance (other than an absence of capacity) to excuse idleness in the 
face of others’ productive efforts. 192 The second level refers to a society which is 
‘substantially just’. In this situation, individuals would contribute at an intensity close to 
that of a fully just society. However, there might remain, for instance, concern over matters 
of brute luck poverty affecting individuals’ access to advantage.193 This second level thus 
changes, by a matter of degree, the contribution individuals owe to their society. However, 
the nature of the contribution remains the same: it still refers to specifically productive 
contributions regardless of the shift in levels from the ideal to the non-ideal. We merely 
have a ‘modest downward adjustment of the work expectation’.194  
The third level – where the proletarian condition has not been noticeably relieved – 
sustains this understanding of contribution: there is one more downward adjustment of 
what can be expected of people when there is a substantial distance between their set of 
circumstances and the ideal formulation of justice. Expectations are still cashed out in 
terms of productive contribution, which is still determined by current market valuations 
and preferences or by reference to the present institutional matrix of public service. To his 
credit, White expands productive contributions to include care-work and domestic labour. 
This recognises the extent of the interdependence that underwrites the economy and 
seeks recognition for these contributions. 195  It is from within present institutional 
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structures – replete with their deficiencies – that reciprocating productive efforts are made 
and the (admittedly downsized) contributory obligations are met.196 
White recognises the importance of the shifts between the three levels: ‘One 
important issue concerns how our specification of the basic work expectation should be 
adjusted to take account of the residual injustices that will characterize a society that 
satisfies fair reciprocity only in its non-ideal form.’ Further, when these ‘residual injustices’ 
are particularly intense the basic work expectation disappears: ‘if the disadvantage is great 
enough, such that the effort to make a contribution is likely to expose individuals to risk of 
substantial harm, then these individuals have no moral obligation to make a productive 
contribution to the community’.197 This idea of substantial harm is filled out, in a footnote, 
by the idea of a slave’s perfect entitlement to revolt against his master.198 This is a very low 
threshold to specify what harm can entail. There is a large gap between the harms slaves 
suffer and the harms we can be said to suffer in our contemporary situation for instance. 
Are the harms faced in the context of contemporary capitalism sufficient to disrupt the 
dialled-down contributions a person makes? Or does this remain in effect until a certain 
level of immiseration is met, at which point total withdrawal can be legitimated?   
I endorse White’s stipulation that a ‘class of disadvantaged individuals is… perfectly 
entitled to withdraw from active cooperation with the economic system’ when the 
disadvantages they face are sufficient enough. However, I believe White leaves insufficient 
space to legitimatize such withdrawal in situations that lie somewhere between the abject 
horrors of slavery and the satisfaction of non-ideal thresholds specified by the proletarian 
condition. I want to suggest that withdrawals are justified prior to individuals suffering the 
‘substantial harms’ to which White refers. This refusal extends even to the dialled-down 
form White believes remains in effect when circumstances fail to meet the civic minimum. 
Political campaigns, civil disobedience and general economic disruption are activities which 
remain under-justified in White’s account. We need a greater sense of the demands that 
emerge in the gap between non-ideal thresholds and actual reality which cannot be 
fulfilled via people’s productive contributions.  
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Charles Mills’ notion of the ‘ideal as model’ elucidates the problem of allowing the 
level of the ideal to frame the other levels.199 By idealizing justice in terms of fair reciprocity 
and allowing it to set a standard that is then employed to measure levels of contribution, 
we take too little account of the substantial qualitative differences that exist between the 
demands these three levels make. As Mills put it, ‘ideal theory either tacitly represents the 
actual as a simple deviation from the ideal, not worth theorizing in its own right, or claims 
that starting from the ideal is at least the best way of realizing it’.200 Starting with the ideal 
is one thing. I can afford to be agnostic on this. But allowing it to permeate down into the 
non-ideal and actual is to understand those ‘lesser’ levels only in terms of their failure to 
meet the ideal: ‘we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension of the 
actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social institutions, and thereby 
guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved’.201 The ideal cannot 
have this all-encompassing role. While ideal models can act as ‘paradise islands’ (to borrow 
Ingrid Robeyns’ phrase),202 the image of standards and practices we can hope to approach, 
they do not tell us how to get closer to those islands and the quality of the work that is 
required at the other levels. 
Until we reach those thresholds of justice, harm, however minimal, will continue to 
be suffered. The issue is thus in specifying what makes this harm substantial enough to 
justify refusals to productively contribute. White offers some resources toward the 
answering of this question: when our integrity interests are adversely impacted on we can 
be said to suffer harm. Where they are harmed to a significant degree, these become 
substantial harms. However, excepting the case of the slave, fleshing out what these 
substantial harms amount to in the actual world is not an easy task. What is more, why 
should only substantial harms matter? Why isn’t it enough that harms are suffered to 
legitimate work in the name of justice, even if this means one’s productive contributions 
are reduced beyond the demand set by a downward adjustment of a basic work 
expectation?  
When our obligations are framed in purely productive terms we lose a sense of 
other obligations that might emerge at the non-ideal and actual levels. Since we only have 
so much effort (time and energy) to give, these other obligations can draw us away from 
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and conflict with productive civic labour.203 Without determining the status of these other 
obligations in non-ideal and actual worlds we are left at a loss in trying to determine the 
status of contribution when it is not directly productive. This is particularly strained given 
the emphasis White places on certain of our reciprocal actions being perceived as such by 
fellow members of our community.204 There is thus an unresolved tension between the 
(reduced) demand to contribute and the other tasks and the obligations they might 
conceivably generate which are also highly demanding, ‘effortful’ enterprises.  
At work in White’s account seems to be an image of society as a ledger in which 
individuals chalk up only their productive deposits and withdrawals. We take a share of the 
goods produced by social cooperation and in so doing establish in others an expectation for 
our reciprocal efforts. In order for withdrawals to be legitimate, deposits of a productive 
variety have to be made. I assume with White that it is possible to devise a ledger in such a 
way that the various differences between individuals’ capacities to expend effort can be 
properly accounted for. This would therefore shift reciprocity conceived as ‘strictly 
proportional’ toward the less demanding conception of ‘fair-dues reciprocity’: the less 
capable can do objectively less than the more talented but not be punished for the lack of 
equality between their abilities.205 Effort is a relative phenomenon that is to be measured 
against some pre-established, unchosen capacity to expend and does not demand the 
same objective contributions from the less fortunate as it does from the more.206    
However, it remains a ledger with a very specific notion of what is to count as a 
deposit, i.e. a productive contribution. But what happens when we consider the efforts of 
someone who withdraws their efforts from the marketplace in order to ply them 
elsewhere, in the pursuit of something she calls ‘social justice?’ Which side of the ledger’s 
line are her contributions to lie? Certainly, the organisation of protests can be costly from 
the point of view of the public purse: police involvement, disruptions to transport 
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infrastructure, interruptions in trade etc. These particular efforts, unless adequately 
balanced by productive contributions made at other times might appear parasitical and as 
large deductions from her societal ledger. They are efforts that are made at the expense of 
a person’s productive endeavours: when she is on the street protesting, she is not at a 
desk/on the shop floor/in the house/factory putting in her shift.    
Tying the value of effort so closely to the issue of production can lead to the 
valorisation of certain kinds of contributory effort and the detriment of others. In being so 
closely tied to this paradigm of productive contributions, the different ways people’s 
efforts build relations between them are too narrowly understood. What is more, tying 
effort to contribution in this way may introduce a sense in which the more obviously 
productive effort is to be more esteemed: the more we produce for the community 
(including in that community’s non-ideal and actual form) the more we are seen as 
answering to the demands of reciprocity. Of course, in non-ideal situations, given the 
downward adjustment to what we are expected to do, we can also contribute more than is 
demanded by justice. But there are other metrics which might still count as contributory 
even though they fail as either productive or even, to some extent at least, reciprocal. 
Agitation 
White’s model requires resources that enable us to move from within situations 
characterised by potentially profound and wide-spread injustices toward situations that 
better satisfy the thresholds constitutive of the civic minimum. It will, after all, take great 
effort to more fairly redistribute the burdens associated with our collective labours. Such 
efforts incur significant costs for the people attempting to enact changes in the relations 
between people. However, these efforts go unsupported in White’s model because the 
obligation to contribute productively, at least until a level of substantial harm has been 
reached, remains a metric by which all citizens should check their efforts.207 Where such 
substantial harms do not exist, agitators and activists can be described as behaving 
parasitically. 
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The efforts of many political activists (of all stripes) are intended as contributions to 
the public good, beneficial to others as well as themselves.208 At one point, White considers 
possible methods of generating ‘public-spirited preferences’ in the citizens of a community 
as a means of maintaining efficiency in the production of public sector goods. He discusses 
institutional measures like assemblies and citizen juries as means to these ends.209 
However, nowhere does he offer an account of political activists or agitators as possible 
means of generating public-spirited preferences.210 Activism incorporates a diverse range of 
activity including strikes, petitions, marches, lock-ins and various forms of civil 
disobedience. Through the use of such means, political activists hope to bring attention to 
and help affect remedies to perceived injustices. In the long term, such activity can force 
shifts in the practices and norms by which a society functions.  
It would seem odd to describe such activism as productive, at least within current 
understandings of what productive contributions amount to.211 Strikes, civil disobedience 
and the like are not made as a return for benefits received – as is demanded by the 
subjective dimension implied by reciprocity. Their intentions are rather to disrupt 
productive contributions, both of the agitators themselves and of other non-agitating 
citizens. These other citizens, who do fulfil their dialled-down productive contributions (and 
probably more) might baulk at the suggestion that agitators should register as contributory. 
Not only do they not perceive the agitator’s efforts as productive, neither do they register 
them as contributory. Instead, they assume the same status as parasites, receiving public 
goods to which they offer inadequate reciprocal effort. Indeed, given that they disrupt the 
productive efforts of others, they are worse than parasites who merely fail to contribute.  
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There is a sense in which agitators are being non-reciprocal in their efforts. 
Agitators violate the subjective dimension implicit in the concept of reciprocity. 212  As 
Becker puts it: ‘the mere recognition of a benefit seems to generate a sense of obligation to 
repay.’213 Part of this repayment is that it should fulfil the subjective dimension of 
reciprocity: repayment should be recognised as a good by the producer of the original 
benefit who regards reciprocal contributions as an expression of democratic mutual regard. 
Agitators ignore this condition, using and accepting (at least some of) the goods produced 
by others whilst not referring their own efforts to the standard that at least part of that 
effort be repayment in kind.214 The provider of goods can like it or lump it: agitators will use 
their efforts for something they and their co-agitators recognise as good. In the long-run, 
they might well be vindicated in their refusal to reciprocate, even by citizens currently 
labelling them parasites. In such a case where their efforts are successful, their parasitism 
might be retroactively excused and recognised as legitimate.215 However, efforts expended 
as a response to these other standards set by agitations exist in tension with other 
productive citizens’ demands for reciprocal productive contributions.   
Defining Contribution 
Agitators often aim at challenging the practices surrounding the production of goods and 
the status of contributions deemed productive. Consider feminists who campaign(ed) for 
the recognition of housework as productive labour.216 Their collective efforts aimed at 
altering and expanding the perceptions citizens have of their own and others’ 
contributions. Through feminist campaigning, popular understandings of what activity is to 
count as contributory are altered. Rather than confining contribution to paid-employment, 
our understandings of contribution are significantly expanded. Citizens should be properly 
understood as being at work when engaged in the tasks of the household. Yet it is hard to 
see the endeavour of feminists’ campaigning in terms of tit-for-tat exchange. Their efforts 
came prior to such exchanges and are not the currency of exchange. Their efforts renew the 
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conditions for exchange and reframe contributions in such a way that we come to regard 
productive efforts in new lights.   
Even seemingly obvious understandings of the form of contributions are the result 
of historical contingency and, more importantly, struggle. For instance, in the case of 
American labour movements, the idea of being paid for one’s time at work, as opposed to a 
piece of work that one has helped produce, was not an immediately apparent notion.217 It 
took one particular section of the workforce made vulnerable by certain changes in 
working practice – specifically the journeyman carpenters in the early 19th century – to 
fight for the recognition of work as hours laboured. Time was thereby instituted as the 
correct measure of both contribution and entitlement.218 This led to various changes in the 
practices of labour organisation and, indeed, to later struggles aimed at limiting the length 
of the working day. (Workers also had to insist on a town bell separate from the factory to 
prevent bosses from manipulating the length of the working day).219 The very idea of 
contribution – how it is understood, measured and therefore the manner in which it can be 
reciprocated – is itself privy to the changes practices undergo when people engaged with 
them challenge the status quo. It is worth noting that when the ten-hour day was first 
suggested in the American context it was described as ‘absurd’, a sure way of crippling 
industry and the nation’s wealth.220 
White repeatedly emphasises how difficult it is to pin down the precise structure 
and content of contribution. 221 However, he does not pay sufficient attention to the need 
for agitators to participate in the process of defining and refining the meaning of 
contribution. The efforts of various agitators and campaigners have changed not just what 
kinds of effort we recognise as productive but also the amount of effort that qualifies as 
such. Reductions in working hours and rises in wages have often been won by agitators 
who, at the inception of their respective movements, were described as baulking against 
the way the world inescapably is and has been since time-immemorial. Their efforts at 
social change were regarded as a waste of what could otherwise have been useful, 
productive energy.    
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Conversely, where now we have laws recognising as legitimate the income accrued 
by owners of capital, we may later, following successful socialist campaigning, outlaw such 
income because it fails as a sufficiently contributory form of effort. 222 Income accrued to 
advertising firms may also suffer a similar fate given the plausibly adverse effects it has on 
the priorities of young and old alike.223 By admitting or denying different activities the 
moniker of ‘contributory’, we change what it is a person can do in order to be seen acting 
with appropriate democratic regard. Capitalist and advertising executives are possible 
candidates for future non-reciprocators, however productive their activity might currently 
be regarded.  
The process of revising what we understand as contribution, as in the example of 
feminist and labour campaigns, is better understood as a consequence of victories accrued 
through battles that are far from easily won. Moving from the actual to the non-ideal to the 
ever more substantively just are not easy accomplishments. They are sticky and hazardous 
processes marked by potential wrong turns and failures. Moves made and adversarial 
strategies employed by organised labour throughout the world have been an essential part 
of filling out an idea of democratic mutual regard. It is through such movements that 
workers’ have been able to constrain the rights and status enjoyed by the employer. We 
might then characterise the battles between organised labour and the owners of capital as 
a working out of the terms of democratic mutual regard. Both sides of this on-going dispute 
are likely to have a different sense of what is owed to them. Unless we believe we have 
reached some era of stasis, these battles are in reality a long way from being concluded. 
In this vein, David Brody warns against the idea that trade unions should shift 
toward a more accommodating, cooperative model of organisation and emphasis, and 
away from being predominantly adversarial in their tactics and strategy. He advises against 
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‘retreating from a “them and us” orientation’.224 This orientation does not seek to resolve 
tensions by acts of mutual compromise.  By taking part in strikes, lock-ins, boycotts and 
other forms of labour agitation, trade unionists are not compromising with capitalists’ 
demands but are actively resisting them: capitalist ends are not workers’ and vice versa. 
Their respective views of what is owed to the other party in the name of democratic 
mutual regard are not necessarily – or even likely to be – mutually compatible.   
This is not an orientation that everyone views with equal affection. Many will 
believe that any kind of adversarial politics which frames gains as necessarily zero-sum, 
extracted from an opponent as opposed to emerging from agreement with cooperating 
fellow-members, is incompatible with a purported ambition to ensure the sharing of 
benefits and burdens. However, friction between capital and labour is likely to persist 
because what is to count as an appropriate contribution from each party is a question that 
remains open to dispute. For labour, agitation is a crucial tool in sustaining that dispute and 
keeping the question alive. For capitalists, it is a thorn in their side with which they would 
rather not have to deal. They would rather the other side simply got on with their 
productive contributions. 
Acknowledging the great efforts and feats of courage performed by participants in 
historic social movements for justice, we gain a sense of the dangers they confronted in 
order to bring about the changes they sought. To be successful these movements required 
a great deal of consistent and sustained effort, often in the teeth of great prejudice and 
strongly held alternative views. This reveals the historic contingency that underlies the 
notion of contribution, and the enduring battle of ideas framing and making sense of what 
it means to contribute and the entitlements that are a consequence of those contributions.  
White identifies the fluctuations associated with the struggle of citizens engaged in care 
work for recognition of their contributive efforts.225 But he does so without sufficiently 
reflecting on the historical struggles, trial and error, reluctant publics and sometimes 
violent protest underlying our very ability to recognise it as such.   
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As a consequence of the real world’s continuing imperfections and failure to 
approximate the thresholds set by the civic minimum, there is likely to remain a tension 
between the tasks and obligations surrounding agitation and the demands of ‘productive 
contribution’. When individual contributions are to be checked by reference to a notion of 
productivity alone, without sufficiently motivating other possible demands made of our 
efforts, tendencies somewhat conservative and protective of the status quo could be one 
of the conceivable outcomes.  
On White’s account, in order to avoid parasitism and still enjoy the fruits of 
economic cooperation, our efforts must ultimately be checked by reference to whether or 
not we are acting reciprocally in a productivist sense. According to this (and taking into 
account the reduced demand to contribute in situations not enjoying substantive justice), if 
we expend effort in such a way that a) does not contribute to the overall productivity of 
the community b) is not sufficiently high compared to our capacity, we are behaving 
parasitically. The efforts made by strikers, abolitionists and protestors of various stripes 
have all, in their day, been accused of parasitism and disrespect for productive norms.  
What is more, effort to reciprocate the other’s productive endeavours seems to 
come before other efforts. So long as a person’s agitating efforts in any way involve or 
draw on the goods produced by a community’s collective endeavours the question 
remains: what gives the agitators the right to enjoy these goods when their contributions 
are directed at ends other contributors do not recognise as goods at all? This productive 
ethic therefore comes prior to our other contributive efforts which do not conform to a 
standard of production.226 
In one respect this is an unfair characterisation of White, who acknowledges that 
we cannot always use the logic of productive contribution when considering entitlements. 
For example, in considering the limits of the endowment-egalitarian agenda and its 
enthusiasm for a marriage between justice and efficiency, he argues that redistribution to 
the elderly or disabled cannot be viewed in terms of ‘investment expenditures’ and are 
purely the transfer of assets. They are still, however, a way of expressing democratic 
mutual regard by providing for those we recognise as disadvantaged even though the 
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transfers may reduce the community’s competitive strength.227 This lack of capacity is a 
means of ‘escape’ from the demand to make productive contributions and also from the 
charge of parasitism. White does not, however, consider the transfer of assets to fully 
capable, minimally/non-productive or disruptive agitators and campaigners who aim, for 
example, at challenging the practices and norms of production.  
Importantly, the work of the agitator has no guarantee of success attached to it. 
Protests against agitation often focus on the feasibility of the movement’s proposals. 
Agitators are accused of being too hasty or naïve in their demands, or else asking for things 
that are opposed to the way things intractably must be. Sometimes their demands are 
dismissed because they are likely to produce unintended and unwanted or dangerous 
consequences. The viability of the current ways of doing things proves itself in the fact it 
exists: imperfections abound perhaps, but we have the means to cope with these to a large 
extent. Anything that departs too swiftly or completely from the current modus operandi is 
destined for failure.   
Failures to Contribute 
There is an important distinction White makes regarding the status of a person’s failure to 
contribute. On the one hand, there are capable individuals with adequate opportunity who 
fail to contribute productively. On the other, there are failures subsequent to the 
‘reasonable’ efforts individuals make to find the means to contribute, i.e. by looking for a 
job. The search itself should still be rewarded, on White’s account, because even those who 
fail to find work have demonstrated that they accept the demand for reciprocal productive 
activity.  
The search for work is supported by public financing. This can take the form of 
money for (re)training, assistance in identifying relevant opportunities, transport to and 
from interviews etc. Where the search ends in failure democratic mutual regard is still 
being expressed by the attempt individuals make to alleviate the collective burdens of 
others and contribute to the public purse. It is a respectful attempt to stop exploiting the 
productive. However, in an objective sense exploitation and parasitism remain because the 
group would be better off (if only in a strictly economic sense) if failing individuals were not 
amongst its membership.  
                                                          
227
 Stuart White, ‘What do Egalitarians Want?’ in Jane Franklin, ed. Equality (London: London 
Institute for Policy Research, 1997) p 75. 
105 
 
This constitutes a possible gap between the various concepts employed by White. 
What if, in doing nothing, people were less of a drain than if they used up state resources 
to have a stab at being contributive but end up squandering those resources? Individuals 
could very much want to try their hand at a variety of things and might draw on state 
support to do so. But there could conceivably be virtue in their checking such desires in the 
light of predictable failure. Individuals exercise restraint (and possibly democratic mutual 
regard) as a means of evading the charge of parasitism, doing things that are not strictly 
productive but which are also not wasteful.  
Furthermore, after having tried and failed to reduce their burdensomeness, in fact 
merely exacerbating it by taking even more of the community’s resources, what are the 
likely consequences for people’s self-esteem? It is possible that, referring to the greater 
goal of productivity, I (and government agencies acting on my behalf) might calculate that 
doing nothing would be just as effective in reducing my parasitic presence, accepting my 
failures with good grace, preferring to be worthless to a lesser extent since this is all that is 
left me. My attempt thus acts, in part, as a shameful revelation of my own inadequacy 
exacerbated by my understanding that I am now wholly parasitical.228  This is the possible 
spectre of uselessness, highlighting the risks of tying effort too broadly to the productive 
reciprocal-demand, creating painful situations for a community’s most vulnerable 
members. 
White recognises this argument but does not find it decisive, precisely because if 
one has genuinely attempted to follow through on a norm of reciprocity by seriously 
looking for work and making efforts to improve employability, any consequent shame is 
likely to be inappropriate. Moreover, the alternative would be to let individuals decide on 
their own uselessness and avoid being contested on that decision. Of course, however 
inappropriate this shame is, this will not stop it occurring. But in the real world where we 
can take certain direct action to alleviate obstacles standing in the way of a person’s ability 
to productively contribute, we should not stop at simply labelling shame appropriate or 
otherwise. Rather, White suggests, we should attempt direct intervention into the causes 
of continued failure and alleviate ‘inappropriate shame’ by employing practical measures 
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to remove the very source of someone’s difficulty,229 perhaps by ensuring that there are 
adequate opportunities for people of all abilities in the labour-market.230    
I agree with White in his characterisation of this kind of failure: he may well be 
right that the shame individuals feel after having expended sufficient amounts of effort 
relative to their capacity is unnecessary. In such cases, shame is the result of individuals 
measuring themselves against inappropriate metrics, i.e. measures of contribution which 
they, unfortunately, are simply unable to live up to regardless of the effort they expend. 
However, there are other kinds of failure White cannot treat in this way. These are failures 
in the efforts directed at altering the practices and understandings underlying currently 
conceived ‘productive contributions’. In distinction to the failures of individuals who are 
incapable of contributing productively, failed campaigners and agitators do possess the 
means and capacities to contribute in directly productive ways. Rather than using those 
capacities in ways that failed to change the world for the better, they could have turned 
them toward productive contributions for the marketplace or public sector.   
Failure for the agitators and campaigners can be determined in a number of ways. 
Sometimes it will be failure to enact their immediate ends and goals. This might refer to a 
specific policy they wished to overturn or introduce. However, there are also the longer 
term ends which admit of continuing frustration and failure, failures that often reach 
beyond the finitude of a generation and stretch on for decades. In such situations, no 
change is definitively wrought in the views of the population at large and the agitating 
efforts continue to be deemed pernicious, wasteful or, at best, naïve, unrealistic and 
nonreciprocal. Such failures cannot be collapsed so easily into an appeal to democratic 
mutual regard.       
There is thus a wider issue at stake within the conceptual framework White devises 
concerning the appropriate treatment of failure. There are the failures of individuals who 
try to contribute productively to their communities and then fail. Then there are those who 
try to shift social understandings of democratic mutual regard or enact new practices 
conducive to justice, and then fail. These second kinds of failure are of a different quality 
because the individuals in question could contribute in productive ways by making deposits 
on their societal ledgers and sharing in the burdens of collective ‘civic labour’. However, 
instead of doing that activists decide to direct their attentions toward other goals 
                                                          
229
 Stuart White, ‘What’s Wrong with Workfare?’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21: 3 (2004) p 274. 
230
 White, The Civic Minimum, p 135. 
107 
 
measured by other standards, less easily articulated and organised than market 
preferences or the goods of public provision. It is by appealing to these other standards 
that her activity conflicts with the subjective dimension of the structure of reciprocity.  
The problem arises when the individual is asked to weigh up her contributions: 
efforts which accord to productivity and those, more experimental in nature (and thus 
more prone to failures, retreats and abandonments), which aim at bringing us closer to as 
yet unsubstantiated and not entirely articulate standards of justice. Again, from the annals 
of the history of labour, just such a story can be told. American ‘workingmen parties’ which 
started to develop in the late 18th and early 19th century were very fragile institutions. ‘They 
lacked funds, seasoned leaders, precedents to follow… Everywhere, the workingmen’s 
parties proved highly vulnerable to the machinations of the established parties.’231 On 
average these parties lived scarcely two years and by the mid-1830s this ‘first surge’ of 
American labour politics had disappeared.  
These parties were not effortless creations. They required organisation, diligence, 
imagination on the part of leaders and members. Moreover, it required all this in the face 
of a great deal of opposition, public scepticism and hostility and, perhaps most importantly, 
a lack of precedents on which they could draw for example and inspiration. Whole lives 
would have been dedicated to the ends of these failed institutions, dedication that could 
plausibly have occurred at the direct expense of production. Where they could have been 
more productive they were not: they removed their labours from the workforce and set 
about organising against the very terms of theirs and other’s productive labour. Some full 
time agitators might have withdrawn from work altogether and dedicated themselves 
solely to the fulfilment of organisational duties. Certainly, such efforts have cumulative 
effects which can be built upon by later instances of labour politics. But such success is not 
guaranteed and in some instances is perhaps very unlikely. However, for all that 
unlikeliness, we should be wary of treating productive contributions as holding the main 
claim to our diligence, attachments and the general direction of our efforts.       
A famous example of someone engaged in full-time agitation is Karl Marx. Marx 
and his family lived in often considerable poverty. While Marx earned some money through 
journalism and publications he was also helped – out of often dire straits – by the 
considerable sums of money donated by his close friend and writing partner Friedrich 
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Engels.232 Marx was a very capable man, who might well have been immensely productive 
if not engaged in his own work of activism. Certainly he and his family bore the costs of his 
lack of productivity and this would temper any claim of parasitism: there was no welfare 
state for him to draw on and complete his work and thus no productive members of the 
community whose wrath he could incur. Instead, he drew on the largess of friends only too 
willing and able to assist. But should we allow agitators, even those who will ultimately lack 
the influence of so huge a figure as Marx, to bear the costs of such poverty and 
degradation when their work aims at improving society? Are there not possible means of 
funding such agitation precisely to offset those costs and encourage this variety of 
contribution? In chapter 6, I look at one possible policy intended for this aim.  
What to do with the Status Quo?  
Tensions between productive contribution and the transitional tasks generated by unjust 
practices and situations are not easily resolved. White provides us with possible standards 
(in the form of the civic minimum) to evaluate the efforts expended in the carrying out of 
those others tasks and the obligations associated with them. What his account lacks, 
however, is the sense in which such obligations and the efforts they inevitably imply are to 
be measured against the productive contributions we are also called on to make. The 
means to resolve the different responsibilities (on the one hand, the call to make 
productive contributions; on the other, the draw to engage with campaigns, agitation and 
protest) is likely to always be fraught with ambiguity at the level of individual motivation 
and decision. In the terms I employed in the opening chapter, the allocative decisions we 
make with regards to the question ‘How should I spend my efforts and energies in 
contributing to my community?’ is an issue we cannot dodge. However, for the sake of 
greater social justice, productivity cannot have final arbitration in deciding what 
contributions a person makes.  
Where and how to make a productive contribution is always from within an already 
existing set of institutions and practices, from a particular location in space and time. When 
we engage in productive efforts we are not only contributing to the commonweal. We are 
also contributing to the sustaining of collective practices which are currently considered – 
however imperfectly – productive of a community’s ‘shared good(s)’. How we produce and 
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consume in the world is always from within an on-going set of practices which are 
connected in myriad ways with the performance of similar acts by others, some (if not 
most) of whom will assume significant costs as a result of their participation. The drinking 
of a cup of coffee is a simple case in point: the low wages paid to the staff and the even 
lower wages and worse working conditions borne by the farmers picking beans in the 
majoritarian world are all preserved by purchases of said coffee. 
But such practices are not inevitable or intractable elements of our reality. As Iris 
Marion Young, drawing on Jean-Paul Sartre’s concept of practico-inertia, puts it: ‘The 
accumulated effects of past actions and decisions have left their mark on the physical 
world, opening some possibilities for present and future action and foreclosing others, or at 
least making them difficult’.233 We experience ‘passively’ what were in fact past actions and 
decisions and which have been marked by human projects and culture. We reify them and 
consider the constraints they produce and sustain as objective parts of reality which 
‘continue to condition contemporary possibilities for action even as we try to transform 
them’.234 By making our contributions from within these reified practices we also preserve 
their imperfection and injustices: letting business ‘go on as usual’ is to implicitly accept 
those constraints, the actions they make possible and the relations they establish.  
In so preserving and reifying these practices and the ways they shape our 
interactions with one another we preserve their inadequacies and injustices. Breaking 
through the crust of such practices before altering them is unlikely to be an easy task. It will 
require (potentially enormous) changes at the institutional level, a great deal of which will 
be without ready-to-hand roadmaps or blueprints to effectively organise the imagination, 
strategies and intentions of its participants. In other words, such attempts are likely to be 
largely experimental involving trial and error, missteps and retreats, demanding hard-
fought changes in public perception and constant efforts aimed at retention of these 
changes.235  When Rawls says ‘unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind of 
extortion, even violence, and consent to them does not bind’ he seems to be allowing for 
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just this kind of experimental refusal to sustain.236 If current arrangements fail to bind we 
must find some that do: agitation is part of this discovery. 
With the successful performance of these refusals and the subsequent changes 
they bring about, the movements, campaigns and individual actions will have impacted on 
the world and brought about an objective shift to the ways in which everyday life is 
conducted. They will have reshaped and reconstituted that practico-inertia around 
different practices, habits and ways of doing things. Again, these are experienced as 
objective and reified and we will settle into experiencing them passively as constraints that 
cannot be usurped. Until, that is, the crust is once more removed for the next round of 
change that reveals the essential contingency of our situations. Without these attempts we 
get locked into unchanging, unjust interactions which nonetheless allow for and facilitate 
the (dialled-down) productive contributions that it is our purported duty to fulfil. 
But what is the status of the effort that sets about tearing the crust from reified 
social processes? How do they weigh against those productive efforts that reify and 
reproduce the already existing practices and habits? White’s account reduces the demand 
to work in non-ideal and real-world circumstances. But there is only a limited substantive 
account of other possible avenues of expenditure which reshape the terms of productive 
contribution but which may nonetheless fail to match up with the terms of productivity as 
they currently exist. On many occasions, these other efforts will conflict with the 
perceptions of some, perhaps a majority of people, regarding what they are owed by their 
fellow-citizens in the name of reciprocity, even at that dialled-down level appropriate to 
non-ideal circumstances.   
Interestingly, elsewhere in his later work White supplies himself with more 
substantial tools to handle these problematic tensions. Discussing the republican strain in 
Rawls’ work, White argues that although Rawls does not (and cannot) embrace ‘civic 
humanism’ – the notion that political participation is a particularly important instance of 
the good life – he can conditionally accept that for the sake of the stability of just 
institutions the republican prescription of active citizen engagement is legitimate.237 
Precisely what this engagement amounts to in non-ideal terms, beyond a minimum 
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threshold of voting and being informed to some degree on relevant policy issues, is not 
fully spelled-out.238 Nevertheless, White does, on instrumental grounds, support the need 
for an active citizenry as a possible boon for the sustaining of already just institutions.239 
However, there is no specific mention of the agitator as a possible instance of this 
instrumentally necessary participation.  
White’s account, like Roemer’s, does deliver far-reaching and radical proposals. For 
instance, he proposes a two-tiered package of welfare support. Guided by what White calls 
‘legitimate paternalistic considerations’ and the ‘distributive aims of fair reciprocity’, he 
proposes ‘a work tested income support underpinned by a form of (time-limited) 
republican basic income’.240 This republican income acts as an emergency measure, to be 
activated when that first tier of work-related welfare support fails to pick citizens up. It 
therefore allows the individual the time and space to develop a strategy to solve their 
personal crises without too much insecurity and cost. No mention, however, is made of the 
possible boons of this type of income for activists and agitators: contributions they make 
are not figured in this model as a legitimate part of citizen participation. 241 In the final 
chapter I consider a particular policy explicitly designed to support agitations and its 
proponents.  
In a world that is at any significant distance from an approximation of ideal 
standards, we cannot merely continue to participate in institutions already existing since 
these are, in maintaining current practices, also part of the problem. Our ‘dispositions’ to 
support and be loyal to just institutions require that we find ways out of current unjust 
arrangements and toward institutions worthier of our loyalty and support. Any changes 
that come about will require the disrupting forces of certain agents whose effort might 
collide with the (dialled-down) productive contributions they are called on to make. How 
are these to be weighed against one another? Most especially when we think of individuals 
joining the struggle (as they might see it), the fear of being labelled parasitic and non-
contributory could prevent the accumulation of actions and movements that are part of 
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campaigns necessary for change. Returning to that motivational question of ‘what to do 
with my efforts?’ and given the necessity to enact some kind of trade-off between these 
varieties of contributions, individuals might well opt for the safer course of action and 
thereby preserve unjust practices and interactions through continuing their economic 
activity. 
Conclusion 
Reciprocity is a fundamental aspect of our social lives. In order to flourish and develop we 
need the (sometimes considerable) assistance of others. This need is particularly evident 
within the family but is equally inescapable as part of our wider social existence. In order to 
sustain these relationships –and thus the assistance they imply – we need to show that we 
are similarly willing to return the favour. This requires reciprocity, the willingness to make 
sufficient effort – ‘sufficiency’ obviously allowing for a great deal of interpretation – to 
return efforts made by others.  
 These matters are of course complicated by a number of factors. First, capacities 
across persons can admit of great differences so that one person’s provision of goods 
requires much less effort than someone else’s return of a similar kind. Additionally, this 
might not be a matter of a capacity but of institutional advantage. The public school boy 
blessed with all the privileges society has to offer may find his becoming a 
lawyer/politician/doctor or whatever else less burdensome than the individual who lacks 
all this and ends up stacking shelves in a supermarket. Both contribute and both 
reciprocate but one person finds this much easier than the other.  
 White performs a considerable service in outlining the conditions of an ideal 
situation within which reciprocity can be fully established. He explicates in depth the 
background it is necessary to institute in order for demands of contribution to be just. 
What is more, he expands reciprocity to include those at the upper echelons of society who 
benefit from inheritance and other unearned advantage. Such citizens must also recognise 
an obligation to others that cannot be met by the advantages supplied by brute fortune but 
which must rather come from a real expenditure of effort. 
 However, problems begin to arise when we move away from this ideal situation 
into the non-ideal world (where there might be some degree of proximity to the ideal) and 
the actual (our world as it exists today and the additional distance that implies). Productive 
contributions in these situations are only dialled down. They are not qualitatively altered. 
113 
 
In an ideal situation we would be expected to give more of ourselves but our contributions 
in the non-ideal and actual are still made with reference to productivity. And this 
productivity, in its turn, is measured according to the satisfaction of preferences and 
answering of needs as they exist today.  
Effort which does not refer to these metric, that does not wish to share in the 
burdens of production in this direct way, is not necessarily condemned as parasitic. But 
White gives too little sense of the ways in which ‘productive efforts’ and what I have called 
‘agitating efforts’ are to be weighed against one another. This leaves us with too 
conservative and too static a vision of the society within which radical changes must occur 
for the achievement of more justice. This change is brought about by social movements 
that have the potential to fail. Failures have many causes but, insofar as activists' efforts 
are concerned, where nothing was achieved, such efforts are objectively parasitic: effort 
that could have been productive and reciprocating was instead squandered. However, 
despite this parasitism such attempts are a necessary part of transforming our 
arrangements to better approximate the ideals White so carefully details. How we protect 
the character of the agitator is something I discuss in the final chapter.  
 Individuals always answer this call to reciprocity within a set of productive practices 
that are already in motion. In the coming chapters, I will focus on the current (unjust) 
economic situation and its various effects on the possibilities – the challenges and 
opportunities – individuals face throughout their lives. Capital decisions, labour market 
legislation and technological levels all contribute to such practices. In so doing they frame 
and partially define the contributions that individuals are able to make. Individuals must, to 
some degree at least, accept these practices and work from within them in order to satisfy 
expectations to work. However, meeting that expectation will impact, sometimes 
negatively, on other areas of people’s lives that are not directly related to work. There are 
other demands outside of work which accompany our involvement with other people, 
places, projects or causes and are the source of a great deal of value and meaning in life. 
Work, after all, is not all that we do. 
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Effort and Depth 
‘I live to become, but I carry the unshakeable burden of what I have been’ 
       Senancour242 
In the preceding chapters I focused on effort in relation to three functions: effort as that 
through which costs are born and deserts earned; effort as that which we control and for 
which we are responsible; and, finally, as productive effort which both creates and fulfils 
our reciprocal obligations to others. The first two approaches concentrate on issues of the 
self: how much can I be said to deserve given what I suffer or, alternatively what I can be 
said to deserve based on what I am responsible for. The third approach is concerned with 
effort’s role in establishing relations of reciprocity between fellow members of a 
community. All these approaches have problems.   
First, deriving desert claims from the disutility effort creates for people misses 
important aspects of the structure of desert. From this perspective, anything we do is only 
relevant as a desert claim if it creates sufficient costs for people. Second, identifying effort 
with responsibility is unable to adequately capture the injustices it sets out to correct. 
When effort is used as that for which we have ultimate and sole responsibility it abstracts 
from the deeper effects of injustices on people’s ability to take responsibility for their lives. 
This approach fails to account for the risks and insecurity that may characterise people’s 
circumstances and which affect their ability to understand and take up the different 
possibilities and opportunities that are available to them. Understanding effort in terms of 
reciprocity does theorise these injustices to a greater extent: where a certain minimum 
standard has not been reached, the demand to reciprocate the productive/contributory 
efforts of others is in some ways illegitimate – as are the comparisons between people 
experiencing different levels of injustice. However, a too narrow focus on reciprocity fails 
to adequately account for the other demands that present themselves to people in 
situations of injustice, which might ultimately override the demands of reciprocity.  
We do not primarily experience effort as something we merely suffer. Effort is 
ubiquitous across all that we do, both that which we love and that which we loath. Effort is 
also not experienced as that for which we have ultimate responsibility. As even Roemer’s 
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account makes clear, what we are ultimately responsible for is not something we can 
directly access or experience. Responsibility can only be understood after a great deal of 
data is organised and assessed through complex mathematical algorithms. White’s account 
comes closer to accounting for people’s experiences of effort by focusing on how we 
respond to other’s efforts with our own and how we expect them to respond to ours. 
However, in overlooking the merits of agitators White neglects the demands which 
accompany injustices in non-ideal and actual political reality and other avenues for effort 
which compete with the demand for reciprocal productive contributions. 
My alternative strategy in this chapter is to attend first to people’s subjective uses 
and experiences of effort rather than using it as a proxy for something else.243 In so doing I 
hope to avoid the pitfalls of the previous accounts while retaining their radical distributive 
implications. I adopt an inductive methodology that starts with what effort does for us, 
how it builds and involves us in the projects, relationships and causes we have reason to 
care about, before moving on to the possible distributive implications that emerge from 
treating effort in this way. This ‘building’ function is what Sher alludes to in his account of 
burden. However, the language of desert he uses to frame that function misses the actual 
purposes and meaning of burdens for the people who assume them. In so doing, he also 
misses the ways in which this ‘burdening’ can be affected by the wider institutional 
framework within which it occurs.      
People face challenges that are specific to the time and places within which they 
live. Youth growing up today face different challenges than those faced by their parents 
and even more different to those which their grand-parents confronted. The details of 
contemporary demands are more fully explicated in the next chapter. But, briefly, they 
might include demands communities make of their members to find jobs that reciprocate 
the efforts of others. They can also refer to the demands democracy makes of its citizens. 
For example, these might include a demand to stay well-informed on current events and 
develop opinions pertaining to policy proposals and political candidates. Or else these 
demands can refer to our relationships, hobbies or interests which, in their turn, are also 
affected by the economic and political variety of demand: our having to seek and sustain 
employment and/or develop our political capabilities to some minimal degree will shape 
the nature of our other involvements and the time we have to take part in them.  
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It is (in part) by responding to the challenges that are made of them that people 
shape their lives. Different employment, political engagements, relationships and causes 
are that by which we become the people we are. Different responses to different demands 
lead to different people with different habits, hopes and desires. Who we are and what we 
do are both wrapped up in our responses to our environments. 244 As James Baldwin put it: 
"people pay for what they do, and still more for what they have allowed themselves to 
become, and they pay for it, very simply, by the lives they lead."245  
It is my focus on the demands associated with current social and economic life that 
leads to a particular account of contemporary injustice. In order to care deeply about some 
commitment we have to spend more of our time and energy doing it than would be 
appropriate for shallower concerns. It will not do to simply assert depth: this assertion has 
to be complemented by significant effort, disciplined by what such care entails. However, 
demands – such as work – that issue from the wider institutional setting do not necessarily 
encourage or support this effortful pursuit of depth. In so doing they expose people who 
would seek depth in their engagements to profound vulnerability. This is a cause for 
concern because in lessening the possibilities for depth, it damages an important 
dimension of the plurality we value as an integral aspect of our communal lives. This 
chapter thus describes the structure of the vulnerability accompanying depth. The precise 
reasons why people are at the risk of such vulnerability in the contemporary political and 
economic climate are discussed in the next chapter.   
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. First, I examine the ways in which we 
use effort in the process of discovering and pursuing the things we care about. An aspect of 
this discovery and pursuit is the dimension of depth: the more we care about some 
commitment, the deeper is our involvement with that commitment. A further complement 
to care and depth is the vulnerability we are exposed to: the deeper we are in an 
involvement, as a consequence of our care for it, the greater the cost to us when that 
involvement is terminated. When individuals avoid deeper kinds of care because the 
vulnerability to which their socio-economic environments expose them is too great, this is 
an instance of injustice. I end with a defence of the value of the depth as a response to a 
possible criticism of my position.    
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Burdens and Value 
As shown in the first chapter, effort (specifically diligent-effort) is crucial for our coming to 
care about things we have reason to value. Diligent-effort is essentially the assuming of 
burdens.  When we expend effort toward some end we are necessarily prevented from 
engaging our effort elsewhere for the duration of that expenditure. For instance, when I 
am reading in the library I am not playing (and am unable to play) football or to go for a 
bike ride or listen to music. We can do these things later of course, but our ‘involvement’ 
with reading at this particular moment is ‘drawing on’ us in a way that means we are 
prevented from doing something else. This is what I mean by the assuming of burdens: the 
precluding of other possible avenues of involvement because of the choices we do make 
and the practices/activities/goods/ends we end up with as a consequence of those choices.  
 To reiterate the point made in the first chapter, this notion of burden cannot be 
collapsed into the idea of disutility. This is not the experience of our involvements as 
hardship. Indeed, it is only through a minimum amount of diligence that we are able to care 
about things at all since doing any one thing implies the presence of costs, i.e. the costs of 
not doing something else. It would be odd to characterise all that we hold dear as instances 
of suffering requiring financial recompense. These costs do not refer to hardship but rather 
to the vulnerability they produce for individuals: if a commitment which has absorbed a 
great deal of effort and is thus cared for is finally recognised as undesired or worthless, or a 
person is forced to abandon a treasured pursuit, then there is disutility. It is the threat of 
such discoveries and forced abandonments that create the costs associated with diligent-
effort and not the disutility produced by one’s current projects and commitments.    
 The assuming of burdens is present across all of our efforts. Even the minimally 
involving activities exampled above preclude other activities and thus produce (admittedly) 
small costs. Increased diligence precipitates greater costs and greater burdens. With larger 
and more complex practice involvements – the people we marry, the jobs we take, the 
children we raise – the idea of a ‘later’ in which other things can be done becomes more 
complicated. The size of the tasks confronting us, and the learning of the skills necessary to 
accomplish them, give us a sense of the finitude of our energy and time. We cannot 
accomplish everything on offer and so we hope to make the right choices and decisions, 
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take advantage of the right opportunities and involve ourselves in the right commitments 
and causes.246   
It is through expending our effort that we come to care about things and how 
certain things in the world come to matter to us. If someone were to claim that they cared 
a great deal about something – like learning to play the guitar – and were given enough 
resources and time to do so, but then signally failed to even give it a go, we would call that 
assertion of care into question. The same could be said of those who claim care for the 
environment and yet refuse to recycle, use public transport or give money to 
environmental concerns. We need to see something behind these assertions of care, some 
minimal degree of effort and activity, in order to take them seriously.247 The ‘allocative 
decisions’ regarding what to do with our time and energy must reflect that care in terms of 
the ends it involves us with, the projects, relationships and causes it makes matter to us 
and the burdens it creates for us.248  
Our choice of involvements and the burdens such choices produce can be usefully 
explained by borrowing Joel Feinberg’s train-tracks analogy.249  Imagine a person standing 
before a network of ‘tracks’ deciding on which route to travel. If at time (T) a person has 
the option set (a, b, c) then her involvement with one of these routes will, at time T+1, 
grow to produce new options (let us call these new options a’1, b’1, c’1). The ‘fecundity’ of 
an option, as Feinberg calls it, is the number of other options made available by having and 
following the original option.250 So, for instance, by starting to learn to play the violin other 
skills within this activity become available: where before a student was unable to produce a 
particular sound or perform a particular movement, her preliminary involvement at (T) in (a) 
has opened up the possibility of (a’1) at (T+1). Furthermore, involvement in (a’1) and our 
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command of the activity we hope to acquire as part of that involvement, is necessary for 
even further and deeper involvement at later moments (a’N). Crucially, the choice at (T) in 
(a) means there was no choice for (b) and thus no exploration of the fecundity of that 
particular ‘track’: options (b’1) through to (b’N) are thus inaccessible as a result of a choice 
for (a). 
We can regard these additional growths as symbolic of the increasing expertise 
that comes with investment in particular options so that a’1 would later lead to a’2, a’3 and 
so on. The complexity of a practice can be measured according to the degree of its 
fecundity: choices that fail to produce options beyond a’1 are less complex or challenging, 
unable to generate further growth or possibilities. Of course, the failure to get beyond a’1 
might also be a consequence of a shortfall in individuals’ capacities rather than a lack of 
complexity in the practice. Whatever the cause, stalling at some particular juncture is also 
the termination of deeper possibilities for involvement along that specific track. 
 Another advantage of this analogy is that it can effectively capture the atrophying 
effect that accompanies sudden elimination of the possibility for further, deeper 
development of the initial options, i.e. when somewhere between (a’1) and (a’N) the track 
is cut off and its fecundity is terminated. If a person chooses (a) at time (T) and then goes 
onto (a’1) and (a’2), but something interferes with her involvement in such a way as to 
prevent (a’3), then she is being denied access to something she has come to care about.251  
An example: imagine that after years of undergoing the training and dedication necessary 
to become a doctor, a sudden advance in technology means that all medical procedures are 
to be performed by robots. Humans are not even allowed contact with patients anymore. 
All the training, commitment and specialisation necessary to become a doctor are now 
useless for the purposes it was intended to serve. Although this is a fantastical example, it 
nevertheless demonstrates the potential vulnerability that we can suffer should 
involvement in a practice be cut short. What is more, the doctor is stuck ‘down the line’ of 
her choice. There may be transferable skills that she can take into other involvements – 
indeed, learning to do one thing well might help in learning well a great variety of other 
things – but the burdens assumed at (a), the care that was begun and nourished, has been 
terminated. 252 New involvements will need to be found in light of this termination and the 
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care that it has interrupted. Later on I will discuss the Japanese author Junichiro Tanizaki as 
an exemplary sufferer of this kind of interruption.  
When we engage with certain ends or commitments over long periods of time, 
developing talents and expertise alongside the expenditure of our effort, we are also 
attaining a certain depth in that involvement. Vulnerability is the cost of that depth. In the 
absence of protracted and sustained  involvement with specific ends or commitments such 
vulnerability is not a problem because one has not invested so much of one’s time and 
effort. The existential magnitude of some commitment increases according to the degree 
that someone cares about something.253 The extent to which we care about a commitment 
is, in part, a function of the time and energy that we ply into it. Where we do not try hard, 
this is possible evidence that there is an absence of care.254 
Some degree of vulnerability is a necessary correlative of our caring for things. If 
we care about a cause or a person we want to see that cause or person flourish. When they 
do not, for whatever reason, this hurts us to some extent.255 Unless we are masochists, this 
pain is not something we will readily embrace. Causes, relationships and projects 
predictably doomed to failure are not going to appeal to the majority of people. Where 
failure is predictable and unavoidable we will do our level best to avoid it. This has 
important implications for the type and quality of activities we engage in. However, before 
describing the structure of vulnerability it is necessary to first attend to what we actually do 
with effort when exploring the fecundity just described.  
Depth in Person-Practices Relations  
The question remains as to how people’s time and energy are used when they choose 
amongst the different ‘tracks’ available to them and how this then issues in their caring for 
some things and not others. I have described the burdens we assume but without yet 
describing what we actually do with our efforts for them to issue in burdens. The depths we 
achieve in our endeavours – and the vulnerabilities that are their correlative – are the 
consequence of our involvement in practices. It is these which make sense of our effort and 
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give form to our strivings. Whether what we do is play football, grow vegetables or perform 
surgery, what we are taking part in is activity defined by standards we try and approximate 
to the best of our abilities.    
When we decide what it is we want to do with our time and energy, we are 
deciding with which practices to involve ourselves. By choosing one career over another, 
embracing this hobby rather than that, joining association A rather than association B, I 
engage with different practices in different ways. The choices we make in the name of 
those rather grand-sounding ‘conceptions of the good’ are choices regarding which 
practices we find reason to value and then pursue.    
Practices are any form of shared activity whose shape is defined by a certain 
pattern of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’. Consequently, practices range from our activities in the 
marketplace, the raising of our children, right down to the ways in which we greet each 
other on the street. These exist at all levels of human life, from the national right down to 
the familial: a practice’s patterns of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ set standards for our behaviour 
which sustain, govern and make intelligible our activity.256 The practices which are of 
particular concern for this thesis are not those understood as lubricants of our everyday 
goings-on – the distances established between people engaged in a conversation, the 
handshakes used to confirm deals, rules regarding eye contact – but those others we 
participate in as part of purposive engagement with valuable activity, i.e. practices within 
which we spend our (non-renewable) time and resources and which make up our various 
‘conceptions of the good’. So where we simply act according to the social norms that 
dictate how we behave on greeting one another on the street, without necessarily doing so 
in a way that acknowledges the possible value of such norms, the concern here is where 
engagement in practices is done with just that intention of pursuing some end/activity we 
find valuable.257 
Valuable performances within practices always entail the intentionality of the 
agent: our involvement with practices is active and purposeful. We do not accidentally 
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become exceptional (or even average) at something in the way that we may simply imbibe 
the know-how necessary to facilitate a conversation with a casual acquaintance on the 
street.258 Whether it be playing a game of chess or being a parent, these kinds of 
engagement require an understanding of the nature of the good that is engaged with and 
of what constitutes success and failure for that particular practice.259  Without that 
awareness we would be unable to appreciate the value which involvement with that good 
opens up to us: ‘all goods are identified by standards of excellence’ and without those 
standards the concept of a ‘good’ anything becomes unintelligible. 260  Coming to 
understand a practice’s standards and the activity they require of us demands a level of 
habituation without which we are unable to properly imbibe and assimilate what it is those 
standards command of us, and the directions our effort must take in order for us to meet 
them.  
Something like this is at work in Rawls’ use of the ‘Aristotelian Principle’: ‘human 
beings enjoy the exercise of their realised capacities, and this enjoyment increases the 
more the capacity is realised or the greater its complexity’.261  The Aristotelian Principle 
expresses, in Rawls’ view, the basic psychological insight that the better we are at 
something, the more we enjoy doing it, largely because we take pleasure in employing a 
larger repertoire of capacities when performing any task. The way we get better at 
something and are able to thus expand and perform an increasing array of capacities is, on 
the view I am here developing, precisely by habituating ourselves to the standards and 
demands of the practices we find in our surrounding contexts (or in some ‘surrounding’ 
context somewhere).   
But these standards of excellence and the judgements they make are not 
momentary phenomena that can be singularly and immediately engaged with. They require 
our on-going engagement, our continuing referencing and, in certain cases where we fail to 
meet the standards, our accepting deferrals. When a father asks himself whether he is a 
good father or not, he can never make a single, final judgement and have that last him until 
                                                          
258
 For an account of the specifically emotional difficulties and complexities surrounding the 
practices of parenting and other complex, deep, and long-term relationships see Arlie R. Hochschild, 
The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (London: University of California Press, 
2003) pp. 69 – 75. 
259
 For an anecdotal account of the need of this practice-time see Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers 
(London: Penguin, 2009) pp. 35 – 68. 
260
 Taylor, Sources of the Self p 204. 
261
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p 374. See also Dworkin’s discussion of the challenge model of the 
good life. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 237 – 284.  
123 
 
the role has somehow been completed. The same is true across all manner of goods, 
including our occupations, hobbies and other relationships. Engagement with goods is a 
process that involves continuous reflection as to whether the relevant standards of 
excellence are being approximated. People develop understandings of what they need to 
do in order to continue to meet those standards, and also decide whether they wish to 
continue with a particular engagement.  
Crucially, our reflections on involvements we have reason to value will be shot 
through with an assessment of our standing in terms of the plurality of other demands that 
confront us in our social lives. A particularly important part of this plurality consists of the 
demand to seek employment. In order to ‘go on’ exploring the ‘fecundity’ or depth of our 
choices and the involvements they precipitate, people need a sense of the probability and 
predictability that they can successfully navigate this plurality – by finding and keeping a 
job for instance.262 If this plurality cannot be safely navigated, that depth will be put at risk. 
It is this which leads to vulnerability. 
References to the demands environments make of people allows analysis at a level 
Roemer’s account ignored. As I argued toward the end of the second chapter, in order to 
gain a sense of individuals’ experiences of their efforts we require a complementary 
understanding of the impact circumstances have on their ability to develop preferences, 
make plans and evaluate the course their lives have taken. Where Roemer’s account was 
unable to properly account for the pernicious effects of injustice and inequality, my more 
pragmatic focus better captures the ways individuals are demanded to react to their 
circumstances and the impact on those abilities these demands precipitate. 
Engagement with practices and their standards requires a process of habituation. 
Such habituation, in its turn, requires a context which allows, nourishes and supports it. It 
cannot merely be assumed that habituation is possible for people because they happen to 
live within a long-established community that contains an historic plethora of interesting 
practices. Habituation requires more than a mere geographical or linguistic continuity. It 
requires a certain stability within the practices and their social constitution.263 That way, 
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individuals are allowed sufficient opportunity to apprehend the standards, to learn what 
counts as a ‘good’ or successful engagement with a particular practise and the value 
contained therein.  
If the rules of chess suddenly changed in such a way as to fundamentally alter the 
techniques, prowess and mental alacrity needed to be a successful chess player, individuals 
who had been habituated into the previous standards would be left without the means to 
continue their engagement with that particular good.264 Similar problems would occur if a 
person had all the equipment necessary to play chess but no way of accessing the rules of 
the game or the strategies and tactics necessary for successful performance. More 
mundanely, loss might occur if an individual was simply no longer able, perhaps as a result 
of no longer having the time, to play the game of chess. The acquired habituation and the 
care to which playing chess had given rise (or would give rise in the event of longer 
habituation) no longer has much relevance if it cannot figure in her possibilities for action.  
Habituation to the standards of practices and the possibilities for depth which this 
facilitates, involves a certain subjection or deferral to the authority of the practices, i.e. its 
standards and its expert purveyors. The relationship to these practices is therefore two-fold. 
First, we require a habituated involvement with those standards in order to learn what 
counts as a good and a bad instance of that practice. It is from this position, where such an 
understanding is gained, that the standards can be challenged, played with and altered.265 
Second, learning techniques associated with good practice-performance also requires a 
degree of subjection and deferral to the expert purveyors of a practice and thus to the 
standards as they are currently performed and personified.266  
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Habituation is not an all or nothing phenomenon. There are degrees involved: 
people can spend longer or shorter amounts of time engaging with practices they find 
valuable. But for depth to be gained, the realisation of this habituation requires a longer-
term engagement with practices. However, long term engagement is not an a priori 
possibility: it is not something that exists simply as a fact of our being human or as a result 
of our culture’s historical inventory of practices. Long-term practice engagement can be 
degraded or even annihilated as a sociological possibility.267  
Deeper commitments and engagements – those that are the consequence of 
significant expenditures of diligent-effort – become harder to enjoy when the context 
within which such engagements take place militates against longer-term commitments and 
the habituation they demand. Involvements that extend over longer periods of time and 
entail the substantive burdens and vulnerabilities to which diligent-effort exposes us will be 
altogether less appealing when the risk of failure becomes too great. In the next chapter 
and its more detailed discussion of changes in the labour market and the economy more 
generally, I argue that certain contemporary demands do so militate, most concretely in 
the case of work.    
The sociology of care and identification  
The concept of depth has important implications for another, that of ‘identification’. This is 
the idea, developed most extensively by Harry Frankfurt, that individuals possess various 
‘orders’ of volition concerning their desires, preferences, projects and plans. We don’t 
merely ‘want X’, we also ‘want to want X’: that is, we have preferences about our 
preferences.268 In addition, we develop a similar set of orderings for our efforts and the acts 
we carry out: we don’t just expend effort to do things we want to do, we expend effort to 
do things we want to want to do. As I have already described, these efforts involve us in 
various practices we have reason to value. A part of identification is thus a set of second 
order volitions motivating our activity, i.e. I want to want to play the violin, be a parent 
and/or become an academic. I want to be the kind of person who does these things and 
does them well. Identification with a given practice precipitates the exploration of its 
fecundity and depth. 
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For Frankfurt, processes of identification and formulation of these second-order 
volitions are an essential part of the value and meaning in people’s lives. Without second-
order desires we lack a sense of what matters to us, to those parts of our life that draw us 
into valued practice engagements. As Frankfurt puts it, ‘the formation of a person’s will is 
most fundamentally a matter of his coming to care about certain things, and of his coming 
to care about some of them more than others’.269 Things we care about more than others 
are things with which we have a deeper involvement.  
Identification is also the development of a particular kind of knowledge about what 
it is people wish to devote their time and energy to doing. By gaining that knowledge, 
individuals gain a sense of what is meaningful to them and give shape and purpose to their 
lives. By identifying with the plans we make, we simultaneously embrace the demands they 
make of us and the constraints they put on our activity: we are no longer entirely free to do 
anything we please so long as care for that particular activity remains part of our concerns. 
To identify with a commitment thus has an important disciplining function in line with the 
processes of habituation described above.  
The self-knowledge that we gain as a result of identification, as well as the 
commitments with which we identify, are closely connected to people’s circumstances. For 
example, occupations that might be available in contemporary cultures would have been 
absent from those a century ago. Moreover, the quality of ostensibly the same job will also 
change given shifts in technology, the market, organisational structures within a given 
enterprise, the relations between the state and the economy, capital and labour etc. Care 
and the formation of people’s wills are never freed from their experiences and 
understandings of the world around them. Employment is but one part of this experience. 
People necessarily start from that world as (for the most part) given. So in the 21st century 
western context where samurais are few and far between, there is no way for me to 
become familiar with the codes, practices and ways of being that would render it a feasible 
objective for my care and effort.270 We start from what is familiar, considering various 
opportunities that are made available by the context at hand. We do not start from some 
position called ‘self’ and only then turn out to the world in pursuit of the goods that the self 
has designed.    
                                                          
269
 Frankfurt, The Importance of What we Care about, p 91. 
270
 Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time (London: Routledge, 1996) p 16. 
127 
 
However, this sense of an already familiar world from which we appropriate our 
various commitments and projects is missing from Frankfurt’s account. He focuses 
exclusively on the internalised machinations of the will’s formation. He describes processes 
like ‘reflection’ and ‘the ordering of volitions’ but ignores other important processes that 
inform our ‘coming to care’ for things.271 Reflection, deliberation and care cannot be so 
divided between the world ‘in’ here and that ‘out’ there. The tasks of identification and 
discovery are formed with the world at large always ‘in mind’, a constant aspect of our (not 
necessarily consciously formed) considerations.  When we see the world ‘out there’ as 
unfavourable or hostile to possible projects/causes/relationships, including those far less 
absurd than the samurai suggestion, the interior processes that constitute the ‘formation 
of the will’ and the decisions concerning what it is we should care about will incorporate 
that assessment.  
Frankfurt is right that in deciding what to do we cannot help but decide on what it 
is we are going to be.272 But the answer to both those questions is found essentially via the 
appropriation of roles/projects/commitments from the environments we find ourselves in, 
rather than through a process of actively creating such things from scratch. By explicating – 
and correcting for – Frankfurt’s omission of the sociology behind processes of identification, 
we gain more insight into exactly how our circumstances complicate the concepts he 
employs and, quite rightly in my view, values so highly.273 Crucial to this undertaking is an 
examination of the vulnerability that accompanies deep habituation to the demands of a 
practice. 
The care we are able to have is itself dependent on a world receptive to such 
concern. If that world fails to encourage the efforts necessary for deeper habituation to the 
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standards of a practice, what becomes of the formative process and, indeed, the will itself? 
For example, we might care a great deal for some particular occupation in some particular 
firm. To then have that taken out from under us because of events beyond our control is to 
remove the object of care from what Frankfurt calls our ‘devotional activity’. What is more, 
when this removal might exist as an ambient threat, i.e. as something we might be able to 
predict and ‘feel’ around us, putting our deeper commitments in jeopardy, this will also 
tend to moderate our devotion and the care we are able to have for such work. To actively 
throw oneself open to high-levels of predictable risk is to behave recklessly. When our 
involvements are at risk of rupture or curtailment a more sensible strategy is rather to 
avoid excessive vulnerability. 
Diligent-effort – and the depth it issues in – is not equally available in all possible 
worlds. It generates vulnerability in a sense other ways of expending effort (those which do 
not imply the same depth, ‘burdens’ or costs) do not. This vulnerability is inadequately 
theorised by Frankfurt as he tends to run ‘identification’, ‘care’ and ‘vulnerability’ together. 
I counsel caution in doing this as the three are ultimately separable. Significant vulnerability 
is not a consequence of care as such. It is a consequence of depth. 
Vulnerability and issues of concreteness  
Vulnerability is a crucial dimension in Frankfurt’s account of care: ‘The same structural 
configuration that makes us vulnerable to disturbing and potentially crippling disabilities 
also immeasurably enhances our lives by offering us… opportunities for practical rationality, 
for freedom of the will, and for love’.274 For Frankfurt, the parts of our lives that make us 
vulnerable to failure, that expose us to the risk that care brings in its wake, are tied to the 
value of our most important involvements. In order to care, the above structural 
configurations would seem to suggest, we need to be made vulnerable. Vulnerability is a 
product of care: where there is little vulnerability, there is also less care. 
What Frankfurt does not discuss are the variations within this notion of 
vulnerability and how our coming to care for things can ultimately be distinguished from 
the structures of vulnerability: we can care about certain ends, projects or relationships 
without necessarily exposing ourselves to a great deal of vulnerability. What the absence of 
vulnerability makes impossible are diligent-effort, depth and significant complexity. But we 
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can continue to care for and identify with our desires, plans and commitments even where 
these things are not characterised by diligent-effort, depth or complexity.  
At one point, Frankfurt discusses the different ways a plan can be abandoned or 
ended.275 First, plans may be ended only temporarily as a means to pursue some other 
valued end. We then return to this initial plan at a later date. Second, we may abandon it 
and never return to it because we simply cease caring about it. The first is thus privy to a 
degree of vulnerability in that we are unable to pursue these plans now alongside other 
cared-for ends. The second is also not a costless decision given that we might have 
expended considerable resources prior to abandoning it. But what of abandonments that 
are forced on us despite our care? We might permanently abandon some end because it is 
demanded by other aspects of our circumstances rather than because we cease caring for 
it. For example, someone might give up a particular career because of massive downturns 
in the economy that have nothing to do with her preferences or plans. These additional 
instances of vulnerability go unconsidered by Frankfurt because his focus is geared too 
strongly toward the internal machination of the person’s will at the expense of sociological 
realism.  
Parallel to the different ways in which we abandon our plans and projects are the 
different ways in which we experience vulnerability. People might be made vulnerable by 
their lack of capacity to accomplish a given end. The success they anticipated was 
chimerical and they fail because it turns out they were not up to the task. Their 
involvement is thus cut short, stagnates and/or is abandoned. Other experiences of 
vulnerability are the result of unforeseen occurrences in people’s situation. Such 
occurrences can have a number of effects: first, they can significantly reduce the time 
people have both for habituating to the standards of a practice and their subsequent 
attempts at approximating those standards. Second, they can precipitate sudden 
reductions in the financial resources necessary either to engage in the activity or else 
ensure more basic functions are met. Third, they can result in the removal of the very 
possibility to engage with a practice, perhaps because the equipment necessary for 
engagement is no longer readily available in one’s locality.276  Finally, the increased 
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expectation or ambient threat of all such occurrences can amplify the sense of vulnerability 
and warn against too deep an involvement.  
Frankfurt leaves these variations in vulnerability unexamined. The first variety, 
which we can call ‘capacity failure’, is likely to always be a source of anxiety, regardless of 
our environments: such anxiety accompanies our most basic human frailties and 
insecurities. There are many things we are able to do but there is always the possibility of 
falling short and being disappointed by limited abilities we cannot transcend. The other 
anxieties and vulnerabilities which refer to the sociological context within which we engage 
with practices cannot be traced so directly to people’s capacities. These anxieties are in 
response to environments perceived as hostile to the demands of diligent-effort and to the 
discipline and constraints implied by depth.    
An example will illuminate this point about vulnerability and its relation to 
potentially hostile worlds. Junichiro Tanizaki was an early 20th century Japanese author, 
famous in part for his embrace of (and melancholy at the waning of) traditional Japanese 
culture. As a young man Tanizaki was intent on Japanese cultural alignment with the West, 
going so far as to celebrate an earthquake for opportunities it gave in this direction.277 It 
was later in life and in works such as Some Prefer Nettles and In Praise of Shadows that this 
embrace of novelty was replaced by a profound appreciation of his nation’s traditional 
culture. 278 At the same time, however, he recognised that it was a culture in decline, 
replaced in large part by the western influences and contrivances that in his youth he 
would have welcomed.  
Tanizaki deeply involved himself with a set of practices and their incumbent 
standards. He identified with these practices and embraced the ways in which they 
constrained his activity, outlook and preferences. He believed they preserved and 
expressed a valuable form of life. However, because of the depth of this involvement and 
the intensity of the identification, he was made supremely vulnerable by changes to the 
very equipment that made that life possible – changes, incidentally, brought about by 
increased interaction with Western ways. For instance, Tanizaki explains the design of 
Japanese outhouses in ways very different to how we might perceive them in the West.  At 
one point he describes the outhouse as a great place for earlier Japanese poets to compose 
haiku because the toilet itself came ‘replete with fond associations with the beauties of 
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nature’.279  The use of porcelain and the colour white typical of Western toilets he 
considers vulgar, showing an obsession with cleanliness he finds inelegant (though he 
accepts its benefits in terms of hygiene and convenience). However, the costs of preserving 
older traditional forms of domestic architecture were getting increasingly expensive given 
that the majority of his fellow-citizen’s tastes had fled west: such a toilet – and the way of 
life of which it formed a part – became impossible to preserve. 
The depth with which he explored these traditions, the deep identification he had 
with them, rendered him extremely vulnerable in light of their inevitable decline: 
inevitability Tanizaki himself recognised as such.280 To have remained shallow during 
Japan’s transitional phase, to have merely dabbled in Japan’s cultural inventory, would 
have been a way to reduce this costliness and minimize that vulnerability. Valuable activity 
would still have been possible in this shallower situation. What would be lost is the deeper 
‘mattering’ of things and a more profound identification with such practices. Without the 
intense burdens and costs that are an inevitable accompaniment of significant depth, 
exploration of the ‘fecundity’ complex practices represent is also being denied.  
In the place of that depth we could have more numerous involvements. It is not 
that ‘dilettantes’ – people who avoid deep involvement in specific practices – necessarily 
lack opportunities for value. Tanizaki could have plied his time and energy, for instance, 
into a kind of cultural promiscuity, sampling Japanese culture along with a great many 
others. Never engaging too deeply with any one place, person or project but instead 
spreading himself and his efforts over a variety of activities and practices. In my desire to 
preserve this dimension of depth, there is a minimal perfectionism at work, one that 
embraces as an option – not an obligation – the axis of depth here under scrutiny.281    
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In distinction to the profound vulnerability accompanying Tanizaki’s deep 
engagement, there are other ‘shallower’ types of end and involvement which produce a 
lesser degree of vulnerability. It may, for instance, be important to an individual that 
she/he has romantic liaisons with as many people as possible. People might care about this 
end and be made vulnerable to failure should they fail in its pursuit. However, failure 
cannot be affected by any specific person or event. After suffering rejection, the pursuit 
strikes up again only directed toward another person. The fact that such vulnerability is not 
specified and limited to a particular object and made concrete, renders it qualitatively 
different to the kind of vulnerability that operates when the object is specific, when it is, for 
example, a particular person in a particular place at a particular time (or indeed any one of 
these three). Care and the importance of ends are therefore not necessarily/conceptually 
tied to their objects being made concrete but can make sense in the looser, more fluid way 
illustrated by the above promiscuity. The depth of Tanizaki’s care, a particularly strong 
exemplar of someone who experiences the costs created by diligent-effort, is not an 
account of care tout court: care remains possible when freed from any concrete specificity 
or particularity.  
When the concept of care is not described in terms of identification with particular 
and concrete ends, ideals or persons, it is simply too broad to encapsulate the important 
variations within the concept of vulnerability I describe above.282 Diligent-effort inescapably 
implies significant vulnerability because of the depth in practice-engagement it involves. 
This depth is almost a matter of arithmetic: where more dilettantish persons can spread 
their time and energies over a number of practice-involvements, the purveyor of diligent-
effort invests those (non-renewable) resources in the gaining of depth and expertise. Time 
and energies are expended in learning and approximating the standards of a particular 
practice engagement: the deeper people go, the more complex are the skills such 
approximation entails. A corollary of this is that less time and effort is available for 
habituation to other practice-standards necessary for the pursuit of other ends. It is thus 
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specifically diligent-effort that is productive of both depth and the vulnerability Frankfurt 
(rightly) recognises as valuable. 
The non-concrete care exemplified by the dilettantes can still possess an organising 
function even though they do not issue in significant vulnerability.283 Dilettantes’ concerns 
can constrain volition in a way Frankfurt deems crucial for the possibilities of human 
flourishing. Dilettantes can consider their desires constitutive aspects of who they are as a 
person. They can fully embrace those desires and identify with them as providing reasons 
for activities they regard as valuable. The same can be said for people (like Dworkin’s 
buzz/tick addicts made flesh)284 who simply hunt for preference satisfaction, treating their 
lives, resources and efforts merely as tools for use in the hunt for certain sensations and 
experiences. This ‘hunt’ is something cared for, considered important and even disciplining, 
but tied to nothing specific that might render individuals vulnerable in a different and 
ultimately more pressing way. Where the hunt hits a dead end, it just starts again in some 
other direction looking for the next possible source of satisfaction. For the person who 
cares deeply for some concrete, specific end, failure in its pursuit does not admit of so easy 
a transition to some other end.  Whereas for the dilettante, where success is not gained 
here it might still be available over there.285  
The issue at stake is therefore the extent of vulnerability: some ends do not leave 
us open and thus vulnerable because they are not fixed by specific, concrete reference 
points and are freed up to range across a variety of reference points. For example, tourists 
who find their good in holidaying in exotic places look only for distant climes and are 
pleased with any place so long as it is warm enough. The goods are thus not especially hard 
‘to get hold of’ as long as resources are in adequate supply. Indeed, even with reduced 
resources the distant climes can just be made less distant. There is thus limited exposure to 
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possible and dramatic failure, no sense in which a complex, effortful involvement with 
some activity or practice could be terminated in the way Tanizaki experienced it.286  
In order for descriptions of identification and care to adequately account for the 
role of vulnerability they must include reference to two things. First, to the concreteness of 
the end in question: this is necessary to distinguish between ends which expose a person to 
very little vulnerability and ends which belong to the purveyors of diligent-effort, shaped 
and charged with the possibilities of quite profound vulnerability.287 The second is the 
depth which is a consequence of diligent-effort. In order for people’s care to issue in 
vulnerability, they need to have achieved a minimum depth in their involvements. 
Dilettantes do not suffer from this problem precisely because there has been no deep, 
long-term expenditure of effort in habituation to practices I described above. They can 
extract their efforts from their shallower involvements and ply them elsewhere without the 
same damage to their sense of what matters to them.   
Preferences and Projects 
A way of examining the variations between the purveyors of diligent-effort (craftsmen, as I 
call them in the next chapter) and dilettantes is by reference to Tim Scanlon’s distinction 
between two rival accounts of preference formation. The first is the summative account 
which makes it (absurdly) rational for individuals to simply rack up desires in order to fulfil 
them and thereby increase their well-being. In the other ‘global’ desires account, 
preferences are only intelligible when they are anchored to specific parts of a person’s life 
or their life considered as a whole: our preferences are derived from the projects, 
relationships and commitments that matter to us.288 Summative desires, by contrast, lack 
reference to larger-scale concerns ‘about how one’s whole life or some significant part of it 
should go’. Instead they refer only to the satisfaction of preferences tout court, with no 
grander scheme of plans and projects to make sense of them.289 Much like the ‘shallowness’ 
of dilettantes, this describes activity as divided into a series of contained episodes of 
preference satisfaction which once completed are left behind to make way for the next 
encounter.  
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But this distinction between comprehensive goods and ‘summative’ goods is not, in 
reality, a hard and fast line: it operates rather as a continuum. There is a certain variety 
within the notion of comprehensive goods that admits of something like a summative view 
of desire. This is the case precisely because comprehensive goods can refer both to 
concrete ends and those less specific ends which lack concrete points of reference. At one 
end of this continuum there are the Tanizaki’s of the world, and at the other end are the 
dilettantes and, even further along, Dworkin’s buzz addicts. It is this variation within the 
type of ends that are pursued which complicates Scanlon’s distinction and produces a 
continuum in its stead.  
At the neurological level ‘buzzes’ or ‘tingles’ are precisely what happens when 
preferences get satisfied. It is just that these buzzes, as Dworkin rightly claims, are framed 
by conceptions of the good which make sense of them, that make them ‘buzzes’ at all.290 
This idea of the framing of preferences is important: buzzes utterly unframed by some 
wider preference structure are at one end of the continuum. These buzzes are perhaps 
descriptive of the highs achieved by drug consumption and basic adrenalin rushes like 
parachuting or bungee jumping. These buzzes are momentary phenomena and do not 
allow for the complex activity consequent to the habituated involvement characteristic of 
deep practice engagement.291  Nor, then, do they expose individuals to the same kind of 
vulnerability. 
At the other end are buzzes, framed by very thick/comprehensive conceptions of 
the good, that can only be enjoyed after sustained, habituated involvement with the 
standards and activities of a given practice or set of practices. If a project, relationship or 
cause which deeply mattered to a person was suddenly eliminated, it is not merely a 
matter of transferring her concerns elsewhere: it is not so easy to reconstruct long-term 
‘framing’ projects that make sense of the ‘buzzes’ we are able to achieve. Tanizaki, as 
described above, is just such a person: he was denied the opportunity to transfer his care 
and concern to other possible frameworks or conceptions of the good precisely because of 
the depths he achieved in his practice-engagements. There was nowhere else he could go 
to achieve his buzzes once the equipment he needed was no longer available. The way the 
world mattered to him was inflexible on this score. 
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Between these extremes are different degrees of comprehensiveness: individuals 
who can slip between preferences that are framed by a larger variety of practices are less 
vulnerable than the person whose preferences are framed by less (even though deeper) 
practice involvements. The ‘dilettante’ who engages shallowly with a range of ‘preference-
satisfying’ practices can, in the sudden absence of one particular practice-engagement, ply 
her time and energy elsewhere. Someone without that variety is thoroughly at a loss when 
a practice with which she is deeply engaged and the commitments, projects and causes 
that she has come to care about are suddenly removed from the field of possibility. Her 
efforts have nowhere else they can go that mattered to the same degree as the 
involvement now absent.   
There is then a variety in the kinds of projects we pursue that tracks this distinction 
– when rendered as a continuum in this way – between comprehensive and summative 
desires. There are the longer term projects that stretch a ways into the future, do not 
admit of easy or short-term satisfaction and require deep and on-going habituation and 
involvement. And there are those which lack this concrete reference point of a future 
dependent on a particular involvement with a particular practice. Instead, more episodic 
desires are determined only by a kind of short-term globalism which makes sense of 
preferences against a background of more episodic concerns and projects regarding what 
can be had or enjoyed now or in the not too distant future.292  
An illustration will make these points more vivid. Imagine someone who works in a 
frontline service in the public sector. Through this job she has a great deal of contact with 
members of the community, often the same members, whom she then becomes 
(professionally) acquainted with. In order to perform this job well, skills need to be learned 
that enable the completion of tasks to a minimum standard. To do otherwise will result in 
less than glowing references from her manager and thus a trimming of subsequent 
employment opportunities. However, differences in how she relates to those skills as part 
of her working life and how she understands them as part of who she is will depend on a 
prior understanding of what the functions associated with that job will or can ultimately 
amount to. 
If she remained (or expected to remain) in that particular sector for a longer period 
of time she might spend more time learning about relevant legislation and developing 
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judicial precedents, cultivating skills directed specifically at what that job in that sector 
demanded. This particular work could then figure more comprehensively or globally in her 
sense of who she is and what she does. But this is plausibly, strategically sensible even, 
treated as an ineffective use of time and energy if she anticipates the need to make a move 
elsewhere at short notice where such knowledge will be superfluous. The same could be 
said of the way she relates to clients: recognition of long-term and on-going contact with 
clients might precipitate a different relationship than one where her involvements with 
particular individuals will be cut short. So a relation to her position and to the standards of 
the practice that determine the quality of her work will be qualitatively different depending 
on where and how she sees herself now and in the future and, indeed, what she might 
have learned at some point in her past about the most effective way to navigate the labour 
market. 293  Constantly changing jobs and anticipating that change, precipitates an 
understanding of work that is ultimately more summative than comprehensive.294 
The routines and habituation necessary for longer-term commitments and the 
competencies that accompany them, will be inappropriate or unnecessary for ends and 
strategies that lack reference to the long-term or the depth that it enables. For instance, 
tourists have to learn how to react in minimally competent ways to a diverse range of 
situations and function in a set of novel contexts. To do otherwise would mean they fail to 
enjoy even, as I term them, the shallower enjoyments of the tourist: being a tourist 
involves a set of skills just as do all other kinds of practice involvement. But the worker 
hoping to thrive in a particular location and a particular role will need a different set of 
skills, ones learned through disciplined practice and repetition, gaining more and more 
familiarity with particular tasks and involvements, building on already routinized habits and 
established proficiencies in order to gain new skills and capacities. Tourists learn 
competencies for any and all settings. The long-term civil servant in the example above 
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develops skills that make sense in much fewer settings. Not all the skills learned becoming 
a good public servant are transferrable to any and all work places.295      
If people hope to achieve the longer-term concrete ends which diligent-effort 
implies, they perform particular activities that are utterly necessary from the point of view 
of their comprehensive ends: learning the standards associated with the practice and 
producing performances of sufficient excellence are not things we can bypass. So long as 
we care about these ends, our activity will be disciplined and constrained.296 Our practice-
engagements make demands of us that cannot be merely pushed aside if our sustained 
care with that practice is to continue. Moreover, so long as that concern remains relevant 
we cannot simply go elsewhere like the tourist – to Marbella and not to Bermuda – 
because we have involved ourselves too deeply in a particular cause/task/place/(set of) 
person(s). Withdrawal remains possible if we give up caring for the concrete ends that 
motivated us to that point but in so doing depth will have been stalled.   
Comprehensive goods can emerge from the summative end of the above 
continuum: larger goals that make sense of our desires and preferences are formed out of 
the accumulated – not cumulative – episodes of smaller units of success. Success can then 
be measured according to the counting or racking up Scanlon described as absurd: the 
holidays enjoyed and the places visited will be measured against the standard of the 
activity ‘tourism’ for example. Individuals seeking enormous amounts of romantic liaisons 
will perform the same counting up, each encounter acting as one more background against 
which the satisfaction of a preference refers itself. The same applies for workers who are 
forced from low-skilled job to low-skilled job, concerned with nothing but making ends 
meet and thereby denied access to a more comprehensive reference point that could give 
greater depth to their careers.  
Individuals who have longer and deeper comprehensive goals are more vulnerable 
than people closer to the summative end of the continuum. Where we fail to recognise 
what this category of depth entails vis-à-vis the demandingness of complex practice 
engagements we also fail to attend to the value made accessible to deeper practitioners 
and, depending on their depth of involvement, to the differences in vulnerability to which 
practitioners are exposed.  
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An adequate assessment of the demands made by social and economic life, like 
demands to find and keep a job for instance, reveals the considerable tension between 
responses to these demands and those that are made by the process of practice-
engagement and deep habituation. Individuals are obliged to navigate this tension by 
either trading off depth for reduced vulnerability or else attempting depth, but with an 
increased vulnerability to possible termination in the things that deeply matter to them. 
Where this chapter focuses on the structure of depth, in the next chapter I describe the 
socio-economic demands that constitute our environments and analyse the ways they 
affect individuals’ possibilities for depth. 
The Value of Depth 
I have described a particular mode of engagement that I have tried to capture with the 
category of ‘depth’. In so doing, I have suggested that this dimension of life is both an 
important and fragile part of value and plurality: it is a sociological rather than an a priori 
possibility that should be preserved. That is not to say other styles of life, more transient 
and episodic, do not have their own virtues. But they are of a qualitatively different kind 
and are only one part of a plurality of possibly valuable ways of living. However, given that I 
recognise value can exist without the depth and vulnerability characteristic of the Tanizakis 
of the world, is my advocacy for depth merely an example of misplaced nostalgia or, even 
worse, oppressive perfectionism? Furthermore, given changes in the demands our socio-
economic environment makes of us – to be explored in the next chapter – is that 
sociological possibility something we can in actual fact afford to relinquish for the sake of 
other important goods and goals?  
Accusations of nostalgia or perfectionism are particularly pressing possibilities 
when we consider the concepts of ‘subjection to authority’ and ‘vulnerability’ side by side 
with one another. By subjecting ourselves to a practice, habituating ourselves to the 
standards and demands of its authority, we are rendered vulnerable to a concrete and 
objectively-decided kind of success and failure, i.e. according to standards the meaning of 
which we do not have ultimate control over. Getting rid of the vulnerability characteristic 
of deep involvements could be seen as a boon. Perhaps we would be better off jettisoning 
vulnerability and subjection to authority. In their stead we embrace the styles of life and 
possible conceptions of the good enjoyed by dilettantes, precisely because they are 
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available without the intensity of these problems and do not rely on the constraints and 
demandingness associated with deep and complex involvement.297    
To examine these accusations it is useful to further examine the concept of 
identification and ask whether it is either necessary or even especially significant. To 
identify with some commitment is to define oneself by reference to it. This concept, like 
depth and vulnerability, also admits of degrees: what we identify with can deeply matter to 
us or matter to us only a little. Dilettantes and deep practitioners can both be said to 
identify with their activities. Is it really so important for us to identify with our 
involvements and the costs these imply in the especially wholehearted ways characteristic 
of depth? Can we avoid the vulnerability described above and still enjoy useful, valuable 
and meaningful lives even if we do not identify with them in as deep a way as might be 
possible in other circumstances? 
Richard Arneson for one does not believe identification has the significance 
necessary to render it a central concern of justice. He relegates it to just one consideration 
among many which can be variously outweighed. He suggests that ‘one can achieve goods 
that are valuable and whose value enhances one’s life even if one fails to appreciate their 
value or recoils from one’s own achievement in response to its coerced or manipulated 
character’.298 Elsewhere he uses the notion of a person who is confused about why they 
reject a particular end. In his example, this is a poem that someone has written and then 
rejected not because it lacks quality, but because of an odd-ball aesthetic theory the writer 
comes to hold. Her rejection of the poem in light of this theory interferes with the role it 
can play in identification:  ‘no doubt her utility would be higher, other things being equal, if 
she were to endorse it, because a subjective sense of accomplishment is itself a not 
inconsiderable good, especially when it is well grounded on genuine accomplishment’.299  
However, Arneson goes on to reject the idea that subjective recognition of the 
value of one’s performances is a necessary part of value or well-being. The sensation 
associated with subjective endorsement is simply one relevant concern alongside, for 
instance, significant achievement: ‘we might prefer for (a person’s) own good that she not 
develop her capacity for self-endorsement but instead develop and exercise her capacity 
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for significant achievement’.300 Subjective assessment of one’s projects and commitments 
is not prior to what the projects and commitments actually are. A person’s success is, in 
this argument, separable from her feeling about it. Where there is little concern or care for 
what one has done this does not mean that what one has done is therefore meaningless. 
The depth of care and the vulnerability it precipitates is therefore regarded as an 
unnecessary part of a person’s well-being. There are alternatives ways of measuring well-
being that cannot be collapsed into people’s subjective experience of their activity.   
There are two problems in Arneson’s account, one which he can respond to and 
another which he cannot. First, there is the realism of the image of the person Arneson 
employs. This image suggests individuals can ‘collide’ into value without any genuine 
intention to do so. This relies on the questionable notion that a capacity for complex 
achievement and some minimum level of endorsement are commonly separated from one 
another. If the poet embraces a silly and confused aesthetic theory then this will 
necessarily act at the level of reasons and intentions influencing her account of why she 
engages with the writing of the poem in the first place.301 She will write in accordance with 
and with reference to that aesthetic theory – given her endorsement of it – and will 
produce a poem according to the standards of that particular genre of poetry. Certainly, 
she might produce a poem that, according to a newly adopted (and identified with) 
aesthetic theory, she later rejects as worthless. But this changes nothing with regard to the 
reasons and prior identification that played their part in producing the poem in the first 
place. I would like to try my hand at these genres of poetry that can be produced in so 
impressive and valuable a form absent the intention to do so!  
Arneson is right, though, that this level of identification does not have to admit of 
any particular depth for valuable activity to take place. Identification need not be so 
intense an experience as was emblematic of Tanizaki nor is the depth he fathomed a 
necessary condition for value. There is only the need for a minimum amount of 
identification for any valuable activity to take place. Dilettantes can identify with what they 
are doing and describe themselves in terms of their activity and preferences: the tourist 
sees herself as a tourist and embraces it. Intentional action would be hard to perform if we 
entirely lacked a sense of what we want to do and why we want to do it. But, beyond that 
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minimal level, a valuable life does not require the kind of depth I have been describing. In 
the same way care and vulnerability are separate from value, value is also separate from 
depth. Dilettantes’ ways of life are a perfectly acceptable version of value.        
Arneson focuses on the individual and I accept his point that, at this level, 
especially deep forms of identification are unnecessary. They can be variously outweighed 
by other considerations such as the quality of the performance a person produces or the 
welfare generated by satisfied preferences even in the absence of deeper identification 
with them. However, at the level of society and the collective, deeper forms of 
identification take on increased significance. 
If we lived in a situation wherein no single individual – or no members of a specific 
group – embraced their ends and their achievements to some significant depth this would 
be a matter of great concern. In such a situation the absence of identification would not 
simply be one value losing out among competing others. It would rather be a telling sign 
that something of fundamental importance was missing, a profound estrangement that 
could not be blamed on proclivities, perversities or inconsistencies in the preferences of 
individuals but would have to be located at a societal level, in processes that were actively 
interfering with the very possibility of depth.  
The way Roemer’s type-methodology expounds the idea of conceivability has an 
interesting resonance with this point (though of course his model lacks the (modest) 
perfectionist impulse I employ). If we recognise an utter absence of depth in the collective 
life of the community this is something with roots beyond individual volition and effort. It is 
not that all people have no desire for such depth. Rather, this kind of depth is not 
contained within the ranges of behaviour available to the population. It is an absence that 
is being produced and sustained as an integral, organising fact of the background against 
which choices are made and lives lived. Where depth is denied to any particular portion of 
the population, the same point holds.    
If we care about variety and plurality in the public life, some people’s depth of 
engagement with some practice – the deeper mattering of things that accompanies deeper 
identification – is just as important as breadth – the variety of activities about which we can 
be dilettantish. We might have different religions, associations, arts and various other 
involvements available to us. As Rawls suggested, a democratic society is one that ‘has a 
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place for all the main purposes of human life’.302 But where a deeper kind of identification 
is made impossible, unlikely or simply difficult, then the evoking of diverse ways of living as 
a sign of modernity’s vibrancy and vitality is being undermined.303 While individuals who do 
not engage to any depth with their involvements can still live a valuable life, to see that 
absence at a broader, societal level should make us uneasy.304  
Furthermore, the fact this depth is taken on by at least some purveyors of a 
practice is an important part of its continuation. Without the ‘expert purveyors’ the 
practice itself suffers because crucial aspects of practice-engagement, i.e. subjection to the 
authority and examples of the expert purveyors, cease as lively options. There is therefore 
a certain structure to the sustaining of a practice that requires depth by at least some of its 
practitioners. Practices are necessary for value, even for the dilettante. The structure of any 
engagement with practices is twofold: (minimal) habituation to the standards and demands 
of the practice and (minimal) subjection to the authority of the expert purveyors. These 
experts are the ‘deep engagers’. Without them the standards would not be made lively and 
personified for the other ‘shallower’ or ‘early’ practitioners to approximate.  
For example, those who have embedded themselves within a community-run 
organisation or association for considerable lengths of time will have a greater 
understanding of the variety of ways in which their work can be accomplished. They will 
appreciate and apprehend the bureaucracy that needs to be dealt with in order to get 
everything above board and legitimate; they will have a better sense of the areas within 
which their resources are best employed; of the limitations concerning what they can hope 
to achieve and the quality of needs that their work is ultimately going to meet. Again all 
this takes time to come to grips with and cannot be fashioned out of nothing.305 They 
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require skills like any other practice-engagement which take time to get right. These 
organisations also need ‘regular infantry’ – as it were – volunteers to do the ground work 
and help with completing tasks and putting plans into action. But such ‘grunt’ work is 
dependent on the deeper kind of engagement characteristic of people with longer histories 
within the organisation. Without those longer histories, the shorter ones could not happen.                
 
Conclusion 
Our efforts are what ultimately make the material out of which a life is formed. It is 
through the allocation of time and energy in projects, commitments, relationships and 
causes we regard as valuable that we are able to get a grip on what it is we care about, 
what it is we wish to do and who it is we wish to be. We do this by first putting effort into 
finding out which projects, commitments, activities and practices we wish to spend time 
learning about and doing. It is through our efforts that we learn about the demands and 
constraints that are definitive of practices and by which our activity is judged. We expose 
our efforts and activity to these standards and are thus made vulnerable to failure: success 
is not a decision individuals make on their own terms. Rather, it is a judgement made 
against the background of demands already formed and expectations derived from the 
practices with which we are involved.  
I began with a reiterated account of the burdens discussed in chapter 1. The 
choices we make about what to do and who to be all issue in costs. By choosing one thing 
we are simultaneously not choosing a whole range of other things. By caring about things 
we are also made vulnerable to their potential absence or withdrawal, whether these are 
the result of personal failures or wider socio-economic factors. Lacking from accounts that 
have previously addressed these matters is recognition of the distinction between the 
concepts of care and vulnerability. There are ways to care without thereby being opened 
up to intense problems of vulnerability and the costs associated with diligent-effort. There 
is, however, a deeper kind of practice-engagement which implies and necessitates this 
vulnerability. These engagements need a certain amount of security, a mitigation of 
vulnerability, in order to protect them.  
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Finally, I considered whether this desire for protection is motivated by a piece of 
unwarranted nostalgia, an inability to accept certain of the terms of modernity.306 However, 
in assessing the ways in which individuals relate to the content and concerns of their lives, 
the potential person-end relations that are being undermined are particularly crucial. I 
concede that we can survive, and in some ways even flourish, without the deeper instances 
of concrete practice-involvement: the promiscuous-type, tourist and other dilettantes are 
ever present and celebrated fixtures of our contemporary culture. But these characters 
cannot flourish in ways that depend on a particularly strong notion of identification and the 
concomitant vulnerability to which this exposes deep practioners. In much the same way 
we celebrate plurality along a dimension of breadth, we should be careful not to neglect 
the depth axis which is also an (increasingly fragile and more tenuous) aspect of this 
plurality. 
In the next chapter I offer an analysis of why this vulnerability is exacerbated by 
contemporary socio-economic circumstances and also examine what this vulnerability 
affects within the person-practice relation. By drawing on a more sociological literature I 
will examine more closely the activities and demands typical of person-practice relations. 
Specifically, I look at the two-fold demand these involvements make of individuals, i.e. 
subjection to authority and extended, habituated involvement with the practice. In 
particular, I examine the quality of this person-practice relation in the context of work. 
Work is an especially crucial involvement because it also represents another important 
demand made on people by the environments they live in. When working not only are we 
potentially engaging in a meaningful enterprise, we are also performing activity that is, 
from a social point of view, necessary.      
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The Craftsman versus the Demands of Late Modernity 
‘I possess the world effortlessly, and the world hasn’t the slightest hold upon me… I am 
here now and I have the power to be elsewhere! I am dependent upon neither time, nor 
space, nor distance. The world is my servant’.  
Honoré de Balzac 
The above quote is emblematic of an attitude opposed to the depth implied by diligent-
effort. It recognises freedom (and value) in the absolute absence of those things that hold 
or ground us, and that, in so doing, make us vulnerable. It is a celebration of the capacity to 
be unburdened by deeper kinds of involvements and the demands these make on our time, 
resources and effort. The absence of diligent-effort is not evidence of a wretched life 
devoid of all value. But dominance of such an attitude throughout a society, if such 
dominance were ever to be fully accomplished, would be devastating to important aspects 
of the commitment and depth that characterise those complex person-practice relations I 
examined in the previous chapter. In this chapter I describe the character of the craftsman, 
someone whose life is in part constituted by diligent-effort and the deep person-practice 
relations it fills out.  
The last chapter developed the image of individuals engaging with valuable 
practices in their surrounding cultures. I argued that engaging in complex and deep ways 
with these practices, of identifying wholeheartedly with them, is not an a priori possibility 
but a matter of sociology. Without an appreciation of the demands our social world makes 
of us, we are left without the means to properly assess this possibility. Our practice-
engagements do not exist in a vacuum away from our having to navigate potentially 
treacherous labour markets or the duties of the concerned activist or citizen. These 
imperatives and obligations significantly impact on the possibilities of depth we are able to 
entertain. 
In this chapter I begin by describing in more detail a particularly deep mode of 
engagement. This description issues in the character of the ‘craftsman’. The craftsman is, 
like Tanizaki from the previous chapter, someone who comes to care deeply about some 
particular, concrete activity. In this chapter, however, I employ the more common usage of 
the notion of craftsmanship and explore the world of work. Work has often been a place 
and activity where a great deal of our time and energy has been ‘put’ and is thus a typical 
instance of a place where depth in a practice involvement could potentially be gained. 
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Work is also important because it is one of those social demands with which the person has 
to deal in the course of their everyday life. 
I then go onto describe the nature of work as an example of a concrete social 
demand within the late-capitalist context, concentrating on the shifts in the way capital and 
labour operate against one another. I argue that the social demands associated with work 
in the current epoch are not conducive to the demands of depth and that they can in fact 
exist in considerable tension with one another. In the absence of some minimum level of 
security, individuals are left without the means to handle and navigate these social 
demands and are thus unable to mitigate the vulnerability that accompanies deep 
engagement. In such a situation, the other demands of depth are, I argue, less likely to be 
entertained. This would represent a loss to the plurality and diversity of valuable ways of 
life we are able to enjoy.    
Who is the Craftsman? 
There is an overall lack of concern for the actual content and structure of meaningful work 
within the political theory literature. A lot of attention is instead focused on the question of 
a right to meaningful work or how work impacts on issues of autonomy.307 These 
arguments tend to emphasise the powerful, self-realising potential that work has – but only 
as a potential.308 The arguments remain abstracted from the ways in which system-level 
economic imperatives affect the meaning it is possible for work to have within a person’s 
conception of the good: the right is therefore defended without exploring the actual 
content of meaning in the context of work and what it means to work in meaningful 
ways.309 People’s work is not invulnerable to the shifting sands of supply and demand, 
changes in technological, organisational and capital infrastructures. The meanings that 
work is able to enjoy – the kind of work available, the content of whatever work is 
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demanded and then done – are thus privy to a great deal of events and decisions that are 
not made in (or anywhere near) the workplace. 
In his discussion of the possibility for meaningful work, White alludes to Dworkin’s 
challenge model of the good life.310 From this perspective, meaning is gained in life via 
responding to intrinsically valuable challenges. Work is one possible site of that challenge. 
To lack the possibility for meaning in one’s work is to be unable to treat one’s work as a site 
of valuable challenge. Challenge will remain in having to stomach the burdensomeness of 
toil. In such a situation, effort is treated as the creator of burdens. But this kind of challenge 
is not of an intrinsically valuable kind. Responding to valuable challenges is thus a possible 
structure of the value we can enjoy at work. In this chapter I build on the previous chapter’s 
description of the person-practice relation in order to describe the content of such 
challenges as they pertain to work. I then assess possibilities for such content within the 
contemporary economic situation.    
In his reply to Richard Arneson, Russell Keat recognises the effects that wider social 
demands can have on the possibility of meaningful or appropriately challenging work. 
Arneson argues that socialists should be concerned with distribution alone and that they 
should be agnostic as to the role work plays in people’s lives and conceptions of the good: 
meaningful work is one choice among many and it is not for the state, on pain of 
accusations of paternalism, to legislate one way or the other. 311  Keat, contra the 
distributive focus Arneson employs, recognises the significance of economic regimes in 
rendering meaningful work a real and lively possibility. In other words, Keat argues that the 
reduction of focus to being one about choice cannot be justified simply by resolving to 
‘devolve’ all further choices to individuals. This is so because the choice of economic 
system ‘determine(s) the framework of societal possibilities within which individuals must 
(largely) operate’.312 There are systemic considerations at play that cannot be ignored given 
the influence any choice at that foundational-level has on preference formation, the design 
of projects and the conceptions of the good people are able to develop and pursue. An 
exclusively distributive focus fails to fully capture the reality of the political situations we 
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face. To remain agnostic on wider issues of institutional structure and capital ownership is 
to implicitly favour and disfavour certain kinds of life.    
While the concept of the craftsman I develop is not confined exclusively to the idea 
of the ‘worker’ I do draw largely on examples of people at work.313 In doing this, I do not 
take a stand on the necessary structures of ‘good work’. This is not intended as an exclusive 
description of meaningful or good work or the role work must have in a person’s life in 
order for it to count as meaningful. What I wish to describe under the heading of the 
‘craftsman’ is one way in which work can be deeply and meaningfully engaged with.314 So 
there is a minimal perfectionism involved in that I am suggesting that this is one particularly 
valuable (and vulnerable) form of life without thereby asserting it as the only possible 
source of value. 
Richard Sennett describes the craftsman as someone who does good work for its 
own sake.315 This puts it beyond the idiomatic notion that ‘craft’ is relevant only to skilled 
manual labour. Certainly, the work of the craftsman is ‘practical’ in that the activities that 
constitute work belong to practices that make sense of them, i.e. provide the standards by 
which they are to be judged.316 But the orchestral conductor and journalist are learning a 
practical craft as much as the carpenter. Craftsmanship thus describes, in part, a particular 
attitude to a person’s work. The work of craftsmen and women is done with an eye trained 
on the quality of the work being done. Carpenters, orchestral conductors and journalists 
may gain (more often than not, pecuniary) advantages in working in a less craftsman-like 
way by, for instance, focusing on the speed in which results are produced, rather than on 
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the quality. But the craftsman treats issues such as speed as less important than 
attendance to those standards of excellence, those ‘patterns of dos and don’ts’, which 
define their respective practices. It is an attitude that recognises a possible gap between 
getting something done and getting something right.317  
Craftsmen thus represent a minimally deep engagement with the rules and 
standards of the practices with which they are involved. Engagement is not regarded as a 
means to some other end but is primarily done for the sake of learning and producing 
‘good instances’ of a practice. Alasdair MacIntyre’s distinction between the pursuit of 
external and internal goods as part of our reasons for engaging with practices is interesting 
vis-à-vis this question of depth.318 Goods that are internal to a given practice are those 
which cannot be had in any way except by engaging with that particular practice. They are 
thus inseparable from the concrete activity associated with that practice: goods associated 
with the study of literature are different from the goods of scientific investigation which 
are also different from the goods of high-level sport performance. External goods are those 
that are obtainable without reference to a particular activity, those goods that are 
potentially available across all practices. The most obvious external good is money since it 
can be obtained through any number of activities. Status in its more general sense might be 
another.  
This interestingly parallels the distinction in the previous chapter between concrete 
and unspecified ends and goals, and the vulnerability that is characteristic of the former. In 
this context, it is internal goods that are especially vulnerable when the processes 
underlying habituation to the standards of a practice are put under threat. The ability to 
gain access to particular internal goods relies on the continued existence of – and thus 
institutional support for – a specific practice, whereas the accruing of external goods relies 
only on there being some practice in which individuals can involve themselves.319 The 
concrete, specific activities and their potentially attenuated relation to the internal goods 
they make available are thus contrasted to the more mutable relation lying between 
practices per se and external goods. Put bluntly, we may be able to find and secure external 
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resources from all manner of work.320 But the idea that we can do so in one particular 
profession – whether it is carpentry, administrative work or in academia – and thus go on 
exploring the fecundity/depth of options represented by concrete and specific practices, is 
dependent on the security of that involvement which in its turn is dependent on wider 
systemic imperatives.  
The behaviour necessary to engage deeply with these internal goods is importantly 
objective, i.e. not subject to shifts according to time and place but to some degree rigid and 
constant. The standards set by the practice do not shift to accommodate failures: if one 
fails to reach them and produce performances of sufficient quality then one has failed.321 
An important part of such engagement is the ability to subject oneself to the authority of 
the practice, both to its contemporary practitioners and those who have come before: ‘it is 
thus the achievement, and a fortiori the authority, of a tradition which I then confront and 
from which I have to learn’.322 The practice and its standards are things we negotiate as in 
important ways given.323  
This concept of givenness is an important aspect of a practice’s authority. Following 
Michael Sandel’s use of this term in his work on bioethics, the acceptance of practices’ 
authority is also an acceptance that certain of our situations’ limitations are not merely 
contingent. These limitations should not be regarded as merely waiting to be 
revolutionised and brought to conform to novel understandings of an activity or good. 
Rather, they are forever set beyond our urge for total control. Putting them beyond this 
‘Promethean’ urge is a large part of the value they are able to have for us.324 We can 
master the standards of a practice and become expert in how to act within its authority, 
perhaps even develop the requisite expertise to alter them to some extent. But to an 
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important degree, these standards exist beyond our impulse for control and act as 
limitations on our activity. 
What exactly does the learning of the standards associated with a practice demand 
of the individual? What concrete processes do people participate in when they engage 
deeply with practices? Sennett is again illuminating on this score. He identifies three 
abilities which are basic to craftsmen. These are the abilities ‘to localize, to question and to 
open up’.325 Take, by way of explicating these processes, Sennett’s description of the 
carpenter at work.   
Localization is the ability to focus one’s attention on ‘a place where something 
important is happening’. For the carpenter, localising might involve the handling and 
inspection of a single piece of wood in the hope of finding interesting or challenging details. 
There is the need for complex tacit knowledge to make sense of this localisation: 
carpenters need a sense of what is being inspected and for what purpose in order for this 
localization to make sense. The grain that shows up as interesting, as possessing something 
of importance is only intelligible in the light of what the craft of carpentry means, what it 
does and what it produces. This is something which might seem immediately apparent even 
to those of us who are not inculcated in the crafts of carpentry: it involves using wood to 
make things of utility. But the application and use of that knowledge is far from easily 
acquired.  
The next phase, questioning, is the exploration of the identified locale and relies on 
an implicit curiosity, an ability to dwell ‘in an incipient state’. That is, in the case of the 
carpenter, a handling of the wood and ‘pondering how the pattern on the surface might 
reflect structure hidden underneath’. The carpenter inhabits a space of ‘suspend(ed) 
resolution and decision, in order to probe’.326 Action therefore leads to a period of non-
action during which results are questioned. Then action is allowed to resume in a new, 
more informed way. The third part, opening up, involves the interactions of different habits 
within the carpenter’s toolkit as a way of arriving at promising ways of using this particular 
wood and its qualities. The carpenter steps back and explores the different possibilities that 
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the identified problem/quality has presented her with, eventually deciding on a particular 
course of action she regards as suitable to deal with it.327   
 An important dimension of the craftsman’s engagement with practices is, 
evidently, the issue of time. The habituation to the standards of a practice is not a 
straightforward event or process and all those skills have been earned via repeated 
accumulative experiences. This involves a great deal of trial and error, the abandonment of 
old techniques in order to develop new, more complex ones and close, painstaking 
inspection of the standards and expectations surrounding our involvement with an activity. 
All of this is both effortful and time-consuming. Part of such effort is engaged in what 
Sennett has called ‘dwelling in error’. This demonstrates the necessary role constructive 
failures have in our learning and development as we experiment, learn and occasionally 
stumble, throughout our engagement with practices.328 It is not a process in which success 
is guaranteed or in which application is naturally and inevitably accumulative and 
productive. Learning to deal with error and failure is a crucial part of what we do with our 
effort. 
The Content of a ‘Practice Session’ 
To supplement the basic abilities characteristic of the craftsman it is also necessary to 
understand what the person does with the time spent in ‘practice sessions’, i.e. those 
activities that inform and fill-out person-practice relations.329 It is through these ‘sessions’ 
that depth is gained. The activities associated with any given practice build on previous 
experience and skills. This process, while obviously admitting of a great diversity across the 
whole range of practices, does have some practice-independent constants. That is, the 
ways in which craftsmen learn about their practices do possess a certain structure that 
facilitates habituation to the relevant standards and expectations.  
A significant part of this structure is dealing with resistance. Progress in learning 
skill is not linear. Any practice in which we take part and about which we care has, in the 
process of our involvement with it, presented us with difficulties and challenges. 
Resistances, ‘those facts that stand in the way of the will’, are experiences common to all 
our attempts to get good at something we have a taste for.330 (Sennett also suggests the 
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necessity for creating opportunities for resistance where none are found as a way of 
developing and increasing capacity).331 It is only in learning to deal with these resistances 
constructively that any (non-linear) progress can be made at all.  
The primary experience of resistance is frustration. In confronting resistance we 
apprehend a situation in which things cannot ‘go on’ as before. Something needs to change 
in order to allow us to continue with our activity. Again this ‘changing’ is a skilful and 
effortful process. It is learned and acquired rather than being some bedrock capacity we 
can automatically draw on. Like a great many of our capacities it is privy to atrophy and 
underdevelopment. Three skills of special importance in dealing with resistance, again 
drawing on Sennett, are the skills necessary for i) reformatting the problem, ii) judging of 
time and iii) identifying with the resistance.  
Briefly, reformatting the problem allows practitioners to take a step-back from the 
problem as it exists and imaginatively recast that resistance in a different light and draw on 
other experiences or frames of reference that can then be applied to the problem at hand 
in order for a solution to be found. Sennett uses the example of Peter Barlow’s building of a 
tunnel under the Thames, in which the architect, instead of trying to resist the river using 
bricks as the material of choice, used iron tubing to work with it.  This shift was achieved in 
the act of imagining himself swimming across the river and seeing his body less as a box 
(which suggests the strength of bricks) and more as an empty vessel (hence the decision to 
use a hollow tube).  
The judging of time involves the revision of our expectations vis-à-vis the length of 
time a particular task will take. The wrinkle here, as Sennett describes it, is that such 
revision is dependent on the fact that ‘we have to fail consistently (in order) to make this 
revision’.332 There is a virtuous circularity at play here: the making of mistakes is necessary 
for the recognition that resistance is present. Such recognition is itself dependent on there 
being an already achieved minimal depth of understanding into the standards of the 
practice at hand. Acknowledging the unusual amount of time a task is taking to complete 
means a third and final skill is made necessary – that of identifying with resistance. This is 
the process of finding ‘the most forgiving element in a difficult situation’, a counterpoint to 
the skill of localisation, and exploiting it as a possible means of solving the bigger problem. 
Returning to the example of Barlow and the building of the Thames tunnel, we see that by 
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turning his attention to the flow of the water and away from the unforgiving aspect of the 
pressure, he was able to reconstitute and reimagine the problem in such a way as to make 
it more amenable to resolution.333   
The reason I have dwelt on a description of the skills associated with craftsmanship 
is to draw attention to the extensive range of those skills and also to emphasise the fragility 
of such a character-type. The craftsman is not an easy way to be. It demands the nurturing 
of a certain attitude, a great deal of time and a significant quantity of effort plied into very 
concrete and specific tasks. Unlike the hero of the Balzac quote at the start of the chapter, 
craftsmen cannot escape the burden and cost of their involvements.334 Her sense of what 
matters – of who she is to be and what she is to do – is too deeply interwoven with that 
involvement. Such burdensomeness – in the sense I described it in the last chapter – has to 
be embraced, identified with and followed through in the ways characteristic of craftsmen. 
To lose those burdens, to be free of them in some sense, would be also to lose the sense 
they made of her life. It is to this loss which craftsmen are made vulnerable. 
The capacities here being described are not preconceived but created out of our 
experiences in the world. They are thus highly contingent. In the absence of possibilities 
that make lively and available the kinds of practice-engagements that are peculiar to 
craftsmen, these abilities, habits and experiences will also remain, at best, an unexploited 
potential. The depth we might wish to ‘enjoy’, drawing on and nurturing the different skills 
described above, is not an act of individual decision alone. It has to occur within a world 
that allows it, that grants us the time and space in which all these things can be learned 
and, importantly, learned well.335 
An interesting instance of this potential being left underdeveloped is the story 
Sennett tells of the modern bakery. In a Boston bakery, machines have been developed to 
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be the most user-friendly imaginable: computer screens and high-tech sensory devices 
have been combined with ovens to furnish workers with the ability to produce and make 
bread in all its many forms despite a total absence of knowledge pertaining to bakery. This 
has certain (institutional) advantages because costs are kept low, profits high and rehiring 
easy. Workers can be unskilled because the machines themselves are chocked full of the 
necessary know-how. Sennett describes this as a ‘terrible paradox’, whereby the 
‘diminishing of difficulty and resistance, create the very conditions for uncritical and 
indifferent activity’.336 The drawbacks of such a system extend beyond those times a 
machine breaks down and the lack of know-how amongst the bakers leads to a lot of sitting 
on hands. Whether the worker intends, must, or desires to be able to flit between ranges 
of differently low-skilled jobs, this lack of know-how does not become an encumbrance but 
a necessary fact of life.  
This lack of concrete, embedded know-how will also influence the ways in which 
these workers are able to see themselves in relation to their work. This is precisely because 
of the lack of skills and understanding they are able to ‘get by’ with, the lack of challenging 
resistance their work supplies. In much the same way that we don’t take seriously the 
person who claims love for an activity or a cause they take no part in, who has yet to face 
the challenges they might encounter in so taking part, we would be hard pressed to 
describe these individuals as bakers. Their understanding of the process and practice of 
that activity – the challenges, difficulties and resistances that have to be confronted in the 
process of so becoming – is too minimal. They lack the skills necessary to support claims of 
identification with the craft of bakery. 
People who claim to care for the environment have to back that up with specific 
practical activity e.g. recycling, use of public transport and vegetarianism. People who claim 
to be bakers also have to demonstrate that care through activity within the practice of 
bakery. Identities have to be earned in some way, through involvement in practical 
performance of the tasks and challenges set by crafts. Without this, even though time is 
spent at a place where baking is done, there is a lack of the kind of involvement which 
issues in the skills that warrant substantive identification with the practice and the 
occupation. This is not necessarily the individual’s fault: the world within which she ‘moves’ 
inside the institution of the bakery demands little from her and provides even less 
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opportunity for the development of her skills.337 It requires only a minimum amount of 
attention which, when emergency/resistance/ambiguity present themselves, prove almost 
utterly useless.   
 
Conflicts with the demands of Depth  
The person-practice relation MacIntyre refers to and the concrete details of craftsmanship 
as Sennett describes them are not isolated from the web of relations that exist elsewhere 
within an individual’s life. The demands that are made of us by some ‘parts’ of our life can 
complicate and render difficult other more craftsman-like uses of our time, energies and 
resources. Occupations are a prime example of the ways in which the demands made on us 
by our environments ‘turn us out’ to other parts of our life. That is, work makes demands 
of us that will be felt elsewhere, in our other engagements. For example, a promotion/pay-
cut/redundancy might entail moving house or cutting back on certain expenditures thereby 
unsettling family life. (This works in the other direction as well: family life or a particular 
religious affiliation may put a pin in a promotion or a particular type of work.)  
Certain expectations are made of the individual in their capacity as members of a 
particular society. It is the meeting of these expectations which allow societies to function 
and reproduce themselves. This is the meaning behind Zygmunt Bauman’s notion that 
‘there are many ways of being human, but each society makes a choice of the way it 
prefers or tolerates’; or Ulrich Beck when he writes ‘the private sphere is not what it 
appears to be: a sphere separated from the environment. It is the outside turned inside 
and made private, of conditions and decisions made elsewhere….With general disregard of 
their private, biographical consequences’. 338  In meeting a society’s demands and 
expectations we become members of specific groups. The expectation that we work, for 
instance, turns us into ‘workers’ which leads to our assuming certain roles and joining 
particular organisations. Different responses to these demands will lead to membership of 
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different associations: a nurse joins the hospital, a teacher the school and a banker the 
bank. There are also secondary associations such as trade unions and professional 
associations which these prior memberships can grow into. The demands that arise out of 
such various memberships can issue in the kinds of associational conflicts that John Dewey 
recognised even in the early part of the 20th century.339  
These conflicts refer to the ways in which involvement in one set of associations 
makes it difficult to associate elsewhere. So, for example, workers spending 14 hours a day 
down the mine or in a factory may find it difficult to operate effectively as citizens, fathers, 
brothers and whatever else.340 Dewey’s concerns were specifically with regards to the 
formation of ‘publics’, to those associations necessary for individuals affected by a 
particular confluence of processes in the social, economic and political situation to take 
control of their collective fates, to ‘project agencies’ which might order such processes.341 
His worry was that ‘new forces’ of mass industry, increased speeds of communication and 
capital accumulation, produced ‘mobile and fluctuated associational forms’ that meant 
individuals were less able to accommodate themselves to the demands of their various 
associations. This in turn would reduce their collective ability to construct and render 
effective those projecting agencies: ‘Without abiding attachments, associations are too 
shifting and shaken to permit a public readily to locate and identify itself.’342 In this example 
then, the habituation necessary for the ‘craft’ of effective political, social and economic 
opposition or organisation is imagined as exceedingly difficult precisely because of the lack 
of structures needed to facilitate the learning, embedding and employment of the relevant 
skills.  
Declines in trade union membership and changes in their purposes and functions 
have borne out this worry. Not only is trade union membership down but the ways in 
which people use unions have also changed.343 Not only are there fewer people joining 
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their unions but those who do are not involved in ways that coordinate on-going collective 
action as effectively as in previous epochs. Where before the union surrounded a person’s 
life and was a large part of workers’ social lives, this is no longer the case: today, the union 
is primarily a place where grievances are registered and complaints made, representation 
sought and employment advice offered.344 It is no longer an all-encompassing association in 
which holidays, education and the majority of extra-curricular activities are collectively 
organised around the workplace. This is not a normative or even nostalgic point. I use this 
only to demonstrate the almost tautological point that the efficacy of a collective agency is 
lessened when people do not regard it as a tool of such agency, when it is abandoned as a 
place worthy of their time, effort and skill: that is, as both a part and means of people’s 
conceptions of the good. 
Robert Bellah (et al.) have noted something similar affecting the ways in which 
individuals understand their engagement with their communities and what these particular 
involvements are able to mean for them.345  Bellah draws on the image of the ‘town father’ 
– an explicit contemporising of Tocqueville’s ‘character ideal’ of the ‘independent citizen’ 
(along with the sexist connotations of that ideal) – to describe someone whose working-life 
and community-life enjoyed a certain unity and coherence. Town fathers’ engagement with 
their community would help them in their working-life: ‘the demands of work, family and 
neighbourliness were intersecting’.346 Men – as they would have been, more often than not 
– first attended to the demands of community and public interest out of a sense of 
necessity, i.e. such assistance helped with the establishment and development of business, 
until such necessity precipitated in them a taste, habit and preference for it.347 Actions 
which were at first inspired by narrow self-interest became activity integral to the person’s 
sense of himself and what he was doing.  
Bellah, however, argues that this intersection and the moral identification it makes 
possible is made increasingly fragile by modern economic and social processes. The 
demands specific to our particular epoch do not function in the same organising way: ‘The 
associational life of the modern metropolis does not generate the kinds of second 
languages of social responsibility and practices of commitment to the public good’ that he 
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believe characterised, in admittedly ideal form, the associational life of the independent 
township.348 The complexity of the modern era and the differently intersecting demands 
made of an individual do not allow for a substantial degree of unity. There is a great deal of 
flux and conflict which individuals must negotiate, a negotiation not easily compatible with 
the trials and tribulations of public involvement.  
Here I have been referring to the ‘craft’ of public engagement. Like those person-
practices relations I have described above and in the previous chapter, this requires time 
for habituation, for the skills associated with such a practice to ‘bed in’ and be properly 
formed. As Sennett says, ‘the slowness of craft time serves as a source of satisfaction; 
practice beds in, making the skills one’s own. Slow craft time also enable the work of 
reflection and imagination – which the push for quick results cannot. Mature means long; 
one takes lasting ownership of the skill.’349 Our other associations, perhaps less voluntary in 
nature – such as work, which the majority of us are obliged to perform – can draw on our 
time, efforts and energies in ways less than amenable to the long-term demands of, in this 
instance, public life.  
In the design of their conceptions of the good, people pursue certain ends and take 
part in certain projects. These pursuits and projects are not matters of pure choice. They 
must also take into account the demands that are found throughout the economy and 
public life more generally. We do not altogether choose the ways in which we work since 
these are guided by imperatives we have very little say over. For instance, when the 
economy needs us to be flexible in our work, prepared to move off or change employment 
patterns at a moment’s notice, success is governed by our ability to effectively negotiate 
that on-going task. To do otherwise – to forgo such negotiation as it were – would be to lay 
oneself open too readily to risk and possibly grave misfortune. It is thus a strategic 
necessity to perform in this flexible way. The skills and competencies needed in order to 
achieve this flexibility are different to other varieties that might arise in response to 
different contexts. Relating this to the wider biographical consequences, skills developed at 
the level of work will radiate out into other areas of people’s lives, affecting the other 
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involvements their efforts have elsewhere drawn them into. Put succinctly, we are ‘workers’ 
everywhere not just at work.350  
This is demonstrated by a character (Rico) from Sennett’s 1998 work The Corrosion 
of Character.351 Rico is a high-flying technology advisor who runs a consultancy firm but has 
done so amidst a great deal of uprooting and long-distance house moves. He is also a 
father who wishes to impart certain lessons of integrity, loyalty and constancy to his child. 
His deepest worry is that the substance of his life – in which there is no sense of the long-
term or of a fixed community in which to settle – is barren of such virtues, that his work 
denies him the opportunity to be a father in the way he would like. This worry expresses 
itself in a question that captures the rift between the demands of different associations: 
“How can (he) protect his family from succumbing to the short-term behaviour… the 
weakness of loyalty and commitment which mark the modern workplace?”352      
A twist on these associational conflicts can be seen in the way shifts in legislation 
produce similar challenges to which people are obliged to respond. Consider, for example, 
the ways in which the United Kingdom’s housing situation – framed by legislation which 
itself absorbs a great deal of the imperatives surrounding economic activity and growth – 
might impact on people’s relation to their community, work and any of the other concrete 
(read: vulnerable) engagements with which craftsmen could deeply immerse themselves. 
Confronting such challenges is effortful and time-consuming, issuing in skills and 
competencies that allow for effective agency in the light of what those challenges present. 
They are also burdensome and costly since time spent tending to such challenges is time 
people do not spend elsewhere in other practices or associations they have reason to value. 
In the UK during the 1980s, housing legislation underwent a great many changes. After 
these changes were initiated they served to render the tenants of private residences 
significantly more precarious whilst also impacting on the more secure tenancies enjoyed 
by council house residents.353 This was coupled with a more general government policy to 
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reduce the overall provision of council houses and even sell off existing stock, the 
consequences of which we continue to live with today.354 All this was (and still is) in the 
effort to encourage private landlords to invest in housing, employing markets as the 
primary means by which to effectively meet growing housing demand. The result has been 
a situation where, within one London borough alone (Southwark – the largest provider of 
council housing in the country), around 17,000 households are currently registered on the 
housing waiting list.355  
Where legislation is organised in such a way, individuals (and whole families) are 
going to have a very different relation to the places they call, for the time being at least, 
their home. This resonates beyond the walls of the family abode. It will radiate out, 
impacting on other associations and possible avenues of involvement. In the absence of a 
feeling of real security we do our best to maintain and ensure as much security as possible. 
This again is an unavoidably effortful process: we learn our rights regarding what council 
assistance we are entitled to, learn ways of keeping a potentially trigger-happy landlord on 
board, perhaps learning how to take care of minor repairs around the house in order to 
maintain landlord-tenant relations, we spend time looking into different schemes of house 
ownership or council tenancy. Challenges that are created at a structural level are dealt 
with via individual competencies.356 These actions are time-consuming and often hard work, 
especially when balanced against other demands such as work and family life, i.e. those 
other possible sites of social demandingness. All this renders difficult the effortful and 
time-consuming habituation to other practices, the learning of concrete, practical skills that 
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are characteristic of the craftsman. Where a person fears her membership to such practices 
will be ended or the effort, resources and time she is able to ply into them severely 
curtailed because of having to deal with those other demands, deep involvement becomes 
inherently risky.  
Unable to rely on the ‘ontological security’357 a stable housing situation would help 
establish, we might try to avoid certain deeper ways of engagement that expose us to too 
much vulnerability in case we fall on the wrong side of some event or happenstance.358 
Combine this with potentially temporary or unstable working situations – zero hour or 
short-term contracts, temporary employment, internships359 – and the compounding effect 
of all the various unsettling, ambient threats seem even more severe, reducing the 
possibility of continued involvement in activities that are not dedicated to the cementing 
and sustaining of some minimum ontological security. In wanting to avoid the ruptures and 
fallouts that are the consequence of falling on the wrong side of this vulnerability, people 
might baulk at the very notion of vulnerability, the potential risks incurred being simply too 
high. This is an attitude necessarily opposed to diligent-effort since, as I have tried to show 
in the previous chapter, some degree of vulnerability is the necessary corollary of depth in 
practice-engagement. So for the craftsman-like behaviour necessary for gaining the depth 
constitutive of diligent-effort, it is crucial to have security in other of our more basic 
involvements.  
Stability and Flux 
In exploring the spectrum which lies between situations of fixed, unchanging stability and 
contexts dominated by ubiquitous flux I will use two examples. One is drawn from a specific 
historical period, the other from fantasy. Via these two extremes it becomes possible to 
see the consequences (in admittedly exaggerated form) that fixity or fluidity in the 
background can have on the ways in which individuals relate to their surroundings. The 
relative fixity or fluidity of that background, how secure we believe ourselves to be in our 
current situation, profoundly influences the possibilities for the relations we bear to our 
practice involvements, to each other and to our lives taken as a whole. 
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MacIntyre’s description of Homeric ethics provides an instance of the pervasive 
fixity of a particular socio-political framework.360 Within this image of society, ‘the most 
important judgements that can be passed upon a man concern the way in which he 
discharges his allotted social functions’.361 Individuals are, in effect, entirely absorbed into 
the various roles they discharge (whether that person be a nobleman, a parent, a 
blacksmith etc.). The content of those roles and the tasks that are thereby assigned him act 
as a guide for life. Appraisal of a person is thus rooted in the performance of assigned tasks, 
and success is measured according to the standards associated with roles and their 
concomitant tasks. If one successfully performs the tasks appropriate to the role then one 
will be considered a ‘good’ nobleman/parent/blacksmith.362 The roles themselves and the 
tasks that are ascribed to them are rooted in social facts and admit of no substantial 
interpretation: one’s behaviour either conforms to the assignments or it does not.   
There exists as a result no possible gulf between what/whom one is from the 
question of what one is to do or how one is to proceed: motivations and intent are neither 
here nor there. Such questions and their answers are fixed by the structures of the society 
into which one is born and immediately absorbed. It appears then that life is laid out ahead 
of individuals who are thereby spared the task of negotiating a changing world, where roles 
might shift around, take on new meanings and annul the meaning of old activity. 
Involvements are enveloping, pre-determined by the objective facts surrounding a person’s 
birth and uninterrupted by radical changes in the infrastructure, equipment and technology 
that undergird these roles. Zygmunt Bauman has described this as a compleat mappa 
mundi.363  
This is a situation whereby the context itself provides the totality of knowledge 
about the world and one’s place within it. All existential questions are answered by one’s 
membership of a given group to which one belongs from birth until death, ‘putting on in 
the meantime and taking off again a series of strictly defined and non-negotiable identities 
in a strictly defined and non-negotiable succession’.364 The surroundings are fixed, the roles 
and their demands are known and the idea of existing beyond those demands in some 
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other community is simply not feasible (within the idealised version of this historical 
account). We would be hard pressed to call this situation amenable to any degree of 
autonomy given that even the most wholehearted identification with one’s roles has come 
up against no alternative, admits of no choice and will brook no resistance.365 In spite of 
this absence of autonomy, people in this situation might well develop complex skills and 
impressive competencies precisely because of that total and focused involvement in a 
particular set of practices.366 There is depth here, but accomplished at the total expense of 
any degree of – or possibility for – breadth.  
This, then, is one end of that spectrum between absolute fixity of context and 
absolute fluidity. The other end of the spectrum is a science-fiction version of extreme 
fluidity, a situation much like the American TV Series Quantum Leap where Scott Bakula’s 
character (Sam) shifts between different eras and situations having quickly to adapt to the 
demands they make and the tasks they set. Imagine a situation within which we can start 
to make our life-plans as we see fit, taking into account the context, predicting 
consequences and developing strategies to see those plans come to fruition, but always in 
full knowledge that at any moment we may be transported to an entirely different context, 
perhaps another country or period of history. Within this different country/era we may not 
have adequate or appropriate resources to continue with our previously determined 
ambitions and intentions. Our previously formulated plans may be inappropriate for the 
new context, unfeasible and derided by those others with whom this environment is now 
being shared. This is a situation, admittedly presented in extreme and fantastical form, 
which has breadth in spades but utterly lacks that dimension of depth. 
Choice is here in evidence, indeed it is constantly being called upon as and when 
revision or adjustments become necessary. To some extent we can even say that someone 
in such a situation is still capable of authorship. Yes, the world is utterly given and the 
potential for the ‘Promethean urge’ – the desire to see the world conform, in some limited 
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way, to our desires and ambitions – severely diminished. But authorship could still be ‘kept 
going’ so long as the individual understood the context and could reshape his preferences 
accordingly. The dilettantes from the previous chapter could well thrive in such a world 
even though craftsmen would likely vanish. The possibility of long-term commitments 
might be removed but this has no effect on preferences that are capable of immediate or 
short-term satisfaction.   
To give this fantastical abstract example some flesh, consider the following as an 
admittedly pale approximation.  A startling example of the ‘liquidity’ of our contemporary 
political and economic situation is the movement not merely of financial capital but of 
whole factories. The actual physical bases of production (in this example, all 250,000 
tonnes of equipment along with 40,000 tonnes of documents explaining its reconstruction) 
can now be stripped down and shipped away to foreign climes. The factory in question is 
the ThyssenKrupp steel mill in Dortmund which after years of providing employment to 
local communities (10,000 people all told) – and years of steady decline it should also be 
noted – was carefully disassembled and packed off to China.367 A mainstay in the local 
economy was thus removed along with the security and livelihoods that had been built 
around it. The very geography and institutional configuration of a situation was thus 
radically altered by the removal of this factory.368 Here it is not the person who is whipped 
off to another setting but rather a significant part of the world within which she moved.369 
A whole factory seems to have mutated into a giant dice, rolled across the world in 
the hopes of a good return. If we take this ‘flightiness’ as a given and, in some quarters as a 
boon for economic innovation and growth, 370  then the consequences for realistic, 
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embedded distributive possibilities become (potentially severely) restricted as the terms of 
engagement with capital increasingly favour those who are in control of its movement. 
While previously there was some imperative for the owners of factories to make use of 
their capital at a fixed location, given the unfeasibly massive project such movement would 
formerly have involved, even this has now succumbed to the force of liquidity.371 The 
physical places of work are pushed into what Zygmunt Bauman has characterised as the 
‘space of flows’, something that can be here today and gone tomorrow.372 
Whereas in Homeric ethics, individuals could find no alternatives to the roles into 
which they had been inculcated as the sole means by which to live, this second situation 
provides no framework within which to establish a long-term narrative. Life is destined to 
be episodic, forever a vignette never an epic. That doesn’t mean we can’t all be the authors 
of picaresque vignettes should our situations demand it. We can even identify with those 
vignettes, the situations that produce them and the person that emerges from them. Again, 
my argument is not against vignettes per se. Rather, it is an argument from a perspective of 
plurality which recognises the sociology needed to support those longer, more involved 
and deeper narratives which look beyond the short-term for their satisfaction. 
What we have to contend with in either of the above extremes are the different 
tasks that the world sets for us, the different ‘givens’ we must face. Any control we have 
over our lives is a skill that is earned by dealing, first and foremost, with these tasks. We 
may no longer live in the first example where our lives are ready-made for us and into 
which we slot without the opportunity for resistance (and this is of course something to 
celebrate). But if instead we are presented with a modern context that is even a vague 
approximation of the Quantum Leap scenario, this too needs to be gauged in its full 
significance. Here too, though apparently free from the strictures of roles and 
commitments assigned at birth, there remain demands that need to be met in order for 
effective action to continue. Currently these demands are, at root, beyond the choices of 
individuals.  
Competencies, Demands and Confidence 
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The ability to deeply involve ourselves with any given practice is not merely the result of an 
unencumbered individual decision. It is dependent on the perception of a degree of 
stability and continuity in our lives which allows for sustained engagement with the 
practices we see around us. What is more, the demands such practice involvements make 
do not occur in a vacuum away from the demands made on us by our other involvements, 
involvements which can take on the aspect of immutable givens which we are unable to 
simply do away with.  
These givens and their demands are of two varieties. The first set comprises those 
involvements we are already engaged with as part of already existing practice-
engagements: these can be described as ‘personal-historical’ in quality. The second set are 
the demands made on us by the type of communities we live in and which stand above and 
in important ways shape the other variety.   
An instance of the personal-historical is the prior involvement characteristic of the 
parent. Parents’ feelings for their work, for example, may be more or less stressful, more or 
less fulfilling, depending on how they think of themselves as parents and how the work 
they do and the money they earn helps them perform the tasks of parenthood. Remove 
the involvement of parenting from their conceptions of the good and the quality of the 
goods, tasks and self-understandings will shift in consequence, perhaps taking on less 
urgency or making promotions, demotions or relocations less/more important. What is 
more, being a parent is itself a practice that is in part defined by the standards and norms 
of the community to which one belongs. Meeting these standards will thus also draw on 
the efforts of the parent in question, cutting off other possible uses of his or her time and 
energy. 
Demands may also come from a more objective context, one that is separate from 
any concern with my particular activities. Here I mean, for instance, the demands made on 
us by an economy to find work and, furthermore, to understand that work in a specific way: 
to regard it as temporary, retractable and forever in doubt or else as a thirty year career in 
the same company. Given the centrality of work in our lives (in the fact that it is through 
work that we are able to earn the resources used elsewhere in our other endeavours) the 
way we are drawn on to work will resonate out into other activities that are potential 
components of our conceptions of the good. In addition, these demands may be political as 
well as economic. The strict republican ideal of deep involvement in organising the affairs 
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of one’s community would inevitably draw on a person’s effort and skill them in a certain 
way, to some extent irrespective of that person’s volition.373 
Our involvements then are not ‘merely’ the expression of certain preferences, the 
design of a certain set of ends as if our lives were, as  Williams put it, ‘a rectangle that has 
to be optimally filled in’ from a place of privileged anticipation.374 The space within that 
‘rectangle’ also includes our negotiating of a situation which is beyond our choosing and 
control but which we nonetheless have to take into account. The ‘allocative decisions’ 
discussed in the first and fourth chapters are in part decisions about how to go about this 
negotiation, the time and energy we devote to meeting the challenges set by those 
constraints. In being demanded in these ways both by our other involvements and various 
political/economic/social obligations, we develop certain skills and competencies that we 
need in order to meet them. For example, the parent who works in retail may have to 
balance a shift-pattern that changes weekly with the responsibilities of childcare, drawing 
on a wide network of relationships or money in order to do so. The private renter, as 
discussed above, develops adequate skills to keep a house in good order so as to avoid 
incurring the eviction notice of an impatient landlord in a market short on supply and rife 
with demand.  
Joseph Raz describes the competencies and skills we need to ‘move about’ in our 
societies as responsible agents as a necessary part of our ‘being in the world’.375 Raz paints 
a picture of individuals who find themselves in a world with which they need to develop 
familiarity. With this familiarity individuals grow confident in their dealings with that world, 
i.e. in the activities they perform as a means to secure certain of their ends and goods. As 
Raz puts it: ‘People develop skills that enable them to do many things with confidence that 
they will succeed, barring some extraordinary events like an earthquake or a seizure’.376 
The reference here to apparently natural or bodily (as opposed to social or economic) 
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catastrophes is really only incidental. The issue at stake is that when we move about in and 
engage with our surroundings, making the choices and decisions that go into the ends and 
strategies of our lives, we do so with an expectation of normality, of things going on as 
before and thus of our competencies remaining relevant to the activities and involvements 
with which we engage.377  
This has consequences for our confidence in ‘moving around’ within our chosen 
practice-relations (i.e. approximating the standards relevant to those practices) and beyond 
(i.e. in the wider-world within which such involvements are pursued). Such confidence is 
founded on an expectation of things going on as we have learned to deal with them. As Raz 
suggests: ‘we expect (the) outcome (of our activities) to depend on our skill and effort. We 
are aware that they too depend on factors over which we have little influence but take our 
skills in using and navigating around such factors to justify confidence that we will 
succeed’.378 These skills are learned and, what is more, become capacities that shape and 
guide our activity. Hubert Dreyfus sums up this point nicely: ‘Our skills have us rather than 
us having them’.379 We are, that is, in important ways defined by the skills that are required 
to move about in the world with confidence.  
Sennett also discusses the meaning work is able to have for workers in light of the 
skills they need to develop to be both confident and effective in their ‘movements’. These 
skills can be classified as either endogenous or exogenous. This means, like the skills of the 
craftsman, they can be embedded in the task and made specific to a given activity 
(endogenous). These are harder to translate into skills that could be used elsewhere in a 
variety of other kinds of work. Alternatively, there are skills which are dis-embedded in 
such a way that they can be valid in a variety of settings (exogenous).380 Exogenous skills 
allow us to ‘go elsewhere’, to withdraw ourselves from any specific milieu and ply our 
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efforts in different places and different trades. The tasks of any particular setting would not 
then draw on us in ways that render us vulnerable precisely because of the fluidity that it is 
possible to achieve in our actual skills and capacities themselves. In effect, the individual, at 
the level of skills employed in her dealings with the world, has imbibed the fluidity 
perceived around her and internalised its demands. Endogenous skills on the other hand, 
which are learned by being embedded in a concrete practice, make the individual 
vulnerable to the absence of the specific and concrete tasks with which she has involved 
herself. Removing a context which makes sense of those skills and their development is 
also the removal of the possibility for continued, confident and deeper involvement with a 
particular practice. Endogenous skills, then, are the skills of craftsmen learned by 
expending effort diligently.   
Confidence is tied up with the fact that as agents, we have a purpose which we 
have set and toward which we act and, in addition, a necessary handle on the means of 
getting there. In order to employ skills confidently individuals need a sense that what they 
do and have – the skills they employ, the capacities they possess – will move them toward 
their goals. Yet all this confidence, these skills, capacities and the role they play in defining 
(at least in part) who we are, are ultimately dependent on ‘normal conditions’ within which 
such skills are and will remain relevant.381 To return to the Tanizaki example, it was 
precisely the ending of a certain relation to the world and the skills needed to navigate that 
ceasing world which moved him to melancholy. The ‘fecundity’ of those options made 
possible by a culture he believed was disappearing were no longer available and it was this 
that plunged him into a sense of loss. He lacked the skills and had reduced confidence in 
moving about the world that remained. 
To remove that normality or perhaps even to merely threaten it, is thus to throw in 
doubt the confidence necessary to appropriate longer-term goals as our ends. 
Consequently, our choices are in an important and interesting way related to our 
confidence: if we choose and are confident in our competencies and in the normality and 
constancy of the situations within which we act – and thus in the continuing relevance of 
our competences and skills – we will have the opportunity to relate to those ends in a 
different way than when such confidence is absent. Where we sense or anticipate that the 
practices within which our competencies have thus far been developed may be removed 
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from our overarching conceptions of the good, the relation to ends will again be of a 
different nature.  
There is something myopic, from a strategic point of view, if we insist on investing 
ourselves in our involvements as if they were guaranteed to continue for a long time when 
the confidence we have in our ability to sustain those involvements is fragile.382 Temporary 
workers, as a less fantastical expression of experiences in the Quantum Leap scenario, who 
try to learn ‘deeply’ the skills specific to a profession they will have for only three weeks 
and which they know will be of little use beyond the three weeks, are failing to assess the 
demands their situation makes of them. The same could be said of the “baker” from the 
above example: what would be the point of beginning to learn the craft of bakery in such a 
setting? Confidence in the possibilities of depth in these instances would be misplaced, the 
result of misjudgements and misperceptions regarding the demands of their environment. 
That confidence needed to commit and skill oneself in the way I have used to describe the 
craftsman, the accumulative learning of concrete and specific skills, is not something that is 
necessarily, a priori attainable.  Confidence is likely to be better achieved and maintained 
by avoiding the demands of longer-term projects which serve as the foundation for the 
learning of those skills.   
Once again we are confronted with the deeply situated nature of the person. Our 
involvements grow out of and are defined by our involvement with the wider context and 
our familiarity with it. Of course, temporary workers can become familiar with their 
situation and thereby develop the kind of competencies necessary to move from 
occupation to occupation confidently and effectively: these are the exogenous skills 
individuals can learn. In this way both familiarity and confidence seem always to be within 
reach, even for the extreme fluidity of the Quantum Leap scenario. But what familiarity is a 
response to, i.e. what the situation demands of a person in order for them to be confident 
and ‘move about’ effectively, will inevitably impact on the kinds of involvements she 
chooses, the depths with which she can engage them and the narratives and identities she 
is able to build out of them. Different situations require different responses, narratives and 
identities in order for confidence to be gained and sustained.   
Using Resources 
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The question arises as to whether the issue of resources, the things employed in the design 
and fulfilment of ‘conceptions of the good’, can be so resolutely abstracted from the world 
within which their employment takes place. The ways in which we use resources will be 
greatly influenced not just by who owns what and how much of it they own (though of 
course these are important), but by the practices and patterns of activity that emerge from 
the answers a society gives to certain economic questions. Questions, for instance, that 
pertain to relations between capital and labour, financial regulation, the use and ownership 
of technology in industry, redistributive policies etc. Such answers will ultimately influence 
individuals’ lives, their relationships, commitments and identities, as they try to navigate 
the demands made of them by those particular systems. It is not just a matter of having 
sufficient resources to navigate the ins and outs of an environment so construed, as if it 
were all a matter of quantity. These resources are fed into and used in cultivating the 
specific competencies that people develop in response to the kinds of demands actual 
socio-economic situations make of them.  
For instance, as mentioned above in connection with the newfound possibilities 
and desire to shift whole factories across the world (Trotsky’s dream of mountains moving 
under the spell of human control now seeming to have been effectively accomplished), 
successful navigation may now necessitate and demand a ‘shallower’ relation to ends on 
the part of individual resource-users that was unnecessary prior to such technological 
capacity. It may mean that individuals who rely on this rather slippery type of factory in 
order to make their productive contribution have to hoard resources they earn in 
anticipation of particular catastrophes, employing them in specific ways that may help pre-
emptively limit the chaos of such happenings. Or it may mean the exact opposite, a 
loosening of all purse-strings in a veritable orgy of one’s current holdings with no mind on a 
future that seems beyond reasonable prediction and thus beyond studied care. 
It is precisely this concern with economic systems that was lacking from Rawls’ 
earlier work. When his concern is directed toward economic matters, it is mostly with 
questions pertaining to ‘what things are produced and by what means, who receives them 
and in return for which contributions and how large a fraction of social resources is 
devoted to saving and to the provision of public goods’.383 By focusing concern in these 
directions, there is a failure to understand i) the ways in which individuals work to accrue 
resources can affect the ways they use resources: lesser job security – because of flightier 
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and thus more exacting capital – may encourage certain attitudes vis-à-vis our resources, 
an aspect of owning resources that cannot be fully captured by reference to the amount 
we have; ii) how various institutional possibilities are affected by questions of who owns 
the means of production and the fluidity of the capital that underwrites the operation of 
those institutions.384 
Consequently, the ways in which Rawls characterises government's ability to act in 
this situation is also anachronistic (even within the confines of ideal theory). For instance, 
Rawls states ‘there is a divergence between private and social accounting that the market 
fails to register. One essential task of law and government is to institute necessary 
corrections’.385 But when such corrections would scare capital away and thereby undercut 
the very production of resources needed to make such corrections possible, i.e. through 
taxation, there emerges a paradox-laden dynamic that fundamentally undermines the 
government's ability to fulfil those tasks required of it by (Rawlsian) justice.386 Rawls 
focuses too narrowly on the individual ownership and quantity of resources. In so doing, he 
evades such questions as pertain to the world within which those goods are produced and, 
moreover, how navigation of those worlds, the skills and types of confidence this issues in, 
will necessarily impact on the quality and diversity of ‘conceptions of the good’ that are 
made available.  
Interestingly, the later Rawls (of Justice as Fairness) provides something of a means 
to correct this matter. He first stipulates, as one would expect, the primacy of the right ‘to 
hold and to have the exclusive use of personal property’ whilst remaining agnostic on the 
more developed claims to a right of property in i) natural resources and the means of 
production generally and ii) the equal right to participate in the control of natural resources 
and means of production. This agnosticism is based on the lack of primacy these two 
aspects have in the development of an individual’s fundamental moral capacities. However, 
these property rights may still be justified at the later ‘legislative stage’ depending ‘on the 
existing historical and social conditions’. 387  The focus remains firmly on resource 
distribution. But the reasons for this emphasis are tied up with resources’ utility for 
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individuals’ development of capacities needed for devising and pursuing diverse 
conceptions of the good. Therefore, questions of economic system and the rules of 
property that structure them are to be answered via reference to the types of life they 
make available, and to the kinds of capacities they develop within the individuals who are 
to set about assessing and choosing amongst these available options. Public ownership of 
the means of production is only one possible, alternative structural mechanism (depending 
on social, historical and economic conditions) that might enable the development of those 
fundamental moral capacities Rawls thinks so important.388    
My argument though is not that the kinds of fundamental competencies necessary 
for coping with the variety of demands posed by a ‘liquid modern’ situation are utterly 
unsuited for any kind of development/pursuit of a conception of the good. Rather, though 
such suitability might well be found for the development and pursuit of certain other 
‘conceptions of the good’, they are nonetheless poorly suited to the deeper practice 
engagements and ways of life characteristic of the craftsman.389  
*** 
 This chapter presents only one reading of current economic and social 
developments.  Without the time or space to get bogged down in hefty sociological or 
economic debates it is therefore necessary to provide something of a disclaimer. My 
intention has not been to provide all the evidence that would convince someone one way 
or the other that descriptions emphasising the fluidity of our current epoch are the correct 
interpretations. The evidence has been anecdotal at best. My intention has been to raise 
awareness that the competencies and skills which structure certain ways of ‘being-in-the-
world’ – in this chapter, the craftsman’s way – are not universally or a priori available. So 
while the emphasis on the liquidity of our socio-economic situation may be wrong in some 
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ways (or perhaps exaggerate its extent and ubiquity),390 what I hope to have highlighted is 
the manner in which our world always draws on us in specific ways, promoting certain 
attitudes to ourselves, our ends and to our environments. This is something that is often 
missed in the abstract reference to 'resources' and their use in 'the design of conceptions 
of the good'. The depth of identification and skill characteristic of the craftsman is not an 
ever-present way of life. It is profoundly dependent on an institutional situation that allows 
it.391 
The person-practice relations within which the skills of the craftsman are learned 
need to provide the individual with adequate security. The longer time-frame, and the 
stability that accompanies it, are crucial in allowing individuals to embrace the vulnerability 
that is a necessary part of the depth of engagement characteristic of craftsmen. 
Habituation to the standards of a practice and subjection to the authority of that practice is 
a risky business at all times: we are always prone to failure or open to some kinds of 
catastrophe. But this is made riskier when fundamental parts of our ontological security are 
placed under threat.   
With the importance of these person-practice relations in mind, the desire for 
stability and predictability is not a sign of weak will in the face of demands made of us by 
our social and economic situation. This accusation of weak-will is made, for instance, by 
Daniel McCabe when he suggests that ‘those made uncomfortable by the uncertainty, 
choice-making, and critical examination characteristic of autonomy, and who instead crave 
security, continuity, and structure may thus actively turn away from the ideal of self-
creation that… liberal society holds out to them’.392  Here we see opposed to one another 
the values of autonomy and those of continuity, structure and stability. The self-creation 
envisaged here is one that people seem to be able to perform through their holdings of 
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resources combined with sheer acts of will that are able to simultaneously make sense of 
their situations and render their lives meaningful. As I have been at pains to concede, 
people certainly can live valuable lives through sheer acts of will. Balzac's hero is an 
example of someone refusing to subject himself to any authority or process of habituation, 
any demand which seeks to fetter his drive for fluid self-creation. This is certainly one way 
of keeping all vulnerability to a minimum, floating beyond all involvements and their 
potentially painful gravity. But this is a very specific kind of value and one that cuts off a 
great deal of the deeper involvements available to individuals of more craftsman-like 
temperament.  
 Conclusion 
In the previous chapter I have described practice-dependence as an inescapable part of 
value. In order to take part in meaningful and valuable activity, involvement in practices is 
necessary. However, it is a matter of shade: there are people who engage deeply with a 
practice and there are others who dabble. Given the ‘non-renewable’, finite quality of our 
time and effort we cannot have it all. Depth precludes breadth and breadth precludes 
depth to at least some degree. The deeper we go into a practice and the more we explore 
the fecundity of a particular concrete option, the less time we have for other practice-
engagements. The more we spread ourselves over a great range of involvements, the less 
time and effort we have for the plumbing of depth.  
 The craftsman is a model of deep engagement. In this chapter I have explored 
some of the techniques and competencies that are characteristic of this mode of 
engagement. Craftsmen explore the depth of a practice and are thus made profoundly 
vulnerable. In addition, the depth to which craftsmen plunge cannot be isolated from all 
the other demands that are made of them. It is when we take these other demands into 
account alongside the different associations in which they involve individuals that we are 
able to appreciate the nature and quality of the craftsman’s vulnerability. What is more, 
the resources we employ in pursuit of our preferred ends, projects, causes and 
commitments are also drawn on in this other process of negotiation. Our time and energy 
are not free from the demandingness of our socio-economic involvements. If a person’s 
company is downsized and she has to find work elsewhere, her resources are similarly 
lifted out of that setting and are reemployed in another firm, amidst other people. This 
inevitably skills her in particular ways which again impact on the actual uses toward which 
her resources are put.     
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 The techniques and competencies that make up craftsmanship have to be married 
with other techniques and competencies that enable successful negotiation of other 
associations and involvements, some of which – like work for instance – are more or less 
compulsory. So, for example, where someone’s work might be a site for the kinds of depth I 
am describing it can also be privy to fluctuations within the market, changes in technology 
or to the organisation of the firm. Skills learned in dealing with this flux are not necessarily 
compatible with those which are needed for craftsmanship. Indeed, the former might make 
the latter incredibly difficult to fulfil.    
  Therefore, if depth of involvement is something we regard as important and the 
character of the craftsman as a figure worth protecting, we have to find a way to settle 
these conflicts in competencies. Of course, if we believe that the situation of flux is 
necessary and that this character is, at best, a regrettable sacrifice that has to be made in 
the name of, for example, economic efficiency, then the settling of these conflicts becomes 
irrelevant and unnecessary. In the same way that we should not pattern for distributions 
out of marketplace arrangements, we should also, this argument would suggest, reject 
patterns for the plurality of types of life such arrangements make available.  
In the next chapter I examine the ways in which one particular policy, 
Unconditional Basic Income (UBI), offers a possible way out of this problem. In addition, I 
argue UBI allows for the flourishing of another character identified in the course of this 
thesis: the agitator. I envisage UBI as a means of rendering citizens more secure and 
therefore more willing to become craftsmen and agitators. Competencies currently needed 
to remain flexible in a world demanding fluidity and shallowness will be less necessary in a 
community where UBI has been introduced. However, there are also other ways to frame 
UBI which concentrate on the ways a basic income can expand our freedom ‘to do what we 
want’. I find this a troublesome argument and make pains to distinguish my account from 
such a defence.  
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Unconditional Basic Income for Agitators and Craftsmen 
‘We take as basic that the human exists in a space of questions’.  
       Charles Taylor  
Two characters have emerged in the course of this thesis: agitators and craftsmen. Both 
characters are at risk in a world that fails to recognise their value and protect them. This 
chapter explores a policy that could protect both character types and make them more 
available to people. The policy is an unconditional basic income (UBI). UBI is a funding 
stream provided on a regular basis to all citizens of a community when they reach maturity. 
It remains constant throughout a person’s life and is provided independent of the uses to 
which it might be put and irrespective of moneys accrued elsewhere, for instance through 
employment, investment or savings. I envision UBI as a means to do two things. First, it will 
facilitate and enable (without making compulsory!) the kinds of depth I have been 
describing over the last couple of chapters. Second, it will furnish means for the struggles 
against injustice I described in the third chapter. 
Both characters represent different relations to authority. Craftsmen subject 
themselves both to the rules and standards that define their practices, and their craft’s 
expert purveyors – individuals most able to approximate the relevant standards of 
excellence. Agitators, on the other hand, offer a more defiant relationship to authority. 
They reject the authority of the subjective dimension implicit in the structure of reciprocity. 
They deny the decisiveness of demands for productive contribution in light of other 
demands made on them by on-going injustices in their communities. Agitators withdraw 
their efforts from productive contributions and ply them in activities that might disrupt 
contributions made by others. UBI is a means of funding and supporting these kinds of 
activity by assuring their more ready availability. 
These different relations to authority are not mutually incompatible: craftsmen can 
sometimes operate like agitators and agitators, to be effective, must operate like craftsmen. 
Once a craftsman reaches a certain level of expertise it is part of craftsmanship to challenge 
the status of the rules and standards definitive of the practice. For a practice to remain vital 
it must be periodically opened up to such challenges. This is especially true so far as we are 
concerned with membership of a practice. Many of the practices we have reason to value 
have been historically cut off to people because of their class, race or gender. Contesting 
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rules governing membership has been crucial in breaking a part this regressive and 
conservative tendency and widening possibilities for practice membership. 
Agitation is itself a craft. Techniques associated with civil disobedience, the 
discipline required for effective organisation and the tactics needed for everything from 
effective campus demonstrations to general strikes are all skills that are learned in the 
course of doing them. Such strategies are not invented from scratch but are developed by 
drawing on past examples, precedents of effective strategies and consulting with experts 
and those with experience. Moreover, such skills are not easy things to accomplish. 
Becoming an agitator obviously admits of degrees. There will be single cause agitators who 
see their involvement only as a means to an immediate end and/or in which they spend 
only limited time and effort agitating. However, others will involve themselves deeper with 
the practice and identify with agitation as a particularly valuable form of life.    
Finally, I offer a caveat to my advocacy for UBI. There are important changes 
happening to the way we work. We are arguably at a point in our historical development 
where work, at least in its 40 hour a week, full-time manifestation, is something a great 
many can live without. This has obvious benefits: reductions in working-time will mean we 
enjoy a greater freedom to do other things. However, we should be careful to retain some 
aspects of work – even as we might jettison the actual content – that are important to our 
political and ethical education. Work is a particularly salient instance of people subjecting 
themselves to an authority other than their own desires and preferences. Working with 
others to produce something for others are both important parts of people’s current 
ethical experience. Being obliged to work means we cannot merely ignore the presence 
and needs of others. These aspects of work are something we should be at pains to 
preserve, even though they might exist in tension with the tasks and aims of both 
craftsmen and agitators.         
Craftsmanship 
The security UBI achieves for its recipients is a feature that pervades the multiplicity of its 
different defences. This is a theme that can be dated back to the inception of the idea as 
proposed by Thomas Paine at the end of the 18th century.393 With this funding stream 
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guaranteed throughout their lives, individuals can extricate themselves from exploitative 
relationships (whether in the household or the workplace) and formulate both short and 
long-term plans, safe in the knowledge that these resources are constant. The funds thus 
facilitate the material independence of the person, draw a circle around her and protect 
her from the vagaries and inconstancies of life.394 In this way, UBI could have powerful 
effects on the possibilities of depth represented by craftsmen in the previous chapter.  
People who fully withdraw from employment or else take part-time instead of full-
time work as a result of receiving UBI will have a great deal more time and energy available 
to pursue their passion for painting, music, languages or sports whilst maintaining a decent 
standard of living. They can spend more time learning and approximating what is 
demanded of them if they want to attain to a level of advanced proficiency within their 
chosen practice. They have more time and energy to correct and improve their techniques 
on the advice of the expert purveyors who, in their turn and because of their own UBI, 
might be more available for transmission of their example to less advanced practitioners 
outside of the workplace. Overall, individuals are better equipped to produce 
performances indicative of excellence for the activities they end up doing.  
These performances need not relate to the more private examples of musical 
instruments and sports. UBI can also fund the pursuit of excellence when it is directed at 
serving the needs of the community. Freed from the need for employment, citizens might 
direct their energies toward responding to the needs of their community in different ways, 
ways they recognise as more responsive to need even if there is no wage attached. This can 
be anything from setting up community gardens, a local film festival, helping coach the 
local football team, visiting the infirm in hospital etc. The possibilities are vast. All these are 
also examples of practice engagements which can be engaged with to various depths. 
Where the market might not find the means to offer payment for such services, a UBI will 
fill the gap and enable individuals to participate in this kind of activity on a sustainable 
basis.395   
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This particular manifestation of craftsmanship is salient in light of possibly positive 
tendencies in the global economy to reduce the need for work: with increased capital and 
technological efficiency, less labour is needed to produce the same output. Thinkers such 
as Andre Gorz and Kathi Weeks have argued that UBI should be seen as enabling moves 
away from work as a primary involvement. Instead, UBI can take us toward a society where 
individuals are involved in a great multitude of associations and activity. This approach 
celebrates, in effect, the breadth represented by the dilettante in the fourth chapter.396 
Work, they argue, should be gradually and effectively abandoned as a demand we meet in 
the course of our daily lives.  
However, even this does not preclude the ethics and ambitions of craftsmen. It 
only shifts them into other arenas of life that have less to do with earning a wage. To 
borrow an example from the previous chapter, we can still engage with the craft of 
carpentry, explore its depth, complexity, and identify ourselves as carpenters who care 
deeply about that craft, without necessarily receiving payment for the work. With reduced 
pressure to find employment and then sustain employment, and vulnerability substantially 
mitigated, depth is made a livelier option. The breadth advocated by Gorz is just one 
dimension of plurality that UBI opens up for exploration: neither dimension obliges 
people’s involvement. However, UBI also has the potential to protect craftsmanship in the 
arena of employment as well. As a component of alleviating the proletarian condition, 
White’s emphasis on meaningful work could also be facilitated by an unconditional basic 
income.  
Depending on the size of the stipend, pooling unconditional basic income with 
fellow citizens can help convert it into a supplementary form of capital. This capital can 
then be used as start-up funds for worker led firms. In the United Kingdom such firms are 
rare.397 This rarity is partly explained by difficulties facing asset-poor workers to access 
credit markets. UBI performs a number of functions in improving this situation. When 
pooled, UBI acts directly as capital or as a guarantee for credit loans and can help fund the 
start-up costs required for sustainable cooperative organisations.398  Moreover, UBI is a 
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means of empowering citizens by providing them with an ever-present safety-net that can 
be drawn on during times of possibly experimental economic endeavour, in which firms 
explore new markets to which they can contribute. If a person fails in the endeavour to 
begin a worker-owned enterprise, she can use UBI (along with other savings perhaps) to 
sustain a reasonable standard of living and avoid the anxiety and precariousness currently 
associated with unemployment. 399  UBI thus supports an entrepreneurial function, 
mitigating the risks currently associated with economic ventures.400  
From the point of view of craftsmen, the worker-led enterprise has several 
advantages. When workers are in charge of the definition and distribution of work-related 
tasks it is up to them to decide the complexity and demandingness of the labour they 
perform.401 Both the definition and execution of work become a part of workers’ decisions. 
As a result of gaining this organisational responsibility, workers can alter current divisions 
of labour which focus on massively reducing the complexity of labour in order to allow 
easily monitored and automated activity – tactics employed to an extreme degree by 
Taylorist modes of organisation. Work can instead be arranged to allow for ‘the 
development and consolidation of particular technical, artisan, social, or organisational 
skills for the accomplishing of specialized ends’.402 Worker-led firms are thus better 
equipped to reduce the severity of the division between task-definition and task-execution 
since both are to be performed by the same people and are not fixed or guided by any 
hierarchical form of organisation, nor the imperatives belonging to one particular strata of 
a hierarchy.403 Workers are thus enabled to submit themselves to the authority of the 
practices with which they are involved, developing the capacities for effective performance 
of their work.  
More generally, UBI empowers people vis-à-vis their responses to the demands of 
social and economic life. In the absence of a safety net that is both constant and sufficiently 
generous, individuals are often forced into a bargaining position that lacks effective status. 
Accompanying the security of unencumbered and guaranteed resources is the ability to 
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stand up to those in power and renegotiate or even refuse the expectations surrounding 
their demands. In the workplace for example, UBI could see the effecting of real power on 
behalf of the worker. A greater parity could therefore be established between workers and 
their employers as basic income takes on the form of an individualised strike fund. In this 
way, even workers who do not wish to join worker-led enterprises can still see 
improvements to their working conditions following the introduction of UBI.404 In effect, 
this is similar to the creating of a space for developing the evaluative competence 
discussed in the second chapter: UBI becomes a means to create real opportunities for 
people who have traditionally suffered from an inability to stand back, re-examine and 
potentially adjust the direction their lives have taken.  
Beyond the issue of working or not working there is also the long-term planning a 
UBI facilitates. Where sources of income are insecure and impermanent it is harder to plan 
our future. Where we have security in our more basic functions we can afford to entertain 
other considerations like depth, long-term commitments and the rest. Our knowledge of 
the quantity and permanence of the UBI stream mitigates the vulnerability accompanying 
changes in employment status when work is the sole means of earning an income. With 
UBI present, work can remain (and even be embraced as) flexible, without having the 
devastating consequences on our ‘ontological security’ that currently accompany un-(and 
under)-employment. Depending on the range of jobs one does, flexible work might reduce 
the possibility of craftsmanship in the workplace: where skills are exogenous and ‘shallowly’ 
learned, the depth required for craftsmanship will be missing. But craftsmanship can still 
remain a possibility in other areas of life that have nothing to do with employment so long 
as the future can be effectively managed and predicted.405 
Basic Income and the Exploitation Objection 
As described in the third chapter, the time and efforts needed for political campaigning and 
agitation can collide with the demand for productive reciprocity. In so doing, such activity 
can be described as non-reciprocal: goods (the results of productive contributions) are 
recognised as goods and enjoyed by agitators but are not returned by sufficient 
productivity. An argument often made against UBI is that it institutes non-reciprocating and 
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exploitative relationships between workers and non-workers.406 UBI has to come from 
somewhere, and by allowing total withdrawal from employment it funds the merely 
feckless, idle or utterly self-involved to do whatever it is they please. However, while I 
believe the exploitation objection is valid it is not decisive. This is because there are other 
advantages that the institution of basic income could bring about which could be set off 
against the possibility of exploitation.    
There are two sets of reasons I consider that should make us wary of too easily 
labelling UBI a necessarily exploitative policy. As with many things, there are shades of grey 
to be explored and understood before jumping to the (admittedly intuitive) idea that UBI 
establishes in law an exploitative and/or parasitic relationship between workers and non-
workers. These arguments, respectively, fall into the following categories: balance of 
reasons in terms of fairness and the balance of reasons in terms of reciprocity.407 
First to the balance of fairness argument. Accepting that reciprocity can be 
breached after the introduction of UBI we can, in defending UBI, point to other gains that 
can be won in the name of other aspects of justice. Reciprocity is undermined but we take 
this loss on the chin for the sake of other potential gains. For example, the significant gains 
in terms of mitigating vulnerability or empowering workers in their struggles with 
employers to enforce fair treatment can be put beside the possibilities of reciprocity failure. 
Any move that raises the exploitation objection cannot rely on the metric of reciprocity as a 
decisive metric: it can only be an all things considered argument which takes these other 
gains into account.  
Second, and more interestingly, even within the concept of reciprocity there are 
gains that UBI can bring in its wake. For example, with UBI in place, women can be more 
demanding of their partners vis-à-vis the distribution of work within the household, 
without fear of the kinds of conflict that could lead to the termination of relationships 
which then expose them to considerable vulnerability.408 As a consequence, reciprocal 
efforts are here being initiated and secured through the introduction of a basic income. In a 
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similar vein, there is a great deal of work going on in the community (such as domestic and 
care work) which would be provided for, secured and even encouraged by a basic income. 
Payment for such work is recognition of the contribution it represents. And, as a final 
example, with people now having the option to work less in order to obtain sufficient 
resources for meaningful activity outside of work, lower working hours will allow other 
people into work and thereby answer the call to productive reciprocity.409 Taking as given 
those arguments that complain about the fact UBI provides for (possible) reciprocity failure, 
parasitism or exploitation, we can still find reasons, using those very same terms of 
argument, to see UBI as (tentatively) triumphant. 
 However, while these are defences for UBI in terms of productive reciprocity and 
other considerations regarding justice, they do not defend the agitator. Agitators cannot 
make the same arguments regarding reciprocity precisely because they deny the validity of 
the terms and currency which currently define what it means to be reciprocal, i.e. the 
subjective dimension of reciprocity. That is, they deny the authority of the demand for 
productive contributions. Of course, in hindsight agitators’ efforts can be justified according 
to the changes they produce in people’s exchange with each other. But until those results 
are won, they throw themselves open to charges of parasitism, however well-intentioned 
their efforts might be. Where for craftsmen basic income secures a situation wherein they 
can expend sufficient time and energy approximating standards definitive of excellence for 
that practice, agitators would do something different with their UBI. 
 Agitators challenge the current terms of exchange that define reciprocity, terms 
that specify what I must do in order to show you sufficient respect for the efforts you have 
made to produce for others. Their relationship to authority is necessarily combative. 
Although in the long-term such combativeness can be justified, to label them reciprocal in 
light of their explicitly rejecting the subjective dimension is to overlook an important aspect 
of reciprocity, i.e. that efforts returned for benefits enjoyed should be recognised as such 
by the producer of the original benefit. With the introduction of UBI, people involved in 
political campaigns can continue to benefit from the work performed by others –use of 
public infrastructure, education and healthcare as examples – just as the merely feckless 
and idle do. However, where the idle do not resist the authority of governments – where 
unconditionality is in place doing nothing breaks no laws or fouls no commitment – the 
agitator actively opposes the government’s authority, challenging the status of the laws 
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and policy that protect the current way of doing things. Disrupting work, throwing up road-
blocks, creating public disturbances are designed to interrupt and make difficult the normal 
course of business. The authority of reciprocal relations are not just being denied but are 
also subverted and made more costly for others.410 Where craftsmen need time to adjust to 
the authority of their practice, agitators need time to develop the skills that challenge 
authority and the status quo that authority resides over. 
Republican advocacy of UBI is founded on the independence it provides to the 
recipient.411 UBI creates a ‘protected position’ and empowers the individual against 
exploitation. Where before exploitation at work or in personal relationships might have 
been accepted as the best possible option, UBI initiates a better worse option than would 
have been previously enjoyed.412 There are various ways to use this protected position: one 
can use it to return to school and retrain, leave a particular firm and look for other work, 
finish a relationship that has become abusive or unrewarding, or else take a secondment to 
participate in more local community work. The security UBI provides is thus used as a 
means of expanding citizens’ range of available options and their freedom to choose 
between them.  
 This ‘protected position’ is also a means of preserving the disruptive functions of 
the agitator. Disruption is always at the expense of a certain kind of reciprocal effort, 
whether of people doing the agitating (who can’t work while they campaign) or those 
whose productive efforts are being interrupted. Effort that would otherwise be spent in 
sustaining contributory practices is being denied to other contributing agents regardless of 
what many of those contributing agents make of that decision. Instead, the effort of the 
agitator goes, for example, into organising strikes, i.e. the refusal of involvement with a 
given set of working practices until certain demands are met. Those other productive 
agents might, subjectively, reject the reasonableness of their demands, seeing them as 
contrary to the spirit of reciprocity and demanding too much from others. Furthermore, 
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they may resent paying taxes that contribute to public goods that these people continue to 
enjoy in the absence of productive labour.  
Philip Pettit discusses the denial of freedom that follows on from some agent (or 
set of agents) possessing the means and rights to ‘invigilate’ an agents’ behaviour, ‘with a 
view to interfering when necessary’. Excessively invasive monitoring and censure of agents 
would not survive the institution of ‘protected positions’ provided by guaranteed and 
secure resources.413 In being free from the threat of such invigilation, agitation and radical 
social/political/economic movements become all the more available as possibilities. As a 
corollary of these individually supplied resources, collectivities are also simultaneously 
empowered. Workers that were previously divided by fear of a loss of livelihood would no 
longer be exposed to the same degree of vulnerability. They can more securely and 
confidently stand in solidarity with their colleagues and comrades throughout their shared 
struggles for fairer conditions. UBI would thereby become part of the process to ‘develop 
practices and institutions that multiply occasions for our exercise of powers of resistance 
and reconstruction’.414  
Without UBI, agitators might have to accept the likelihood of significant losses 
before deciding to engage in agitation. Going on strike usually involves drawing on one’s 
savings and/or accessing a union’s strike fund, both of which will eventually run out.415 
However, where basic income is instituted these losses do not weigh so heavily and the 
risks of agitation are therefore significantly mitigated. Of course, as stated above, this does 
allow for exploitation. Individuals will perhaps agitate more frequently and their demands 
will be considered by contributing others as too high. Or else they will not work at all and 
cease making demands altogether.416 This is undoubtedly a risk of UBI: we remove the 
sword of Damocles and the individual who was once obliged by necessity now escapes that 
compulsion. The costs of agitation currently in place are, some might argue, necessary to 
make sure that it is not a decision taken too lightly, that the heat of righteous indignation 
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and sense of injustice must be accompanied by significant material sacrifice to ensure a 
modicum of responsibility. To have it otherwise is to have everyone become or call 
themselves an agitator and there is thus no possibility for the sustaining of productive 
exchange and stable social practices of any variety, just or otherwise.   
However, people who suffer most from injustice and have the most reason to want 
to change current practices and institutions often lack sufficient assets to make their needs 
felt by those in authority. Consider the effects borne by poor Americans as a consequence 
of systemic changes that have occurred in industrial cities across the country since the 
1960s.417 Deindustrialisation, under investment in federal housing programmes, refusal of 
bank credit to landlords seeking to improve their housing, mass migration to the suburbs, a 
shortage of employment in poor areas and chronically underfunded public transport have 
all conspired to make it increasingly difficult for residents of many urban districts to secure 
a minimum standard of living or find employment.418 The work that there is has moved out 
to the suburbs, so those without the means to leave the ghettos have to rely on a car (itself 
expensive to buy and run) or public transport, often requiring several changes meaning 
commuters have to get up several hours before work begins. 
Are these reasonable demands for the residents of poor areas to meet?419 In order 
to contribute and reciprocate, individuals in these ghettos have to find employment, 
navigating all these different factors while doing so. As a side-effect of so contributing and 
of successfully navigating those factors, they also serve to sustain such practices, plying 
their efforts into producing goods and services even though they endure a great deal in 
doing so. To withdraw their labours, to refuse to search for employment because the 
demands are too high is seen by some as the action of a parasite, willing to live on the 
efforts of others. And yet their circumstances do seem fairly obvious instantiations of 
White’s proletarian condition and might, indeed, qualify as ‘substantial (enough a) harm’ to 
warrant total withdrawal from productive obligations.  This refusal and the activism it leads 
to can therefore, potentially at least, be legitimated by the absence of the meeting of those 
thresholds White describes in chapter 3.  
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But how is this legitimate refusal (if we can describe it as such) to be made 
sustainable? As things currently stand, such a refusal means the ending of the possibility of 
an income sufficient to meet a basic standard of living (unless the individual turns to 
‘deviant’ behaviour’.420 This is hardly sustainable – the American justice system is evidence 
to that effect).421 An unconditional basic income, however, could be seen to have just this 
sustaining function. Not then as a means to sustain the practico-inertia of the current ways 
of doing things but rather as the means to sustain the refusal to implicate oneself in such a 
situation, to break out of that inertia and bring new demands to the table. It is thus a twist 
on the subjective dimension implicit to reciprocity discussed in chapter 3. I may benefit 
from your contributions to some degree; from the taxes you pay you contribute to the 
provision of services that I use, to public goods, a UBI and to the production of goods I can 
(limitedly) purchase at the marketplace. But I do not return that effort until I see certain 
thresholds of fairness have been satisfied: acting thus I reject your right to demand 
contributory effort from me. It is thus a way of keeping constantly open to challenge the 
fairness of the exchanges between us and of interrogating the prior relationships that 
frame our exchanges with one another. When Rawls says ‘unjust social arrangements are 
themselves a kind of extortion, even violence, and consent to them does not bind’ he 
seems to be allowing for just this refusal to sustain (and thus of a right to sustain refusal).422  
The disruptions to contemporary social practices that have gone on throughout 
history have also, necessarily, been refusals to ply effort into institutions then existing. 
Effort that was spent in campaigns, agitation and sabotage was effort that had been 
withdrawn from its sustaining functions. Agitators refused to accept that a terminating, 
authoritative point had been reached by which the justice of exchanges could be assessed 
and judgement passed. These refusals were long fought battles, often in the teeth of fierce 
opposition phrased precisely in terms of the reciprocating effort they thought they were 
owed and which were being denied them by disruptive agitators.423 Basic income, as a 
protector of this agitating space (and with the caveat of the risks identified), ensures that 
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we are never in a position to pronounce that practices currently being sustained by our 
reciprocating efforts have no need for disruption or sustained challenge. 
Of course there might be times when the agitation and the demands made by 
agitators are misguided.424 In such circumstances these agents will, to some extent at least, 
not only be exploiting contributing others (by not reciprocating their efforts) they will also, 
perhaps, be exploiting those with whom they share associations and who are considered 
comrades and fellow-sufferers.425 Such moves of agitation are likely to be best served in 
cooperation and continued deliberation with these others rather than as individuals.426 
When agitation is misguided, or when it collapses into simple free-riding idleness, it 
displays an undoubted disrespect to the subjective assessments made by others regarding 
what they are owed in the name of democratic mutual regard. I have been arguing that 
given the distance between our current state of affairs and a substantially just situation, 
other people’s assessments and demands for productive contribution may be wrong: 
withdrawal from the sustaining of current practices is therefore justified. But this is not 
always the case. It is therefore necessary to exercise this power after careful deliberation 
and discussion with others who share one’s situation (alongside those making claims that 
they are owed) as a means to avoid these problems.427    
Cross-Purposes 
This last point about the responsibilities associated with agitation reveals a point of mutual 
compatibility between agitators and craftsmen. They both have a lot to learn from one 
another regarding their different relations to authority. The craftsman submits himself to 
both the standards of a practice and to the expert purveyors of that practice. This 
asymmetrical relationship gives standards and the experts who interpret them a great deal 
of power over the practitioners. However, it is not a power that enjoys incontestable status. 
Indeed, a great deal of progress has occurred precisely because the experts and standards 
have been contested, challenged and, after protracted battles, overturned.  
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 This contestability is not exactly like the work of the agitator. Agitation, as I have 
been developing it, refers specifically to denying the authority of demands for productive 
reciprocal contribution. However, there is something similar in the attitude of contestation 
that produces changes in the meaning and relevance of practice-activity and the 
membership of a practice. Progress in the practice of science, for example, has often 
required ‘heretical’ practitioners to go against the authority of elders (both scientific and 
religious) and the paradigms to which they referred their activity and which made sense of 
their work.428 Art as well has changed as a result of challenges to the established 
techniques and meaning of what art is supposed to be and do.429 What counts as 
excellence and as definitive of good practice is not fixed for all eternity. The standards and 
expectations definitive of practices are often the result of painful evolution and great 
contestation. At the less epoch-changing level, ‘students’ can, when versed enough in their 
practices, come to challenge their teachers and demand more of them by way of 
explanation and justification for doing things one way rather than another.  
 There is also the more strictly political contestation in which craftsman can engage 
to expand the membership of a practice. There have been long struggles fought for 
underprivileged people, oppressed minorities and genders to gain access to various 
practices. Experts and the standards they approximate should not be the prerogative of any 
particular part of a population. Certainly, advantage often means that only small sections of 
a population have genuine access to particular practices. But this is due to lack of financial 
resources as opposed to dearth in native ability. Indeed, in order to ensure that potentially 
very talented members of a community are not held back by their lack of money and thus 
ensure the health of a practice, it is necessary for practices and their institutions to open 
their ranks to as diverse and abundant a source of talent as possible.430 To do otherwise is 
to risk leaving the standards of excellence under-approximated and under-developed, 
stagnating by being overly populated by people sharing only very similar experiences.431 If 
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all literature had been written exclusively by privileged, white men, it would never have 
been able to entertain, inspire and provoke in the way it has.   
Conversely, agitators are exemplars of craftsmanship. Agitation is not an effortless 
capacity that simply emerges as a consequence of recognising or suffering injustice. Indeed, 
suffering a great deal of injustice can often stand in the way of learning and adopting the 
best way of opposing it. Trade unions have, historically, been a great space within which to 
learn the art of political campaigning. They exposed their members to the arsenal of tools 
at their disposal and the solidarity and discipline on which the use of such tools relied. 
Where unions have shrunk from public life other associations have had (or, more probably, 
will have) to emerge to replace or reenergize them. Tactics and strategies have to change, 
incorporating responses to new developments in the demographics and demands of their 
membership and the challenges being confronted: agitation is thus an evolving craft. For 
example, the contemporary Occupy movement uses strategies similar to the lock-ins 
employed by unionists, inhabiting particular spaces of high-visibility or public use as a way 
of raising their complaints.432 Such agitation also needs to develop complementary means 
to articulate demands in as democratic a way as possible. All these are challenges that are 
met by skills, learned on the street, in the workplace, the family and, sometimes perhaps, 
the school.  
Solidarity is necessary for effective agitation. Without solidarity between members 
of a community experiencing injustice, UBI will not be as effective a means for agitating 
against the structures and perpetrators of injustice. Tommie Shelby’s description of 
solidarity is useful as a way of highlighting the practical aspects of this concept.433 Shelby 
highlights five dimensions that are crucial for developing solidarity: identification with the 
group; special concern (‘a disposition to assist and comfort those with whom one 
identifies’); shared values or goals, and loyalty and mutual trust. With the possible 
exception of the first, these aspects of solidarity are more than merely passive expressions. 
They are defined by demands and norms that constitute what it means to be solidaristic. 
They are standards, in other words, that must be met with practical activity.  
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When someone is in need, for example, the expression of special concern implies 
we are in a position for that person to approach us and ask for assistance. This involves 
publicity of some kind, letting our fellow-members know we have such concern and are 
capable enough to assist. Shared goals and values, where they are not readily apparent, 
require articulation in order to be properly identified with. This is itself a complex process 
fraught with difficulty and potentially fierce disagreement. After articulation, values and 
goals also require translating into effective demands that can be brought to bear against 
those in power. Beyond the tasks of articulation, it is also a job for effective leaders in such 
movements to ‘first champion this turbulent insurgency and then channel it into a set of 
well-consolidated laws, institutions, and bargaining arrangements that can last a 
generation or more’.434  This is all skilful work borne out of (something like) the practice 
sessions described in the last chapter. 
In order to be loyal one must develop a sense of what that means, i.e. precisely 
what one is being loyal to. Identification with a group is thus a reference point against 
which we come to understand to whom and to what we are being loyal and how we can 
‘live’ that loyalty in our day to day realities. Moreover, mutual trust must be earned 
through concerted effort and activity. Where such activity is lacking so too is evidence 
enough to express that I am one who can be trusted: there is no obvious foundation from 
which trust can grow. The development of solidarity is the development of practical skills 
which are further necessary (if not sufficient) for effective agitation. It therefore requires a 
craftsman-like dedication to the demands and excellences of solidarity, as well as efficacy 
in the use of other tools that are a part of agitation.435   
 The consequences of unconditionality 
My defence of basic income is consequentialist. Should UBI prove to produce more 
craftsmen and agitators I believe these count in favour of such a policy. Why then do I 
advocate unconditionality? Why do I not advocate a basic income with conditions attached 
for it to be used in ways that encourage craftsmanship and agitation? This should be 
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straight-forward in the case of agitators: the protected position necessary for effective 
agitation is curtailed when states can fix it to some kind of demand for contribution that 
they define. Agitation cannot be so pre-determined precisely because it aims at challenging 
both the standards of what is to count as contribution and the authority of those in 
positions of power to define and designate contributive activity. It is thus unsuited to the 
rigidity of bureaucratic rules and enforcement. 
However, there are also advantages in unconditionality for the craftsman. First, as 
it pertains to craftsmanship at work: in order to be able to withdraw one’s labour from 
work one finds meaningless and unfulfilling and which thus admits of no possibility for 
depth or complexity, a person must be able to refuse certain employment. The protected 
position provided by unconditionality means that one can more easily leave undignified 
work knowing full well that another source of income cannot be disrupted.436 Moreover, in 
the same way that the agitator refers their efforts to standards that are not shared by 
everyone, the craftsman can use his skills to contribute in ways he and members of his 
community deem effective without having to refer it to the market or some bureaucratic 
definition of contribution or craftsman-like depth.437 In this way UBI might encourage more 
informal ‘gift relations’ between people, a form of exchange that can supplement or even 
replace the ‘cash-nexus’ economy which currently defines so much of our cooperative 
activity. When their more basic needs are covered, people no longer need to pursue 
additional wealth for material gain and can do (craftsman-like) work, should they so wish, 
for other reasons.438 Deeper participation in producing for this gift relation is also made 
possible by UBI.                
Having said all that, challenges remain. I frame unconditionality according to the 
consequences it produces. There are other ways to support unconditionality that do not 
promote the same set of consequences. That is, they retain the focus on consequences 
produced by UBI but they emphasise an alternative set of them. First, UBI can be defended 
as a means of expanding liberal neutrality, blocking the state’s ability to impose and 
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enforce people’s preferences. In the same way as it is deemed inappropriate for 
governments to decide what religions we follow, the people we marry or hobbies we enjoy, 
the unconditionality of basic income means involuntary employment is eliminated: no 
longer do we have to work if we do not like it because what we do not like we can just 
leave behind. We only work because we want to and an unconditional basic income is a 
way of ensuring that. 
This, for example, is Philippe Van Parijs’ motivation and is captured by his third 
condition of a truly free society: ‘each person has the greatest possible opportunity to do 
whatever she might want to do’. This approach opposes the minimal perfectionism of my 
position. Where I ground the value of UBI in particular lives it makes available and which 
we have reason to value, expanded neutrality, on the other hand, is a way of leaving all 
such questions alone: it cashes out the benefits of UBI in the way it reduces, if not 
eliminates, all those parts of our life that we do not experience as voluntary. It thus flattens 
out our experience of the activities with which we are involved: the quality of all our 
involvements become voluntary in nature.  
A second possible defence of the unconditional of a basic income is on the 
pragmatic grounds that it reduces administrative costs associated with means-tested 
payment. So we might in fact prefer to have an element of conditionality but the costs, 
practical difficulties and intrusiveness of instituting the necessary bureaucracy make 
unconditionality the fall back position.439 Thirdly, and as an aspect of the intrusiveness of 
administration, unconditionality can be seen as eliminating the shame and low self-respect 
that accompany having to answering the prying personal questions of a bureaucracy 
attempting to expose the extent of a person’s incapacity.440 Fourth, we can institute 
unconditionality so that nothing anyone does can jeopardise their right to the 
opportunities and goods made possible by a basic income, thereby acting as an expression 
of community solidarity with its members.441  
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A final reason to institute an unconditional basic income is that it is made 
necessary by massive changes in the economy that have occurred over the last century or 
so. A great deal of work has been automated and appropriated by machinery. As a 
consequence, workers are not only much less involved with their work there is also simply 
less work to do. UBI is a way of reforming welfare systems to better meet people’s complex 
contemporary needs in light of these changes. With the increasing efficiency of machinery, 
much (if not most) productive labour is reduced to menial tasks, supervision and the 
maintenance of machines becomes the primary task.442 In such an environment, work can 
only be experienced as a burden to be lessened and never as a craft to be rescued from the 
clutches of technological development.443  
From this perspective, a basic income is necessary to civilise this process. Rather 
than baulk against this trend of deskilled labour we should seek rather to complete it, to 
take that simplifying process as far as we are able in all types of work and then to share out 
any residual labour in as egalitarian and just a fashion as possible.444 A basic income is a 
necessary redistributive mechanism because massive reductions in work mean there are 
fewer opportunities for people to find gainful employment and earn enough money to 
support themselves and their families.445 Basic income thus breaks up the connection 
between wages and income. Work might cease to be an arena within which the complex 
practice-engagements that are characteristic of craftsmen can remain a lively possibility. 
But, so this view has it, this is more than recompensed by the other possibilities opened up 
outside of our labours.446 UBI is a way of facilitating this move toward a society that would 
be dismissive of work as we currently conceive it.  
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This reduction in work, following Marx, is another way of reducing the time we 
spend in the ‘sphere of necessity’ and thereby enhances our freedom. 447 This is importantly 
different to the above freedom from involuntary employment. This alternative position is 
not that it allows some people to choose unemployment while others fill the gaps with 
their particularly strong preferences for work. Rather, it requires a concerted collective 
effort to massively reduce all work for all people. Preferences for work are thus cut off at 
the source since there is significantly less work available for people to prefer and no 
occupations with which they can identify and by which they can define themselves. The 
question ‘what do you do for a living?’ which seems so inescapable a part of our culture, 
will no longer make sense.  
However, despite differences in the specific ways it affects our sense of necessity 
or the involuntary, enormous reductions in work produce the same levelling effect in our 
ethical experiences that accompany the expanded liberal neutrality described above.  
When all work is taken out of our hands and denied to our cooperative efforts we no longer 
experience our involvement with one another in the same way: it is no longer necessary 
that we come together in order to produce the goods we consume. In a situation of liberal 
neutrality, preferences for work mean that it is no longer experienced as involuntary. 
Massive reductions in work also mean that no work is experienced as involuntary precisely 
because there is no work to do. This is a huge shift away from the forms of current (adult) 
sociality which, for a great many people, will to a limited extent at least, take place in the 
workplace. The elimination of such work will also mean the elimination of this necessary 
sociality. The objective demandingness of social life has ceased. Our mutual participation 
with one another can only be the consequence of voluntary engagement.  
We can practically distinguish different dimensions of unconditionality. So, for 
instance, we retain the advantages of the third and fourth dimensions above (non-
invasiveness; expressive solidarity) whilst exploring ways of mitigating the ‘flattening’ 
effects of liberal neutrality at other points in the institutional arrangements. Instead of 
                                                          
447
 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 3 (A New Abridgement) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) p 470. 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (London: University of Chicago Press, 1998) esp. Chapter II. 
While I follow Hannah Arendt in her definition of necessity, I do not follow her into the more refined 
distinctions between work and freedom. Work is specifically that which we perform in order to build 
a durable world in which to live- it still occupies the realm of necessity and is designed to facilitate a 
move into public, away from necessity and toward freedom (it liberates but does not make us free). 
For Arendt, freedom involves engaging in the public realm of action where we join others to speak 
and act together embracing the plurality and individuality of each and every participant and is thus 
very different from freedom as I am understanding it here.   
199 
 
regarding the gains achieved by unconditionality in terms of hugely expanding the realm of 
things we might like to do and reducing all sense of the involuntary, we see its gains in 
terms of security, bureaucratic simplicity or as an expression of communal solidarity. 
Everyone would therefore be entitled to the basic income but in schools, culture and in 
society more generally we might try to counteract the possible excesses brought about by 
the a priori neutrality that is a natural (but, on this view, unfortunate) concomitant of 
unconditionality. It comes down to whether we wish to institute this expanded liberal 
neutrality alongside the other goods a UBI might facilitate. What, ultimately, are the terms 
with which we wish to frame the introduction and purposes of UBI? And, if I envisage UBI 
as a means of protecting agitators and craftsmen, is it likely that a consequence of 
expanded liberal neutrality will be this protection? 
Senses of Necessity 
So long as work remains an engagement we have to take part in if we are to enjoy a 
reasonable standard of living, what we wish to do with our time and energy will have to 
take that obligation into account. Necessity is a many layered concept.448 First there is the 
idea of necessity as it refers to all the work that has to be done for the community to go on. 
This is not a fixed notion: ideas of what constitutes socially necessary labour change over 
time. For instance, the socially necessary labour – including its ‘rational regulation’449 – 
required to sustain today’s advanced economy and the greatly expanded set of needs and 
desires that inform it is considerable. If we wish to sustain these needs and desires, this 
kind of necessity cannot be reduced per se because the more things we want the more has 
to be done to satisfy that want. But what can be achieved is a delegation of such labour to 
machinery and increased efficiency in the use of such technology. The work gets done then 
but by something else that it is not (yet!) human. This idea of necessary labour thus 
includes work that is performed by machinery. 
The second level of necessity refers to the people engaged in labour. It can be split 
into a further couple of categories. The first of these is the labour that is the necessary 
counterpart to that variety of labour, signalled above, already delegated to advancing 
technological capacity. Technology has yet to completely supersede our capacities and so 
there remain gaps, sometimes quite extensive, which we fill with our own time and efforts. 
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The service and creative sectors require human involvement at least at this stage of our 
development. The second category is labour that it is necessary for the individual to 
perform in order for her to receive compensation sufficient enough to sustain a reasonable 
standard of living and satisfy her basic needs. As things stand, without the income provided 
by work it is very difficult to attain even a modicum of good living. Such labour is thus 
necessary from the subjective point of view. By guaranteeing income even for the 
unemployed, UBI reduces the impact of this subjective kind of necessity. However, the 
quantity of labour performed by advanced technology to meet our expanding needs might 
continually increase. Indeed, such advanced technology might come to take over more and 
more of currently human labour.450 
 Finally, and at something of a tangent from the above, we can talk about the ‘inner’ 
necessity associated with labour. This refers to the (controversial) Marxist notion of 
species-being, or some other essentialist understanding of human nature and its relation to 
productive labour. Briefly, we have an idea of what it is to be human. This includes a desire 
to see in our productive labours a primary reason for living, a central and axiomatic practice 
within which to develop our capacities, creativity and inherent nature from which we are, 
under capitalism, presently alienated.451 With the advent of communism we create the 
means by which work takes on these characteristics and through which we are finally able 
to develop that inner, bedrock human sense of what is necessary for us to live meaningful 
lives. 
The last of these is the most controversial but seems implicit in any defence of UBI 
that retains a view of the good of community but does not take into account the habits, 
socialisation and inculcation that is necessary to achieve any kind of substantive, patterned 
human behaviour. There seems to operate the optimistic idea that once we liberate 
ourselves from the other kinds of ‘objective’ necessity we are, at root, the kinds of people 
who simply come together to work. Necessity is here re-appropriated as an entirely 
internal and subjective phenomenon without recourse or appeal to the disciplining effect 
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of actual objective necessity. We can therefore, in an unproblematic and costless way, 
reduce our involvement with the demands of work without concern for the wider 
implications vis-à-vis our relations to other people. 
Socialisation and education would also be needed to bring about what Van Parijs 
himself calls ‘solidaristic patriotism’ and ‘pride in the collective project’ of which citizens of 
a UBI-instituting community would be a part. 452 But this seems to introduce some serious 
tensions into the concept of liberal neutrality: freedom is expanded this far but only on 
condition that we bring about these kinds of sentiments, habits, visions of the good and 
accompanying actions. How is this solidaristic patriotism to be encouraged in light of the 
voluntariness that Van Parijs would like to see characteristic of all our endeavours and 
associations?    
Van Parijs is not helped on this score by one of his proposed sources of UBI: 
employment rents. These rents consist of resources accrued by the employed simply 
because they are employed and not through any additional effort on their part.453 A portion 
of the wealth/goods/resources created by a productive community and that are not owned 
by anyone are, according to Van Parijs, owed to its members regardless of their 
contributions to that product. 454  Legitimate reciprocity and appeals to things like 
‘solidaristic patriotism’, on this account, can only be appealed to after workers’ 
monopolising effects have been counteracted and the basic income has been distributed. 
Otherwise what we are demanding is something more than reciprocity.455 In other words, 
UBI is supplied to everyone to prevent its being accrued by people who have done nothing 
to deserve it. The supply of basic income is not something that we recognise as obliging us 
in any way: we are owed it. The stipulation that any obligation (such as that required for 
Van Parijs’ ‘solidaristic patriotism’) follows on from that requires an additional argument, 
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precisely that which is lacking when all our associations are to be thought of as valuable 
only insofar as they are voluntary.  
By making these distinctions in necessity we reveal the different ways in which it 
informs our understanding of work. When an inner sense of necessity is said to survive the 
end to objective necessity it is an empirical claim that is being made. But what reason do 
we have to believe that this will be the case? Having delegated all work to machinery or 
making all employment voluntary we also reduce a sense of our being needed to work. Can 
we be so comfortably assured that some essential part of who and what we are will 
generate sufficient sociality for a thriving community and public life?456 Might we not 
conceivably translate freedom from the compulsion of necessity into isolating ourselves 
from one another as much as is possible, enjoying the private realm of family and friends at 
the cost of wider public involvement?457  
Of course, this desire for isolation is entirely consistent with expanded liberal 
neutrality: UBI opens up the possibilities for whatever it is we might want to do. Should a 
vibrant public and community life vanish along with the craftsmen and agitators I hope to 
see protected, then these are just the consequences of ‘real’ freedom. But why should 
freedom (and a particular version of freedom at that) have such a monopoly on the reasons 
we have for instituting UBI? There are other concerns, such as the protection of particularly 
valuable forms of life, which can motivate our advocacy. Again, this need not issue in 
enforceable conditions. Nevertheless, there are other ways to promote and protect 
valuable options without the threat of sanction or the denial of benefit.    
Socialising without Enforcement 
The unconditionality of UBI and liberal neutrality are separable. Indeed, we could have a 
very substantive perfectionism still linked to an unconditional basic income. We would still 
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provide funds to everyone but would load our society with schemes of socialisation, public 
schemes and particular incentives and funds which would produce particular constraints 
and limitations. For instance, when Carole Pateman recommends UBI as a way of 
encouraging citizenry reflection on the structural interrelationships that characterise 
contemporary society, giving individuals the space to leave and/or challenge those 
relationships, it becomes animated by an agenda of politicisation and democratisation 
rather than the ‘real’ freedom of Van Parijs’ ‘real’ libertarianism.458 We could have UBI in a 
situation which still regards Van Parijs’ Malibu surfers enjoying the goods of social 
cooperation without contributing any of their efforts as worthy of collective censure 
precisely because they do not use UBI for its intended (though unenforced) purpose.459  It is 
precisely this censure which liberal neutrality seeks to eliminate. 
Depending on how seriously we take the unconditionality of a basic income and 
how deeply we allow it to pervade our institutions, there also arises the question of the 
norms and processes of socialisation that would have to accompany neutrality expanded to 
include reference to preferences for work. If we really wish to make work a choice, a large 
accompanying cultural shift will have to be produced. It cannot just be a matter of grafting 
an expanded sense of liberal neutrality onto current ways of life drenched as they are with 
non-neutral work ethics of all denominations. For ‘real’ freedom to be instituted individuals 
must have as wide a field of options as possible. Where the demand to contribute is 
retained as an aspect of our cultural environment, even if it is not enforced, the involuntary 
nature of such contributions, the sense that we must contribute in spite of what our 
preferences might be, can still remain.460 
If liberal neutrality is to be an aspect embedded in our cultures it has to be taught 
somewhere. It cannot be merely transplanted into our current situation after it absorbs 
employment into its remit. If freedom is made ‘real’ and we are to regard the capable and 
lazy as doing what they have a right to do, then this is a necessary part of its institution. To 
neglect the educative needs of a population is to allow the current scorn for such people to 
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continue unaffected and remain as obstacles to freedom.461 The oppositional terms to 
words like ‘courage’ and ‘hard-work’ would no longer be allowed to carry the weight they 
once did and this would unavoidably throw new light on what we mean when employing 
them. Doctors and teachers could still be seen as ‘courageous’ and ‘hard-working’. But we 
can no longer chastise those who, though capable of becoming doctors and teachers, put in 
no effort whatsoever and contribute nothing to the collective good and yet cannot be 
labelled ‘cowardly’ or ‘lazy’.462  
With the ‘expanded neutrality’ defence of UBI nothing replaces work as an activity 
with which we necessarily engage, as something that cannot be avoided as a sine qua non 
of community membership. Work and all other demands to contribute can be, if one so 
wishes, forgotten as organising questions of life. Our life will continue to be surrounded by 
questions pertaining to what we want to do and who we want to be. This, as Charles Taylor 
suggests in the opening epigram, is part of the human condition. But the quality of those 
questions is no longer of a kind that admits of the unavoidability and necessity descriptive 
of work. Work can still be engaged with as a valuable activity and association. Or, where 
work is massively reduced, other forms of contribution can be made. But such activity can 
only be conceived of as consequent to desires and preferences and not as a necessity or 
ethical demand we must answer either in the form of reciprocal productive contribution or 
agitation. What we are surrounded by are questions we voluntarily assume.  
This involves a diminution of our ethical experience: where before we had a 
plurality of experiences, seeing some things as necessary and other things as voluntary, all 
our involvements are now collapsed into the latter. Work, religion, political and social 
involvement all take on the shape and feel of voluntary associations. Where association or 
involvement are experienced as involuntary UBI fails to perform its primary function of 
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expanding the realm of what we want and desire to do. In so doing, these associations lose 
a part of their formative quality.463 
I also accept of course that stipulating the value of certain kinds of life over others 
because they include this appeal to necessity is itself a curb on a plurality of different ways 
of life. I am suggesting that UBI should be framed by an understanding that housewives, 
agitators and volunteers are doing something more valuable than people who only surf – 
even if those surfers are, in a broad sense, craftsmen. However, I agree with White that the 
principle of liberal neutrality – and the plurality it might entail – can still be checked by 
other considerations such as reciprocity.464 It is only that I do not believe it is legitimate to 
articulate the demand to contribute solely in terms of productivity. First, because of 
reduction in the amount of work available for people to do and the difficulty this 
introduces for everyone to contribute in that particular way.465 And second because of the 
limitations such demands could impose on other forms of contribution, in particular that 
performed by activists and agitators.   
In a situation of expanded liberal neutrality people will not be entirely without a 
sense of the demands of authority. When people take part in valuable practices, subjection 
to the standards of that practice will still be required in order for performances to be 
considered even minimally good. However, such performances will derive their motivation 
from an exclusively internal sense of necessity. This has to be sufficient since other 
demands, to contribute for example, are lacking. In effect, the kind of subjection I argue is 
also valuable is a sense of obligation to others that cannot be derived solely from our 
preferences. Work is one particular way for this obligation to be made manifest.  
There are two separable senses of subjection. The first, emblematic of the 
craftsman, is subjection to authority of the practice. Subjection is a quality of the craftsman 
and, by extension, the agitator qua craftsman. Indeed, White’s description of reciprocal 
productive contribution involves subjection to a particularly authoritative demand: that of 
other cooperating members of a productive community. I have not denied the relevance of 
such a demand. I only made the case that the authority of such a demand exists in 
considerable tension with other demands, to which we submit in other ways. Agitation 
remains bound by the suffering of oneself and one’s fellow sufferers, as well as the causes 
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for which one fights. At work, craftsmen refer their activity both to the standards of their 
respective crafts and, insofar as their work will be purchased in the market or employed for 
public service, to the demands of the public.   
The second sense of subjection is that which is, currently at least, emblematic of 
the worker qua worker (and not qua craftsman). This is subjection to the demand to find 
work because there is an enforceable obligation that people do so: where people do not 
fulfil this demand and there is no reason to excuse it, income is denied. While the depth 
plunged by craftsmen may be assisted and complemented by the subjection that workers 
experience, this is an empirical point that may prove untrue.It is not a coincidence that 
craftsmanship and work have often gone hand in hand with one another: by being under 
the pressures of necessity to work for long periods of time a great deal of expertise can – 
when circumstances are favourable – be developed in the course of a career.  
My concern is that without something to replace the sense of objective obligation 
that accompanies the current necessity of having to work, the other forms of subjection 
characteristic of craftsmanship will be harder to inculcate when the expansion of neutrality 
is considered as utterly costless. But craftsmanship might survive the absence of this 
second kind of subjection.  We may be able to sustain craftsman-like depth without having 
to endure the traditionally long hours spent at work and without the sense of necessity and 
enforceable obligation that previously characterised it. Voluntary involvements, when 
embraced with sufficient intensity, could conceivably still produce the depth of 
identification characteristic of craftsmen. 
Even with this possibility though, both aspects of subjection are worth retaining. 
For craftsmen, the first variety of subjection to the authority of practices opens up the 
deeper mattering of things. More generally though, a sense of the involuntariness of some 
of our engagements is important for sustaining a particular relation to our fellow citizens, 
one that is felt as prior to choice, as something to which we must attend, rather than as a 
merely voluntary engagement.   
Robert Heilbroner makes an interesting point when he discusses the definition of 
work and its relation to an idea of submission.466 Work has changed character since its 
beginnings. Technology, organisation and communications have all developed in such a 
way as to radically change what we mean by work as well as the quantity of it. However, 
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what remains as a constant through all the different manifestations of work is the fact that 
it ‘refers to activities undertaken in a social condition of submission – a condition that 
results from the inability of individuals to avail themselves directly of the resources they 
need’.467 This submission can refer to that which accompanies the production line: we 
cannot baulk against the rhythms and pace of the machines that dictate our movements 
and which render our activity little more than ‘dismembered gestures’. In short, we submit 
to the demands of the machine in order to perform effectively.  
However, there are also wider connotations associated with the idea of submission. 
In whatever way we work, for that work to make sense there is submission to what 
Heilbroner calls ‘social direction’: work, at least as we currently conceive it, is necessary 
because it is through work that the community sustains itself. As agitators make clear, such 
sustaining must also be disrupted for greater gains in the name of justice. But prior to such 
agitation is the community itself, sustained by the efforts of a great many people, 
producing goods and services for one another. As long as work exists as something to 
which we have to attend, we are not merely left to our own devices to do as we see fit. The 
obligation we feel to contribute in some way – whether through agitation, production or 
some other service – means we open up to interaction with others. The disciplining effect 
of this kind of subjection is not necessarily anathema to value in the way the production 
line might be.  
I am not suggesting that work is the only way in which we can experience 
obligation as prior to our preferences. Familial relations are also examples of such 
experiences. But work has been a historically effective way of inculcating in people a wider 
sense of doing things because they must be done rather than merely desired. When 
enormous reductions in necessary labour and the end to work as we know it are coupled 
with the expanded liberal neutrality described above, this produces consequences that 
should worry us. If our coming together is assumed as a good that will naturally occur 
without any force of circumstance, it relies on an essentialist notion of inherent human 
sociability that is not empirically verifiable for advanced society. It is an assumption that 
treats mutual involvement as something that simply occurs when the detritus of other 
(perhaps less edifying) involvements, like work, are removed from our collective lives. It 
assumes that once we step away from the daily labours which thrust us into a common 
space with one other, involvement in some cleaner, face-to-face variety inevitably takes 
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centre stage.468 Our mutual involvement will be the result of choice alone and the 
possibility to make that choice is all sociality needs to flourish.  
But if necessity and involuntary associations have the value I argue for them, how 
are they to be reinstated alongside the unconditionality of basic income? So long as our 
needs are sufficiently low we no longer have to work together. We can make do with a low 
income and restrain our consumption so that any extra cash accrued through work is more 
or less superfluous. With the same constrained consumption, there is no prerogative to 
agitate (at least for reasons of self-interest) since basic income covers our basic costs. 
When work is no longer necessary because of the unconditionality of basic income or 
because our wants can be met without cooperative productive endeavour, isn’t it precisely 
this notion of subjection to the demands of others which we lose? How can we inculcate a 
notion of the involuntary when we no longer enforce compliance through means-testing 
access to benefits and punishing individuals who refuse to perform in ways deemed 
appropriate? 
 Without the sense of necessity imposed by enforceable obligation it will ultimately 
have to be rooted in self-motivation. However, this sense of internal necessity can be a 
peculiarly strong form of conviction. Indeed, deeply committed agitators and craftsmen can 
both regard their actions as emblematic of what Frankfurt has described as ‘volitional 
necessity’. Frankfurt describes Martin Luther’s exclamation of ‘Here I stand, I can do no 
other’ – spoken as he posted his 95 theses on the church door in Wittenburg – as an 
example of someone moved by volitional necessity.469  There was nothing enforcing 
Luther’s sense of obligation, no condition that he was being made to meet. There was only 
the belief that this action was commanded of him by the strength of his convictions and it 
was by this that he felt both compelled and constrained.  
Again, I do not wish to suggest that only craftsmen (and agitators qua craftsmen) 
can experience this aspect of necessity, the sense of being drawn in a way that is different 
from simply desiring something. Certainly, the experience of necessity is itself gained 
alongside the learning of a craft: we begin with preferences that develop into conviction. 
What today I merely have a taste for, is tomorrow something definitive of a great deal that 
is important to me. But the submission which is a natural part of the depth involved in 
craftsmanship does expose craftsmen to rules and demands that cannot be treated as 
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merely volitional. In order to be a craftsman, certain activity has to be performed: that is, it 
is necessary.    
This is altogether too brief an account of what necessity and obligation can amount 
to in a society that no longer enforces a work obligation. Detailing the complex sociology of 
a situation where work is either made voluntary or massively reduced will require extensive 
study and is perhaps more suited to radical manifestos and blue-prints. I do not wish to 
attempt such a study here.470 However, by describing the plurality currently characteristic 
of our ethical and social experiences, we gain a sense of the difficulties we plausibly face if 
we eliminate the experience of commitments and associations as involuntary and thus as 
prior to our wants and desires.  
As a result of levelled ethical experiences, duties associated with citizenship might 
be harder to inculcate. We will occupy a society that takes seriously a version of liberal 
neutrality that does not attach any substantive or primary value to contributory effort of 
any kind.471 Expanded liberal neutrality make demandingness, necessity and duty harder 
habits and values to inculcate because these are notions that ride roughshod over 
neutrality, over that terrain of what we might want to do. The burdens assumed by citizens 
are regarded as volitional, voluntary and engaged with as possible components of the good 
life, to be measured against the other (equally valid so long as voluntarily held) conceptions 
of the good held by the playboy, the tourist or the couch potato. In this situation the 
community has ceased making demands of our resources and energies from the standpoint 
of duty or necessity. Our contributions, productive or otherwise, now occupy the same 
terrain as the holiday, consumption or some other source of challenge, pleasure or buzz 
and so must appeal in those terms: they are involvements in which we might spend time 
and energy but not necessarily so. As long as the unconditionality of UBI is cashed out in 
terms of greatly expanded liberal neutrality it must also take account of the norms and 
socialisation that would have to accompany it.472  
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Perhaps it is resistance to being pushed onto this terrain of the voluntary that has 
made certain trade unions sceptical of UBI. When work is made an optional extra, one 
possible component of the good life amongst many others, workers’ active involvement 
with struggles that emerge out of engagement with employers and capital more generally 
might considerably decline. In other words, agitation is made a less lively or vital a (possible) 
part of people’s activity within the workplace: the solidarity required between members of 
the working class is released from much of its meaning. Rather than staying on to fight 
collectively workers choose instead to look elsewhere or drop out altogether: the exercise 
of exit preferred over voice. Work and the terms of employment no longer establish a 
terrain upon which employers can be engaged with in a sustained way, a space of 
contestation where significant gains can be made so long as workers organise and stand 
together. Instead, employers can defer demands for wage increases back to the state and 
urge union representatives to negotiate with public bodies in order to increase UBI, 
effectively treating it as a wage subsidy and state-sponsored shock absorber.473   
Conclusion 
An unconditional basic income is a potentially effective means of protecting the two 
characters I have singled out of particular worth. With UBI, craftsmanship becomes a more 
readily available way of life. The discipline and long-term involvement necessary for the 
depth that is an important aspect of craftsmanship is made possible by the security of an 
income that is not tied to people’s employment status. Agitators are also funded by UBI. 
Citizens can press their employers and governments for potentially transformative 
initiatives whilst enjoying a guaranteed income that sustains a minimum standard of living 
to see them through their campaigns. What is more, UBI allows craftsmen to behave like 
agitators when the need arises and the agitator to act like a craftsman, learning the ropes 
of successful agitation and what needs to be done in order to ensure success. 
My support for basic income is not based primarily on the particular variety of 
freedom some have suggested it could offer individuals. I do not support the idea that basic 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Anderson, ‘Optional Freedoms’, Van Parijs, ed., What’s Wrong with a Free Lunch, pp. 70 – 74 argues 
much the same, saying that any transfer of resources must be done with an eye on protecting the 
‘particular’ freedoms we owe to one another- i.e. freedoms which protect the capabilities individuals 
need in order to function within a democratic state.  
473
See Yannick Vanderborght, ‘Why Trade Unions Oppose Basic Income’, 1:1 (2006) esp. pp. 7 & 9-11 
on the Belgian trade union situation where membership density is still relatively high and scepticism 
regarding UBI is especially strong. For advocacy of union advocacy of basic income see Guy Standing, 
‘Income Security: why unions should campaign for a basic income’, Transfer: European Review of 
Labour and Research, 4:4 (2004) pp.606 – 619. 
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income is of value because it allows us to do what we want. Work is important as an ethical 
experience in our lives because it involves referring to something other than our 
preferences. Changes in the economy that reduce possibilities to gain full-time 
employment should alter what we mean by work but not eliminate that aspect of it which 
refers to needs and wants beyond our own. There should remain a sense of things that we 
do because they need to be done. This sense of having to do things because we experience 
them as such is a notion of submission that is complementary to – and should be preserved 
alongside – the submission demanded of craftsmen.  
Involvements and relationships that are experienced as involuntary and necessary 
are an important part of our ethical lives. These experiences are unwittingly denigrated by 
both the position that wishes to expand liberal neutrality and the celebration of 
possibilities to massively reduce work. I am not necessarily suggesting that the skills and 
habits of craftsmen and agitators can only be learned in the workplace. Indeed, given my 
example of unemployed people in underprivileged areas of the United States possibly 
coming together to agitate, my approach requires the possibility for meaningful and 
craftsman-like associations beyond the workplace. But I do want to suggest that where 
work is no longer a large part of our socialisation, an aspect of our constitutions and 
identities, other mechanisms and spheres of association should be found to replace them 
in order for us to retain the habits and capacities necessary for preserving forms of life we 
have reason to value.  
This is particularly salient for the agitator. She is someone who refuses the demand 
of reciprocity, denying its authority over her actions. However, she can still gain a sense of 
other people’s demands by referring her agitation to the needs and worries of her 
comrades and fellow-sufferers and then positing proposals that either articulate their 
concerns or seek to meet their demands. In so referring her complaints she is responding 
both to the needs of others as well as to the demands of the craft of agitation. Historically, 
effective agitation has mostly been performed by groups and not by individuals. Indeed, to 
withdraw one’s labour without appeal to others is unlikely to count as a political act, 
lacking the numbers to act as an example of voice. It would be a simple act of exit, 
ineffectively communicating sentiments of dissent and discontent.       
This chapter has not only further articulated the perfectionism of my position, it 
has also argued against a policy that does not take this minimally perfectionist stance. 
Rather than advocate for UBI because it means individuals have more freedom to do 
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whatever it is they might want to do, I argue that any defence of basic income must attend 
to the types of socialisation it produces and the kinds of people it wishes to see populate 
society. Craftsmen and agitators are two particular characters we have reason to value and 
thus further reason to create environments suitable for developing the skills and capacities 
associated with them. However, they are not intended as an exhaustive list of valuable lives. 
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Conclusion 
 The objective of this thesis was to examine the concept of effort within political 
theory. While the thesis ends with a distributive proposal, my concern throughout has not 
been with traditionally distributive questions of who gets what and why. Indeed, the first 
two chapters signal my belief that these distributional concerns have only minimal 
relevance for matters relating to effort. Instead, I turn to various philosophies of action and 
value to inductively develop an account of what effort does for us, the ways in which we 
use it to create meaning and purpose in our lives. It is as a protection of the possibilities for 
particular kinds of meaning and effort that leads me to my final distributive 
recommendation.       
This distributive proposal is for an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). It is through 
UBI that the characters of craftsmen and agitators can be protected and encouraged. 
Craftsmen are exemplars of depth and complex involvement. UBI operates to mitigate the 
vulnerability that is a condition of craftsmanship, a condition currently exacerbated by 
contemporary economic demands. The security provided by a constant source of 
sufficiently high income separate from employment, creates the space necessary for the 
long-term planning that is a pre-requisite for depth both in and out of the workplace. UBI 
acts as a boon for the agitator by allowing strategic disengagement from exploitative 
practices and degrading activity. It can then precipitate possibilities for strategic re-
engagement with the terms of those practices and relations. Moreover, skills associated 
with agitation are made more available to be learned as a craft for those who so wish it. 
This proposal is the result of the inductive approach to effort I adopted in the 
second half of the thesis. I focused on the actual processes that occur when individuals 
make decisions regarding what they want to do with their finite time and energies. We use 
our effort to involve ourselves in practices and activity we have reason to value. This effort 
is disciplined by the standards and expectations which are definitive of what it means to 
produce a ‘good’ performance in that specific practice. 
The common thread across all three accounts considered in the first half of the 
thesis – effort as burden; effort as responsibility; effort as reciprocity – is their fashioning of 
a role for effort without attending to the actual complex subjective experiences of those 
whose effort is being expended. Instead, effort performs the role of a proxy. It is either that 
which creates costs and merits deserts; that for which we are in control and thus as the 
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sole justifier of inequality; or else it is that by which we express respect for our fellow 
citizens.  
Using effort as a proxy in this way means important contemporary economic and 
political tendencies have been overlooked. Although this has the potential to give the 
accounts I considered a quality of universal applicability because they can purport to be 
relevant as a template across all places and times, it also blinds them to possible 
consequences regarding changes to how we think of and use effort in our current situations. 
The option of depth that is the accompaniment to the concept of burden, for instance, is 
not recognised as being particularly vulnerable to deterioration in the current epoch.  
Burden is a complex notion that is insufficiently understood when it is collapsed 
into definitions of disutility and used as a way of determining deserts. The ‘non-renewable’ 
time and energy we expend in pursuit of things we have reason to value make it possible 
for our lives to go well but also for them to fail. By caring about something we suffer when 
the objects of our care suffer or no longer exist. The burdens we assume are thus tied up 
both with the value and meaning life is able to have for us, as well as with the vulnerability 
to failure to which such care exposes us. The way in which I develop George Sher’s notion 
of burden allows this vulnerability to be better understood, particularly in light of the 
current climate of increased flexibility and insecurity in the labour market and society more 
generally.  
It is through this appreciation of vulnerability and depth that the character of the 
craftsman emerges as both a fragile and valuable way of life. Vulnerability is the 
complement of depth: involving ourselves deeply with something is to increase the amount 
of time and energy we spend approximating and learning the standards of excellence 
associated with a specific practice. When we do this we open ourselves up to possibly 
intense loss when our involvement with that practice is ruptured for reasons beyond our 
control: where before we recognised value and purpose such disruption causes only a 
sense of loss and perhaps regret. To have avoided depth is to avoid vulnerability and thus 
exposure to such costs. UBI is a way of supporting craftsmanship by mitigating this 
vulnerability and therefore facilitating depth.  
The proxy of control is also an inappropriate concept with which to conflate effort. 
People have vastly different experiences of their own effort depending on the types of 
injustice they face and the challenges that these represent. The complexity of social 
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relations and the inequalities and unjust structures which influence how we live our lives 
do not leave some pristine, ‘sterile’ residual of effort beyond the vagaries of circumstance 
for which we can take ultimate responsibility. This involves an abstraction from the effects 
of injustice which distorts rather than clarifies its effects. In the fourth and fifth chapters I 
developed an account of a certain kind of injustice being wrought by tendencies in 
contemporary political economy. These injustices are the result of the ways in which 
current social and economic structures make it increasingly difficult for people to choose  
and enjoy particularly deep ‘conceptions of the good’ .    
From my discussion of reciprocity in the third chapter the character of the agitator 
emerged as someone who adopts a defiant stance against injustice. Agitators agitate 
instead of produce: agitation – and political activism more generally – is thus an alternative 
response to alternative obligations that arise in situations of injustice. By locating the ‘civic 
minimums’ as ideals to be approximated we are not necessarily given a sense of other 
urgent obligations which emerge when these ideals are a long way from being 
approximated, i.e. in the non-ideal and actual worlds. Stuart White suggests at various 
points that any distance from those ideal standards will result in a dialled down demand to 
contribute productively. Or, in the case of extreme injustices, like slavery, there is no 
obligation whatsoever. But there is something missing in this account about the qualitative 
changes that take place in our obligations depending on the justice of those background 
conditions. Changes can be wrought in our sense of what we owe others between 
situations where we do not regard the backgrounds shaping our interactions as sufficiently 
just but are not as yet confronting severe and life-threatening injustices.  
By finding the means to preserve agitation as an important part of political life, at 
least so long as we continue to experience significant injustice, my approach offers a bridge 
between the non-ideal and ideal worlds. We can continue to theorise about justice, what it 
looks like and what it demands. Through instituting UBI we invent a means by which we 
can more readily bring such questions out of the academic seminar and discussion group 
and into the daily life of politics. It is a way, in other words, of opening up a dialogue 
between the ideals we hope to approximate and the battles by which we can achieve them.               
This open dialogue is especially important in light of changes to our contemporary 
political and economic realities. New challenges have emerged as a consequence of these 
changes. The old welfare state and its presumption of 50 year long-term and stable careers 
is no longer either an attractive or feasible option for most people. The account of these 
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realities that I provide draws on a particular section of the sociological literature as a way of 
highlighting the increased vulnerability and risk to which individuals are exposed. Because 
people have to first and foremost navigate the insecurity characteristic of this epoch, they 
cannot as readily embrace the character-types I describe and defend.     
UBI is thus conceived as a preservative measure. I have not invented the characters 
of agitator and craftsmen. History and contemporary society provide us with examples of 
these kinds of people and the activities with which they engage. I have argued these are 
valuable ways of living – without claiming they possess a monopoly on valuable lives – and 
should be preserved in the names of plurality and the demands of justice. ‘Shallower’ 
practice-participation, involvement with practices which do not expose people to the 
vulnerability accompanying depth, should not be the only way in which our lives can go 
well. The deeper engagement characteristic of craftsmen should also be a viable option for 
people. Agitation is necessary for responding to the demands of justice. Rather than 
assume agitation must necessarily come with significant costs and sacrifice, we must find 
the means to preserve and democratise it as an activity, open it up to a wide variety of 
people from all walks of life. We owe a lot to agitators and we could do with some more of 
them. 
* 
In terms of the shortcomings of the thesis, the descriptions of the economy and 
contemporary society are admittedly unsystematic and even somewhat anecdotal. I have 
been unable, for reasons of space, to properly analyse and interrogate the various accounts 
of the modern economy and its tendencies vis-à-vis work and workers. However, this does 
not mean I have painted the modern economic and social environment as destructive of all 
values. I can perfectly accommodate the argument that the contemporary economy is an 
exciting, vibrant place to work for certain kinds of people. I have been at pains to avoid an 
image of the apocalypse, even though certain trends emerging since the recent financial 
crisis might seem to justify such a picture. My approach limits itself to the description of 
particular forms of life, valuable because of the deeper patterns of meaning and complexity 
that it engenders, which is becoming harder to sustain without undue risk or vulnerability 
on the part of the person.   
Moreover, I limit myself to saying that a specific valuable form of life is being 
negatively affected by the processes undergirding what Zygmunt Bauman has called ‘liquid 
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modernity’. My additional claim is that this is a valuable part of the plurality we should be 
able to enjoy. I oblige nobody to adopt the imperatives of the craftsman and the depth, 
care and long-termism that it implies. I am therefore making no claims about the necessary 
conditions of the good life. Rather, what I argue is that any society that has only one way of 
relating to the projects, commitments and causes that make up a person’s life, suffers from 
a certain flattening homogeneity that we should resist.  
It is against this homogeneity that I take an admittedly perfectionist stance. For 
those who reject that stance there has been, I admit, no knock-down argument in the 
preceding pages that could convince them otherwise. However, I have raised the stakes 
somewhat: those who reject the need for this dimension of plurality have to defend the 
homogeneity that I am describing as a consequence of an at least plausible description of 
our political economy. If certain distributions or institutional designs do produce this kind 
of undifferentiated flatness, however unintentionally, this move now has to be defended 
with consideration of the effects it has on possibilities for depth. The argument of the 
above thesis is therefore better stated as a conditional: if the description I supply is an 
accurate portrayal of either current or a coming state of affairs then the concerns I raise 
are important.  
Further work would thus have to attend to both these issues by providing, first, a 
more systematic analysis of the workings of the contemporary economy. This would also 
include a more detailed account of the relationship between the depth I identify as 
valuable and my final proposal of UBI, especially in light of the concerns I raise regarding 
the possibly different framings of such a policy. Second, further work could be done to 
provide a more detailed defence of the implications of the perfectionism of my position. 
Moreover, it is necessary to consider it alongside other accounts of perfectionism and 
distinguish their various implications and consequences.   
Finally, it is necessary to supplement the final chapter by giving a more systematic 
account of the socialisation necessary for protecting the characters of craftsmen and 
agitators where the stipulation and enforcement of conditions are unavailable. This would 
have to take into account the different ways in which certain behaviours can be promoted 
without the threat of legal or financial sanction or the force of necessity. Of course, censure 
currently attaches to idleness, both of the very wealthy and the poorer, and so this form of 
socialising would be in some ways a preservation of such an ethic, expanded to include the 
contributions made by agitators. Furthermore, the mastering of the complexity and skills 
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associated with the craftsman remains a draw for people even in the contemporary context. 
Again then, this is also an imperative of preservation and emphasis of tendencies already 
implicit in our social worlds, rather than an invention of such imperatives.  
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